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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SOCIAL-COGNITIVE ANTECEDENTS OF AMBIDEXTROUS ORIENTATION IN FAMILY-
OWNED STARTUPS: THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES, ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION, AND 
INTERNAL LOCUS OF CONTROL 
by 
Patricio Mori 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor K. Galen Kroeck, Major Professor 
Regulatory Focus Theory predicts that the motivation to self-regulate goal-directed 
thought and behavior depends on two distinct regulation strategies: a promotion focus based on 
attaining gains and a prevention focus based on avoiding losses.  
This study took a social-cognitive approach predicting that regulatory focus has an impact 
on how family startups (several family related founders) explore “new ideas”, exploit “old 
certainties” and achieve the balance of both (ambidexterity), compared to lone founder startups 
(only one founder present).  
It was proposed that the social context of family ties among founders leads them to a 
prevention focus concerned with avoiding the loss of the socio-emotional benefits of those ties. In 
order to avoid such a loss, family founders were expected to increase their risk perceptions and 
thus, explore less than lone founders, who lack such socio-emotional ties. It was also proposed 
that two commonly used psychological traits in entrepreneurship research --achievement 
motivation and internal locus of control, predispose entrepreneurs to a promotion focus. Founders 
with a promotion focus, in turn, were hypothesized to lead startups to more risk-seeking behaviors and to 
more explorative orientation. 
The previous argument was used as a springboard to derive hypotheses about 
ambidexterity (the ability to exploit and explore simultaneously) and survival hazards. Using 
Regulatory Focus Theory, exploitative orientation, conceptualized as the motivational strength to 
continue on previous paths of action, was hypothesized to be not significantly different from that 
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of lone founder startups. Taking previous arguments together, lone founder startups were 
hypothesized to be more ambidextrous than family startups. Finally, ambidexterity and internal 
locus of control were hypothesized to reduce survival hazards in family startups.  
The findings suggested that family startups explore less than lone founder startups even 
after controlling for group effects. Interesting but contradictory findings revealed that internal locus 
of control have both a positive direct effect and a positive interaction that increases the 
explorative and ambidextrous orientation gap of family startups over lone founder startups. As 
expected, ambidexterity and internal locus of control reduced survival hazards on family startups. 
Implications for practitioners were derived based on a sample of 470 nascent entrepreneurs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Nearly all supporters of a capitalistic model would agree that the encouragement of innovation is 
vital for the growth and long-term health of the economy (Schumpeter, 1961).  Astrachan, Zahra, 
and Sharma (2003) found that family businesses are internationally a key source of funding for 
new startups, promoting economic growth and technological progress (Chakrabarty, 2009). 
Although family entrepreneurial firms are important drivers for economic growth and technological 
progress, little is known about innovation processes in family-owned startups such as exploring 
new ideas versus exploiting current capabilities.  
 
Since the publication of March’s (1991) pioneering article, the terms “exploration” and 
“exploitation” have increasingly dominated organizational analyses of technological innovation, 
organizational design, organizational adaptation, organizational learning, competitive advantage 
and organizational survival (e.g., Benner & Tushman, 2003; Burgelman, 2002; Holmqvist, 2004; 
Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Lee, Lee, & Lee, 2003; McGrath, 2001; Sigglekow & Levinthal, 2003). 
Exploration, as a strategic action, is risk seeking behavior which relates to the attempt to explore 
new ideas, increase variance in profit outcomes and generate variety in firm activity (McGrath, 
2001). These strategies and actions include characteristics embodied by the creation of new 
markets and products, experimentation, frequent change, broad search and discovery (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002). Exploitation, in turn, consists of behaviors that maximize known capacities, such as 
exploiting an existing product or service. Exploitation requires motivational strength to commit to 
current courses of actions which results in persistence and perseverance. Characteristics 
embodied by exploitation include incremental rather than radical innovation, decrease in variance 
of profit outcomes, focus on implementation, refinement, routinization, local search and efficiency 
(March, 1991; Beckman, 2006; Miles & Snow, 1978).  
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Exploration and exploitation have both been found to be positively related to organizational 
performance and sales growth when strategically concurrent (He & Wong 2004; Lubatkin, Simsek 
& Veiga, 2006). March’s (1991) suggested that “organizational adaptation requires both 
exploitation and exploration to achieve persistent success” (1991: 205). Some studies have 
concluded that the answer lies in “ambidexterity” (e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2003, Tushman & 
O'Reilly, 1997, Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, Ancona, Goodman & Lawrence, 2001, Katila & Ahuja, 
2002, He & Wong, 2004; Lubatkin, Simsek, Ying & Vega 2006) or the organization’s ability to be 
able to exploit and explore simultaneously. However, because exploitation and exploration may 
stem from contradictory knowledge-processing capabilities (Floyd & Lane, 2000), there is a 
theoretical debate over the feasibility of achieving a balance between both and whether such 
simultaneous pursuits result in higher performance.  
 
This tension can lead firms to be trapped into either unconstrained exploration or excessive 
exploitation. Excessive exploitation can lead to a reinforcing loop by making attractive for firms to 
augment current capabilities even if the environment demands new ones, turning these core 
competencies into core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1995), organizational myopias or competency 
traps (Levitt & March, 1988).  Unbridled exploration, in turn, can lead to self-destruction because 
"... failure leads to search and change which lead to failure which leads to even more search, and 
so on" (He & Wong, 2004, p. 105).   
 
The main purpose of this study is to propose antecedents that help to understand how this 
balance of exploitation and exploration plays out in family startups. Since exploitation and 
exploration are both related to risk behaviors, this study analyzes what factors influence risk 
behaviors at the startup level taking a social cognitive perspective. This perspective follows 
recommendation from scholars to include these two dimensions to predict risky decision making 
processes (Higgins, 2002; Mischel & Shoda, 1998; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). The social context 
and the cognitions of a decision maker have been proposed as important antecedents of risk 
propensities and risk perceptions (Bryant & Dunford, 2008; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin & 
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Weingart, 1995). Social cognition is concerned with learning about what matters in the social 
world and, thereby, provides essential aspects of risk perceptions and risk propensities which 
underlie risk behaviors (Bryant & Dunford, 2008).  
 
Social cognitions are concerned with the fundamental motivation that drives people’s systematic 
thought and behavior in order to regulate their behaviors and achieve goals (Higgins, 2002). 
Specifically, the regulation focus (Higgins, 1997, 1998) is concerned with people’s motivations to 
accomplish aspirations (gains) or with procuring safety and maintaining responsibilities (avoiding 
losses) (Higgins, 1997, 1998). This study uses Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) as 
the major theoretical framework and proposes that these motivations affect the way founders 
approach their goals and their risk perceptions and propensities at the social and individual 
levels.   
  
Regulatory Focus Theory is a comprehensive framework in which external situations and 
individuals’ propensities are cues to activate a systematic self-regulation system. This regulation 
system controls to attain two end states: one aimed at positive states related to accomplishments, 
fulfilling aspirations and hopes, and the other aimed at avoiding undesired states by embracing 
safety, responsibility and security values (Higgins, 1997). Regulatory focus theory proposes that, 
in order to achieve these end states, decision makers develop certain strategies to regulate their 
behaviors, which become persistent over time. A promotion regulation focus leads to strategies 
aimed to attaining goals and aspirations and a preventive regulation focus leads to strategies 
aimed to attain safety and security.  
 
Regulatory focus can be activated by external situations -situational regulation, or by individual 
characteristics -chronic regulation (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004).   
 
This study applies the Regulatory focus framework to make predictions about exploration and the 
balance of exploration and exploitation in family startups, using the socio-emotional context of 
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family ties as situational regulation, and individual differences of the main founder as the chronic 
regulation. 
 
Explorative Orientation and Family Ties  
Exploration is a risk seeking behavior (March, 1991) and, as such, depends on risk propensities 
and risk perceptions of decision makers (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992, Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). In the 
case of startups, exploration refers to an orientation, rather than actual behaviors, which may not 
be yet observable at startup launch. Therefore, in this study, rather than exploration per se, which 
refers to the variability of outcomes and behaviors (March, 1991), exploration will be referred to 
as an explorative orientation, or the founder’s assessment of the importance of explorative 
behaviors and actions, such as targeting new markets, developing new products, being the first to 
achieve a competitive advantage, developing a new technology development, and the importance 
of patents (Benner & Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004).  
An explorative orientation is often challenging for family startups. Research on family top 
management teams (TMTs) engaged in new ventures points out that these TMTs lack the 
cognitive diversity, such as differences of opinions or new contributions of ideas, that new 
ventures with non-family TMTs tend to exhibit (e.g. Ensley and Pearson, 2005). Contrarily, new 
ventures with non-family TMTs often lack social interaction capacities, such as team cohesion, 
conflict resolution, and consensus capabilities that result from shared values and common 
experiences that new ventures with family TMTs tend to have (e.g. Knight, Pearce, Smith, Olian, 
Sims, & Smith, 1999). For example, Beckman (2006) found that entrepreneurial firms with strong 
social ties and common experiences provided shared understanding and consensus necessary 
for exploitative behaviors, but these ties also hindered discussion of alternative courses of action 
necessary for explorative actions.   
 
Moreover, recently, Gomez-Mejia, Tabacs Nickel, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, and Moyano-Fuentes 
(2007) suggested that family businesses are more risk averse because family owners tend to 
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protect their involvement in the business, which provides them with a psychological benefit 
equivalent to non-economic welfare, or “socio-emotional wealth” (SEW). Gomez–Mejia et al. 
(2007) argued that SEW was embedded in family ties among owners, which is the major 
distinction between family and non-family business (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005) and 
should, therefore, predict several organizational outcomes as compared to other ownership types 
that lack such ties (see Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & DeCastro, 2011 for a review). SEW was 
defined by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) as the non-economic factors embedded in family 
relationships among the owners such as altruism, sense of belongingness, identification and 
control (Berrone, Cruz & Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) applied a Behavioral 
Agency Model ---which is an adaptation of agency theory propositions but applied to a specific 
context- to predict risk behaviors in family owned firms. They found empirical evidence that family 
business founders were willing to take higher risks by accepting a higher probability of failure and 
below target level performance in order to avoid deviation from existing courses of actions which 
may challenge their already accrued SEW. 
Moreover, exploration, in the form of diversification strategy, has been shown to be negatively 
related to family owned business as compared to non-family owned businesses, both nationally 
and internationally, with a greater proportion of diversification in culturally close countries than in 
culturally distant countries (Gomez-Mejia, Makri & Larraza-Kintana, 2010).  
Similarly, Hills & Lumpkin and Singh (1997) found that solo entrepreneurs considered creativity 
more important than did networked entrepreneurs. Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester and Canella 
(2007) found that founders who lack family ties to other members (i.e.  lone founders) had faster 
rates of revenue growth, invested more in R&D, and were often more emotionally detached, 
diverse, and financially motivated (Miller et al. 2007) than firms with multiple family members in a 
Fortune 1000 sample.  They explained these findings based on the social context among family 
owners, which might have evoked familial attitudes and agendas.  
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In sum, previous research suggests that family founders’ ties involve socio-emotional factors, 
which influence founders’ risk behaviors by reducing variability in actions. Contrarily, lone 
founders, lacking such ties, tend to be more risk seeking, diverse and financially motivated. It is 
surprising, therefore, that the literature is mute about how family ties may affect the difference 
between family and lone founder startups in terms of explorative orientation. In order to shed light 
on this research gap, this study proposes that family ties have a direct effect on explorative 
orientation. Specifically, using Regulatory Focus Theory, it is argued that family ties have a 
situational “prevention” regulation focus which leads family startups to be less explorative than 
lone founder startups which lack such ties. 
 
Cognitions of the Main Founder and Explorative Orientation  
This study also focuses on the stable personal traits or attributes which provide predictive stability 
and are essential to a person’s potential for, and interest in, acting in an entrepreneurial way 
(Allport, 1937; Mischel, 1973). These attributes stem from cognitions formed by life experience 
either by interaction with the social context or genetic predisposition (Gaglio & Katz, 2001).  
 
Some Psychological traits have been related to entrepreneurial cognitions. Sitkin and Pablo 
(1992) predicted that an individual’s history outcomes influence risk propensities, which become 
activated chronically, independent of the situation. Sitkin and Weingart (1995) tested empirically 
that risk propensities have an effect on risk behaviors and also have an indirect effect through risk 
perceptions. Given the importance of psychological traits and their impact on risk perceptions and 
risk propensities, they can be viewed as important antecedents of explorative behaviors by main 
founders. 
 
In entrepreneurship research, many psychological characteristics have been studied such as risk 
taking propensity (Begley & Boyd, 1987), attitudes (Fraboni & Saltstone, 1990), and personality 
(Roberts, 1989), Need for Achievement (McClelland, 1990) and Locus of Control of 
Reinforcement (Rotter, 1966). From all these traits Need of Achievement and Internal Locus of 
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Control have been shown to have a significant value across several studies in predicting 
entrepreneurial behaviors (Johnson, 1990; Venkatapathy, 1984). Tang (2009), applying 
Regulation Focus Theory to entrepreneurial settings, found that for entrepreneurs in a promotion 
focus there was a significant empirical association between both achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control with Entrepreneurial Alertness -the ability to recognize opportunities that 
have yet to be recognized (Kirzner, 1973). This is consistent with studies about the importance of 
both constructs in opportunity recognition process, as shown by meta-analysis performed by 
Collins, Hanges and Locke (2004) regarding achievement motivations, and recent studies on 
locus of control performed by Kroeck, Reynolds and Bullough (2005).   
 
In entrepreneurial literature, McClelland (1961, 1965) was the first to suggest that the need of 
achievement promotes entrepreneurship and economic growth. After that, many researchers 
have studied the relationship of achievement motivation and entrepreneurial behaviors. A recent 
metanalysis suggests that there is in fact a positive association of achievement motivation and 
entrepreneurial behaviors (Collins et al 2004). Similarly, locus of Control has also been related to 
entrepreneurial behaviors. In particular, more internality in the scale of locus of control, or internal 
locus of control orientation, has been recently related to entrepreneurial behaviors (Hansmark, 
2003; Pandey & Tewary, 2011). Shapero (1975) was the first to propose that internals, or 
individuals who feel that they have some influence on the course of events in their life, are more 
likely to perceive that they have control over their destiny. Internals are also more self-reliant, 
independent, and compatible with entrepreneurial orientation (Pandey & Tewary, 2011) and new 
venture creation (Hansemark, 2003).  
 
This study suggests that a promotion regulation focus is likely to be activated by psychological 
attributes or traits that affect cognitive processes that maintain individuals’ goal-directed 
behaviors (i.e. achievement motivation) and the belief that individuals can have control over 
events in their life (i.e. internal locus of control orientation). Psychological traits are not fixed and 
depend on an individual’s previous history outcomes from life experiences, which become 
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schemas or mental models that are further activated by external situations (Higgins et al., 2001; 
Gaglio & Katz, 2001).  
 
Using Regulatory Focus Theory, it is argued that both achievement motivation and internal locus 
of control provide a chronic promotion related to the main founder’s individual characteristics. 
These individual characteristics refer to psychological traits of entrepreneurs related to both 
achievement motivation and internal locus of control. These psychological traits prompt cognitive 
biases in entrepreneurs. Several experiments suggest that a chronic promotion focus leads to 
risk-seeking behaviors and variability in actions (Crowe and Higgins, 1997; Sitkin & Weigart; 
1995, Friedman & Foster (2001); Liberman, Idson, Camacho & Higgins, 1999; Levine, Hiiggins &  
Choi, 2000; Hmieleski & Baron, 2008), which are also associated with internal locus of control 
and achievement motivations. It is proposed, therefore, that both achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control prompt a promotion regulation focus of the main founder, which, in turn, 
leads to variability in actions consistent with explorative orientations.  
  
Explorative Orientation Model 
In sum, applying Regulatory focus theory, a model is proposed in which both social context 
present in family ties and the cognitions of the main founder have an effect on explorative 
orientation.   
 
On the one hand, it is proposed that a preventive regulation focus can be activated by situational 
factors such as the SEW present in family ties, which prompts family owners to perceive more 
risks in losing their source of identification with the business and the family. This source of 
identification results in non-economic benefits related to positive affect such as altruism, control, 
belongingness , and a sense of purpose (Berrone et al.,  2012), which Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) 
labeled Socio-emotional Wealth or “affective endowments”. Therefore, the social context of family 
ties among founders should foster a situational regulation focus consistent with a preventive 
regulation focus in order to protect the loss of these endowments, which in turn reduces family 
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startups’ explorative orientation as compared with startups that lack these family ties (e.g. lone 
founder startups). 
 
On the other hand, personality traits of the main founder such as achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control tend to foster a chronic regulation consistent with a promotion focus. This 
promotion focus leads to increased risk propensities and to perception of fewer risks in a given 
situation (Sitkin & Pablo 1992, Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) consistent with explorative orientation. 
Moreover, it is expected that Achievement Motivation and Internal Locus of Control should 
moderate the relationship between family ties and Explorative Orientation. For high levels of 
those traits the gap in explorative orientation of family startups compared to lone founder startups 
should be reduced.  
 
Moreover, this study uses the previous propositions and a regulatory focus framework as 
springboard to make predictions about ambidextrous orientation and survival hazards during 
startup. 
 
Ambidextrous Orientation and Regulatory Focus Theory 
An ambidextrous firm has the ability to be able to exploit and explore simultaneously (He & Wong, 
2004, Tushman & O’Reilly,1996). Given that family startups are more challenged with exploration 
as compared to lone founder startups, this study poses the following research questions: Are 
family startups more or less ambidextrous than lone founder startups and if so, on what does it 
depend? Similar to the previous explorative orientation propositions, and according to Regulatory 
focus theory, it is suggested that the answer lies both in the social context and the psychological 
traits of the main founder.  
 
Organizational scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of simultaneously balancing 
seemingly contradictory tensions between exploration and exploitation, shifting from trade-off 
(either/or) to paradoxical (both/and) thinking (Bouchikhi, 1998; Earley & Gibson, 2002; Gresov & 
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Drazin, 1997; Koot, Sabelis, & Ybema, 1996; Lewis, 2000; Morgeson & Hoffman, 1999). 
Paradoxical thinking involves conceptualizing ambidextrous orientation as two interdependent 
constructs which can be simultaneously deployed in order to effectively respond to environmental 
changes. 
 
In this study, exploration and exploitation refer to orientations rather than actual behaviors as they 
may not be yet observable or completely deployed at startup.  As previously mentioned, 
exploration orientation refers to variability in actions and performance as reflected in the founder’s 
assessment of the importance of explorative behaviors and actions. In this study, it is also 
conceptualized that exploitative orientation, in turn, refers to the motivational strength that a main 
founder puts forward to commit to current courses of action. It refers to the effort and 
perseverance required to continue exploiting current courses of action such as exploiting current 
market domains, using existing technologies, improving existing products, and focusing on 
promotion and sales of existing products (Beckman, 2006; Miles & Snow, 1978).  
 
Since exploitation and exploration are two paradoxical constructs, it is possible to have all 
possible combinations of exploration and exploitation at any given moment. This means that if a 
firm is low in exploration (e.g. low variability in actions and outcomes) it can also be low in 
exploitation (e.g. low motivational strength). Moreover, as further discussed, exploitative 
orientation, conceptualized as motivational strength, can be related to accomplishment, 
aspirations and hopes to achieve gains (promotion focus), or to safety and responsibility to avoid 
a painful loss (preventive focus) (Higgins, 2000). Therefore, it is argued that exploitative 
orientation can be associated with either family startups or lone founder startups and no 
significant difference in exploitative orientation between them should be expected a priori. 
 
Following the logic of Regulatory Focus Theory, if family startups are less explorative than lone 
founder startups, and family and lone founder startups do not differ in exploitative orientation, it 
follows that the social context of family ties among founders should lead family startups to be less 
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explorative than lone founder startups. In sum, it is proposed that family startups would be less 
likely to be high in either exploitative or explorative orientation (i.e. ambidextrous orientation) than 
lone founder startups. 
 
Furthermore, under the tenets of Regulatory focus Theory, it is proposed that internal locus of 
control should lead to more ambidextrous orientation. Although achievement motivation is related 
to regulatory focus, classical theorists in achievement motivation (McCLelland, Atkinson, Clark, & 
Lowell, 1953; Murray, 1938; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger & Sears, 1944) argue achievement 
motivation may be oriented toward the attainment of success (e.g. promotion focus) or the 
avoiding of failure (e.g. prevention focus). Therefore, achievement motivation will not be included 
as predictor of ambidexterity as it can act hindering or fostering either exploration or exploitation 
depending on the reference point (e.g. gain or loss) and the regulatory focus activated.  
 
It is also proposed an interaction effect between the social context and the internal locus of 
control orientation of the main founder, such that high levels of internal locus of control orientation 
will reduce the difference in ambidextrous orientation as compared to lone founder startups.  
 
The previous antecedents of ambidextrous orientation are analyzed in relation to Survival 
Hazards in family startups 
 
Survival Hazards in Family Startups  
According to previous arguments, factors that influence survival hazards in family startups are 
analyzed in relation to survival hazards, that is, the probability that a family startup discontinue 
their attempts to startup a new firm. This study extends these findings to family startups analyzing 
the social cognitive effects on survival hazards. Specifically, this study uses Regulatory focus to 
analyze the effect of an ambidextrous organizational context and the internal locus of control of 
the main founder, on survival hazards on family startups. 
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Previous research on ambidexterity suggests that firms that are able to develop this dynamic 
capability earlier in time (Eisenhardt & Martin 2000) are more likely to have better performance 
(e.g. March, 1991). Studies on survival hazards on family business are just a few (exception 
being Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) with all the emphasis being placed on survival hazards in large 
public corporations. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) found that family businesses increased their 
performance hazards, by accepting a greater probability of failure (i.e. survival hazards) in order 
to protect the loss of their SEW. This study extends these findings to family startups and it is the 
first to propose a direct relationship between ambidexterity and the reduction in survival hazards 
in family startups. Specifically, it is suggested that family startups that have an ambidextrous 
orientation, that is, are willing to explore and exploit more simultaneously from inception, can be 
able to display the proper response according to environmental demands and decrease their 
survival hazards.  
 
Finally, the variables involved in ambidexterity hypotheses are proposed to also affect the 
probability of business failure, or survival hazard. In particular, according the social cognitive 
perspective of Regulatory Focus Theory, it is predicted that a main founder’s internal locus of 
control and the firm’s ambidextrous orientation, reduce survival hazards in family startups.  
 
Contributions  
As pointed out by De Carolis and Saparito (2006) the social context and the cognitions of 
decision makers have an important role in recognizing entrepreneurial opportunities in new 
ventures. Moreover, the sole focus on the individual entrepreneur as a determinant of 
entrepreneurial success has been criticized for over-personalizing, and has fallen out of favor 
(Low & MacMillan, 1988). Scholars have called for revisiting the psychology of the entrepreneur, 
and ask why, when faced with the same pieces of information, some entrepreneurs see 
opportunities whereas others do not (Venkataraman, 1997). Regulatory Focus Theory is 
consistent with this current trend in entrepreneurship research in emphasizing more process-
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oriented and contextual examinations of entrepreneurial processes by highlighting not only the 
role of psychological factors, but also the role of social factors on innovative activities.  
 
In all, this study attempts to contribute to answer what Shaver and Scott (1991) posed as salient 
psychological questions: how are market environments represented and interpreted in the mind of 
the entrepreneur such that opportunity identification occurs? How do these representations and 
interpretations differ from those of other market actors?   
 
In the following section a more detailed review of the literature on risk perception and its 
relationship with Regulatory Focus Theory is outlined. Then, the relationship between SEW and 
Regulatory focus Theory is discussed to further explain the effect of SEW on exploration. In the 
next section, the effects of the psychological traits of the main founder (i.e. internal locus of 
control orientation and achievement motivation) on explorative orientation are proposed. The 
following part uses the previous findings on explorative orientation to draw hypotheses about the 
effect of the social context and the internal locus of control orientation of the main founder on the 
ambidextrous orientation at the startup level. Finally, hypotheses are drawn related to the effect of 
ambidextrous orientation and internal locus of control orientation of the main founder on the 
survival hazards of family startups. Results are discussed and implications for practitioners are 
derived. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Identifying and selecting opportunities for new businesses are among the most important abilities 
of a successful entrepreneur (Stevenson et al., 1985). However, deciding whether an idea is an 
opportunity involves judgments made under conditions of uncertainty and complexity (Das & 
Teng, 1997; Allinson, Chell, & Hayes, 2000). These judgments have important consequences for 
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entrepreneurs because they can make the difference between successfully exploiting an 
opportunity, missing an opportunity that may have led to success or wasting resources in 
opportunities that lead to failure. Entrepreneurs, in order to make these judgments, have to make 
the best decision between exploiting an existing opportunity and continuing to explore different 
ideas. Risk perception, or the perception of whether an opportunity will turn into success, is at the 
core of this judgment. 
 
Startup firms face high environmental uncertainty and complexity which forces decision makers to 
use their perception to economize on bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1979). In this context an 
entrepreneur’s exhaustive decision making process is not likely to give any benefits compared 
with the costs of delaying a decision when entrepreneurs need to act quickly in order to exploit a 
brief window of opportunity (Busenitz & Lau, 1996). Moreover, in these conditions entrepreneurs 
do not have the cognitive capacity to process and remember large amount of information and 
they find themselves in new and unpredictable situations in which they lack historic trends, past 
performance or any other information that can reduce uncertainty at low costs (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997). Therefore, in an attempt to minimize cognitive effort, entrepreneurs use mental 
shortcuts or heuristics in conditions of uncertainty and complexity. 
 
It follows that entrepreneurs’ use of subjective perceptions should help them by simplifying their 
decision making process, (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985; Stevenson & 
Gumpert, 1985), act quickly, and be able to exploit a brief window of opportunities. This study 
argues that these perceptions are anchored in the way entrepreneurs motivate themselves to 
achieve certain goals or end states that are important for them, given their previous experiences 
and the situation that they face. The following section will describe in more detail how Regulatory 
Focus Theory fits as a theoretical framework with risk behaviors and explorative orientation 
propositions. 
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Regulatory Focus Theory and Risk Behaviors 
Regulatory Focus Theory has been proposed as a promising framework for entrepreneurship 
(Brockner, Higgins & Low, 2004) and used to predict risk perceptions and risk propensities  in 
risky decision making (Bryant & Dunford, 2008). Previous research suggests that regulatory focus 
has an impact on risky decision-making (Higgins, 2002), risky bias to saying “yes” or “no” 
(Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003), and a bias to overestimate or underestimate the probability of 
occurrence of an event (Kluger, Stephan, Ganzach, & Hershkovitz, 2004).  This study is the first 
to suggest that regulatory focus should also have an effect on the actual processing of 
information in terms of exploitation and ambidextrous orientation.  
 
Recently, the field of risk research has been redrawn by including concepts related to limited 
information and bounded rationality (Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004; Schwartz, 2002) rather than 
models based on rationality and expected probability outcome. Scholars, therefore, increasingly 
incorporate psychological and sociological factors into models of decision-making (Slovic, 2000a). 
Although previous studies have been prolific in analyzing the importance of risk perceptions for 
opportunity identification (e.g. Gaglio & Katz 2001), opportunity evaluation (e.g. Keh, Foo & Lim, 
2002) and new venture decisions (e.g. Forlani & Mullins, 2000), few studies have looked at the 
social cognitive antecedents of risk behaviors. This is surprising because risk behaviors depend 
on the dispositions and biases of the individual decision makers, the characteristics of the 
organizational context and the nature of the decision problem itself (Beach & Connolly, 2005, 
Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  
 
Regulation focus theory is concerned with both the social and the cognitive aspects in decision 
making processes as it relates to the fundamental concerns and motivations that guide self-
regulation, or the systematic process of thought and behaviors that guide individuals to set up 
their goals and steer toward the achievement of those goals (Boekaerts, Maes, & Karoly, 2005). 
Regulatory focus influences goal-directed thought and behavior through a promotion or a 
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preventive focus. The former motivation is on attaining gains whereas the latter motivation is on 
avoiding losses (Higgins, 1997).  
More fundamentally, Regulatory Focus Theory proposes that people regulate their behaviors to 
aim two distinct survival needs, such as nurturance (e.g. nourishment) and security needs (e.g. 
protection). A nurturing social regulation is concerned with promotion focus, which self-regulates 
in order to attain the presence and avoid the absence of positive outcomes and is concerned with 
advancements, aspirations, and accomplishments. A security social regulation is concerned with 
prevention focus which self-regulates in order to avoid the presence or absence of negative 
outcomes and is concerned with protection, safety and responsibilities (Higgins, 1997, 1998). 
 
At any given point in time, people can engage in self-regulation of their behaviors with a 
promotion or a prevention focus. In a prevention focus people’s security and safety needs 
motivates them to be in alignment with their ought-selves related to their sense of duty and 
responsibility, heightening the salience of potential losses rather than gains. In a promotion focus, 
instead, people’s advancement and growth needs motivates them to be in alignment with their 
ideal-selves related to accomplishments, wishes and hopes, heightening the salience of potential 
gains rather than losses. Therefore, Regulation Focus Theory, in bringing oneself into alignment 
with one’s desired end-states, highlights the salience of outcomes, increasing their felt presence 
over available stimuli. 
 
This study proposes that follows that entrepreneurs would be likely to frame a situation according 
to their motivation to achieve end states based on their future subjective image of the outcomes. 
It is expected that decision makers will make idiosyncratic trade-offs between perceived risk and 
rewards in their decision making process (Bazerman, 2001), which depend on how those 
decisions would make them feel in terms of the future image of the outcome or end states (e.g. 
pleasure or pain).  
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in their influential paper, formulated Prospect Theory to explain 
the effect of problem framing on risk behaviors. Prospect theory predicts that decision makers’ 
risk behaviors will vary depending on the framing of a situation in such a way that a positively 
framed situation (when the actual situation is preferred compared to other alternatives) leads to 
risk averse behaviors, whereas negatively framed situation (when the other alternatives are 
preferred compared to existing situation) leads to risk seeking behaviors. Although Prospect 
Theory doesn’t mention explicitly risk perception, framing depends on perceptions of reality. Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992), extending Prospect theory propositions, suggested that decision makers who 
are in favorable circumstances (positively framed situations) will perceive higher risk than is 
normatively appropriate (e.g. risk averse) because their focus is on potential losses rather than 
gains. Similarly, decision makers who are in unfavorable conditions (negatively framed situation) 
will perceive lower risk than is normatively appropriate (e.g. risk seeking) because their focus is 
on potential gains rather than losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  
 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) not only highlighted the role of the framing of situations in risk perception, 
but also included risk propensities at the individual level as an antecedent of both risk perception 
and risk behaviors. Sitkin and Pablo’s (1992) propositions were further tested empirically by Sitkin 
and Weingart (1995) and found overwhelming support for the effect of both risk perception and 
risk propensity on risky decision making behaviors. However, Sitkin and Weingart (1995) tested 
their hypotheses on a group of MBA students which may compromise the validity of the study to 
other populations such as entrepreneurs. Moreover, they manipulated problem framing by 
reading the subjects a passage highlighting the potential losses and gains of a case assignment, 
however, no attention was paid to which environmental conditions or which psychological 
characteristics of the main founder influenced the problem framing of the subjects.  This study 
attempts to make a contribution to risky decision making literature by applying the regulatory 
focus framework to analyze how the social context among founders, the psychological 
characteristics of the main founder and their interaction, influence explorative orientation, 
ambidextrous orientation and survival hazards. In the following section the social context 
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embedded in family ties among owners is analyzed using literature on SEW preservation (see 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011 for a review), and its relations to regulatory focus framework. 
 
Socio-Emotional Wealth in family startups and Preventive Regulation Strategy. 
Regulation strategies differ in 3 dimensions: 1) their underlying motives that individuals try to 
satisfy (achievement vs. safety needs) 2) the nature of the goals or end states that are important 
to people (oughts’ vs. ideal selves) and 3) the types of outcomes that are salient to people 
(Brockner, Higgins & Low, 2004). For example, for a person with a promotion regulation, the 
underlying motives are growth and advancement needs, the nature of the goals is to be able to 
align with the ideal self-guides and what is salient to them are the potential gains to be attained 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). For a person with a prevention regulation, the underlying motives are 
security  and safety needs, the nature of the goals is to be to aligned with their own ought self-
guides and what is salient to them are the potential losses to be avoided (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997). 
 
Hence, a prevention regulation strategy will help decision makers to attain safety and security 
whenever goals are consistent with ought-self guides and whenever those goals are salient for 
decision makers.  Likewise, a promotion regulation strategy will help decision makers to achieve 
aspirations whenever goals are consistent with advancement and growth and whenever those 
goals are salient for decision makers. This study proposes that family startups are more likely to 
use a preventive regulation strategy than lone founder startups due to the presence of socio-
emotional wealth within the family founders. 
 
Recently, family business research points out that non- economic factors embedded in family ties 
is pivotal to differentiate family from non-family business, and their differences in processes and 
outcomes (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) labeled these factors  “socio-
emotional wealth” (SEW), or “affective endowments”, to refer to  the non-economic factors 
embedded in family relationships among the owners such as altruism, sense of belongingness, 
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identification and control (see Berrone et al., 2012 for a review). These affective endowments 
represent a non-economic welfare, which is not reflected in economic value, and represent a 
source of satisfaction of affective needs (Gomez-Mejia et. al., 2007).  
Gomez-Mejia et al (2007) proposed a SEW model to test the impact of SEW in family businesses’ 
risk behaviors and survival hazards. In their empirical study, family businesses were three times 
more likely to refuse to join a cooperative of Spanish oil mills than non-family businesses, even if 
joining the cooperative reduced performance hazards and the probability of failure. The authors 
reasoned that these firms refused to join the cooperative to avoid losing their source of affective 
satisfaction represented by their involvement in their family business. These findings suggest that 
family startups may be constrained by the presence of affective endowments because family ties 
are salient for founders and thus need to be protected, which may lead them to be less 
explorative in order to avoid losing those endowments.  
 
Gomez-Mejia et al (2007) applied March and Shapira’s (1987) propositions regarding “critical 
performance targets” or the targets that are salient and require decision makers’ attention. March 
and Shapira’s study suggested that managers are quiet insensitive to estimates of probable 
outcome, and rely, instead, on targets that are important or salient for them under conditions of 
uncertainty: survival targets and/or performance targets. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) argued that in 
family businesses, survival targets are more prevalent than performance targets because the 
operation of the family business already represents a non-economic utility already accrued and 
that they can count on, which represent an “affective endowment” for the family owners. These 
endowments gives family founders a sense of purpose, continuity and socio-emotional wealth 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Therefore, losing those already accrued endowments would prompt 
decision makers to focus their attention on potential losses rather than potential gains. For non- 
family businesses, which lack affective endowments, in turn, the pursuit of performance targets 
would be more salient than the concern with survival and losing affective endowments. 
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Regulatory Focus Theory shares many similarities with March and Shapira’s (1987) and Gomez-
Mejia et al.’s (2007) studies. A promotion focus is consistent with aiming a performance target, 
and a preventive focus is consistent with aiming a survival target. A salient performance target is 
perceived as important for decision makers with a promotion regulation because performance 
targets motivate them to use eagerness to attain achievement and aspirations (Higgins 1997). 
Conversely, a salient survival target is perceived as important for decision makers when survival 
targets motivate them to use vigilance to avoid a painful state (Higgins, 1997). Therefore, Socio-
emotional wealth (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) can help family founders to frame a situation as a 
potential loss (positively framed situation) rather than a potential gain (negatively framed 
situation), prompting them to use preventive rather than promotion regulation focus.  
 
Signal detection framework has been used in Regulatory Focus Theory to explain explorative 
behaviors associated with a preventive and a promotion regulation strategy (Brockner et al., 
2004, Tang 2009). 
 
Signal Detection and Regulatory Focus theory 
Regulatory Focus Theory proposes that the promotion focus and the prevention focus should 
differ in terms of the strategies chosen to achieve end states. For example, a promotion 
regulation strategy uses eagerness to attain matches in end states (i.e. aspirations, hopes) 
whereas a preventive regulation strategy uses vigilance to avoid mismatch in end states (i.e. 
safety and security). A signal detection framework (e.g.Tanner & Swets, 1954; see also Trope & 
Liberman, 1996) can help to understand the behaviors and actions that are preferred for each of 
these strategies in order to achieve end states. Regulatory focus theory can be described in 
signal detection terminology. Decision makers have to make a decision whether a stimulus or 
signal is present or not. In the context of this study a signal is represented by an opportunity. An 
entrepreneur, who is in a promotion focus, would be motivated to detect opportunities when they 
are present. However, in order to do this, an entrepreneur can decide to exploit what he/she 
believes is an opportunity when it was present  (i.e. “hit” in signal detection terms) or he/she can 
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decide to exploit what he/she believes is an opportunity when in fact it was not present (i.e. “false 
alarm” in signal detection terms). Similarly, an entrepreneur who is in a preventive focus would be 
motivated to avoid making the mistake to exploit an opportunity when in fact it was not present. In 
order to do this, an entrepreneur can either decide to correctly avoid exploiting an opportunity 
when in fact it was not present (i.e. “correct rejection” in signal detection terms) or he/she can fail 
to exploit an opportunity when in fact it was present (i.e. “misses” in signal detection terms). 
 
A promotion focus uses eagerness to increase the probability to successfully detect an 
opportunity (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997, 1998). In order to do this a wide arrange of 
alternatives need to be considered to increase the chances in order to be able to detect an 
opportunity when it is present and to avoid failing to detect one (Baron, 2004, Brockner et al., 
2004). Put differently, a promotion regulation strategy uses eagerness to increase the probability 
to successfully detect an opportunity , which results in actions that increase variability in 
outcomes and actions in order to attain “hits” and minimize the chances to fail to detect an 
opportunity when it is present (i.e. error of omission). It follows that a promotion regulation 
strategy is consistent with explorative behaviors which increase variance in actions and 
performance (March, 1991).  
 
A preventive regulation strategy uses vigilance avoidance to reduce the probability to mistakenly 
exploit and opportunity when it is not present (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997, 1998). In 
order to do this a narrower range of actions and a more thorough and careful screening of 
information need to be performed to ensure correctly rejecting opportunities that lead to failure 
and minimize the chances to exploit an opportunity that leads to failure (Baron, 2004, Brockner et 
al., 2004). Put differently, a preventive regulation strategy uses vigilance avoidance, which results 
in actions that reduce variability in outcomes and actions in order to increase the probability to 
successfully reject an opportunity that is not present (i.e. correct rejection) and minimize the 
chances to detect an opportunity when in fact it was not present at all (i.e. error of commission). 
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Therefore, a preventive regulation strategy is consistent with less explorative behaviors which 
reduce variance in actions and performance (March, 1991).  
 
This pattern of behavior has been replicated in several experiments. Crowe and Higgins (1997), 
in study 1, found that participants in a promotion focus were able to come out with a greater 
range of solutions compared to participants in a promotion focus, even after having experienced 
failure in an unsolvable anagram. Also, they found that when individuals were in a task where 
generating any number of alternatives is correct, those in a prevention focus tried to avoid errors 
of commission by generating as few alternatives as possible and repeating the ones already 
used. Crowe and Higgins (1997) indirectly suggested that there is a relationship between 
promotion focus and creativity as compared to a prevention focus. In their study, they 
experimentally manipulated regulatory focus of participants and then administered a sorted task 
aimed to measure the ability to generate alternatives in a sorting task. Promotion regulatory focus 
was manipulated by task framing in which participants were told that the quality of their sorting 
task performance would determine whether they will participate in a desirable task in the future. 
Contrarily, in the manipulation of preventive regulatory focus, participants were told that the 
quality of their performance would determine whether they are not going to be assigned an 
undesirable task. The sorting task was simple and involved subgrouping exemplars according to 
freely chosen criteria. As expected, participants with a promotion focus generated more groups 
than those in a preventive focus. They also found that participants in a preventive focus were 
more concrete and perseverant in a particular selection criteria, showing also more repetitions of 
a simple pattern, which they applied across categories. The findings were also independent of 
transient affects.  
 
Crowe and Higgins (1997), in a second experiment, tested whether promotion and prevention 
focus differentiate in terms of risk aversion and risk seeking processing styles, which were also 
proposed to mediate the effect of regulatory focus on creativity (Higgins, 1997).  Similar to the 
previous experiment, the manipulation in this experiment was contingent in performance and the 
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task consisted in memorizing a list of words (memory signal detection task). After 20 seconds 
participants performed a filler activity and then they looked at another list, half of which contained 
the words they had memorized previously. The participants’ job was to determine whether the 
object in the second list were present or not in the previous list (e.g. “old” or “new”). The authors 
analyzed this experiment in signal detection theory terms by using response biased scores, that 
is, the bias that respondents have to answer yes (i.e. low threshold to say yes) in order to achieve 
a hit (successfully remembering a word present in the previous list) at the risk of a “false alarm” 
(failure to reject a distractive word). Contrarily, they used a lower response biased score or 
“conservative bias” (i.e. high threshold to say yes), in order to attain a correct rejection 
(successfully rejecting a distractive word) at the risk of a “miss” (failure to recognize a distractive 
word). The findings strongly supported the hypotheses that a higher response bias was 
associated with a risky behavior and a promotion regulation focus, and that conservative bias was 
associated with risk-averse behaviors and a prevention focus. These findings confirm Higgins’ 
(1997) hypotheses that promotion and prevention regulation is associated with processing styles 
associated with risk- seeking and risk-averse behaviors respectively.  
 
Moreover, previous manipulation of regulatory focus has been made in such a way that 
participants were instructed that gains/non-gains or losses/non-losses were contingent upon 
performance. However, Friedman and Foster (2001) demonstrated that those manipulations of 
regulatory focus does not necessarily elicit activation of cognitive processing directly, and can be 
elicited by external cues on regulatory focus. Friedman and Foster (2001) also tested the effect of 
promotion and preventive regulatory concerns on creative insight and found that a promotion 
concern would differentially lead to more creative insights and to greater risk behaviors than a 
preventive concerned more concerned with risk-averse behaviors.  
 
Family ties and explorative orientation  
According to Regulatory focus theory, a situational preventive regulation stems from the way 
decision makers perceive their social context (Higgins, 1997, 1998). This study argues that a 
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situational preventive regulation can be activated by the social context present in family ties. 
Simply put, family owner not only consider the profit motives of the family business, but also 
considers what he/she can lose in terms of non-economic motives. This study incorporates SEW 
as the source of these motives for family owners. SEW is an “affective endowment”  for family 
owners, that is, something of value related to positive affective states such as belongingness, 
altruism to other family members, family control over the outcomes, identity associated to their 
family names in the business (see Gomez-Mejia et al.,2011 for a review). Therefore, family 
owners are less inclined to choose uncertain actions that may or may not lead to positive 
performance outcomes, than to continue with previous courses of action which at least allows 
them to continuing perceiving the benefits of SEW and avoiding challenging the loss of those 
affective endowments.  
 
As pointed out by March and Shapira (1987), both survival and performance target coexist, but 
their relative importance in the decision maker’s mind determines risk behaviors. In the case of 
family startups, the loss of SEW is more salient for family founders than profit motives, which 
leads them to positively frame their current situation and perceive they have more to lose than to 
gain.  
 
This study argues that this positive framing also leads to perceive more risks (Sitkin & Pablo, 
1992; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) consistent with a situational preventive regulation strategy 
concerned with aiming “correct rejection” and avoiding “false alarms” (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
Therefore, it is argued that SEW in family startups will lead family founders to use more vigilance 
avoidance and thus, narrow their range of alternatives in order to ensure being able to avoid 
exploiting opportunities that lead to failure. This is consistent with less explorative orientation. On 
the other hand, this study proposes that the lack of socio-emotional wealth in lone founder 
startups would reduce the felt presence of losses over gains. This, in turn, leads a lone founder to 
frame the existing situation less positively, which lead to perceive less risks consistent with a 
situational promotion regulation strategy concerned with attain hits and avoid misses (Crowe & 
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Higgins, 1997). Therefore, a lack of SEW in lone founder startups will lead lone founders to use 
more eagerness and thus, a broader range of alternatives in order to be able to detect more 
opportunities. This is consistent with more explorative orientation.  
  
In sum, comparing family startups to lone founder startups, it is expected that family startups 
would tend to behave in a less opportunity-seeking manner, avoiding deviating from previous 
business opportunity and challenge their SEW. Lone founders, in turn, who lack SEW, will 
behave in a more opportunity-seeking manner by promptly deviating from current courses of 
action to avoid losing a business opportunity, and paying much attention to what they can lose if 
they fail to change their current courses of action (Pennington & Roese, 2003). Hence, 
  
Hypothesis 1 
Family startups would have less explorative orientation than lone founder startups. 
 
Main Founder’s Psychological traits and Regulatory Focus  
This study analyzes, in addition to situational variables due to socio-emotional wealth previously 
discussed, the effect of the psychological characteristics of the main founder on explorative and 
ambidextrous orientations.  
 
Kirzner’s view of entrepreneurial alertness as the entrepreneur’s ability to detect opportunities 
that others have not yet identified, has motivated researchers to look for ways in which 
entrepreneurial alertness can be fostered. However, being alert to opportunities does not only 
occur as a “deliberate search”, but also can be unconsciously deployed by the decision maker. 
This study argues that Psychological traits of the main founders stem from cognitions associated 
to previous successful experiences associated with a promotion focus, which prompt them be 
more explorative without a deliberate effort (Gaglio & Katz, 199).  
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Psychological theories for explaining the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities have been 
proposed (e.g., Begley & Boyd 1987; McClelland, 1961). These theories predict that 
entrepreneurship is a function of stable individual characteristics, such as willingness to bear risk 
(Brockhaus & Horowitz, 1986), self-efficacy (Chen et al., 1998) and tolerance for ambiguity 
(Begley & Boyd, 1987).  The problem with this approach is that the psychological framework 
studies have focused on the decision to exploit opportunities once the opportunity has already 
been exploited rather than on the discovery of the opportunity ex-ante (Venkatraman, 1997).  
 
In contrast, Austrian school sees opportunity recognition as a spontaneous process that takes 
little effort from entrepreneurs. Previous experiences, education or the person’s idiosyncratic prior 
knowledge, facilitate the opportunity recognition by creating a knowledge corridor, which allows 
him/her to recognize certain opportunities, which are not easily recognized by others 
(Venkataraman, 1997). These prior experiences include “…prior information, whether developed 
from work experience, education, or other means…” which “…influences the entrepreneur’s 
ability to comprehend, extrapolate, interpret, and apply new information in ways that those lacking 
that prior information cannot replicate” (Shane, 2000, p. 452). 
 
Yu (2001) proposed that psychological theories and Austrian school, although seemingly different 
views on their predictions of opportunity discovery, are not necessarily at odds. To reconcile both 
views, Yu (2001) proposed that discovery can be conceptualized as a forward looking or 
“extraordinary discovery” or a backward looking or “ordinary discovery”. Yu argued that previous 
experiences can have be forward looking when opportunities are created as actions are enacted 
in the present (Austrian school), or backward looking when previous experiences creates a 
knowledge corridor that help entrepreneurs to discover opportunities that already existed (Yu, 
2001). However, the author didn’t mention specifically which factor leads to each of these types of 
discovery. Similar to Yu’s (2001) suggestions, this study argues that some distinct psychological 
traits subsume an entrepreneur’s previous outcome history and, therefore, provide the cognitions 
to be constantly looking forward for new opportunities. These traits depend on previous outcome 
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history and previous life experiences which become part of a schema related to successful 
previous outcomes. These schemas are persistent cognitions based on outcome history, and 
provide the basis to make decisions involving risk and uncertainty. 
 
Although disregarded, outcome history has been proposed as an important determinant of risk 
propensities. Osborn and Jackson (1988) and Thaler and Johnson (1990) found that decision 
makers will seek risks in the domain of gains if prior risk-seeking actions were successful. Sitkin 
and Pablo (1992) proposed that previous outcome history should have an effect on risk 
propensities through the founder’s idiosyncratic history of success or failure. For firm strategies 
that lead to success in the past, decision makers would tend to be fixated on that strategy. 
Contrarily, a strategy that repeatedly led to failure would lead a founder to be constantly shifting  
to other strategies (March, 1988).  
 
In this study, rather than outcome history at the firm level, it is proposed that the personal 
subjective outcome history at the individual level should have an effect in the expectancies of the 
future outcomes. Specifically, individuals with successful history of success should accumulate a 
promotion regulation focus which prompts them to look for opportunities in order to achieve 
accomplishments, hopes and aspirations (Higgins et al., 2001). According to McClelland and 
Atkinson's classic theory of achievement motivation (e.g. Atkinson, 1964; McClelland, 1951, 
1961; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), in time, a new achievement task evokes the 
feelings associated with past task experiences. Higgins et al. (2001) applied this concept to 
Regulatory focus theory and argued that previous subjective histories of success with a 
promotion regulation strategy should produce an achievement pride, which energizes and direct 
efforts to achieve a new task goal. Similarly, previous subjective histories of success with a 
preventive regulation strategy should produce an achievement shame which energizes and direct 
efforts to avoid the new task goals. Higgins et al. (2001) showed in 5 studies that individuals with 
subjective success in previous promotion tasks that required eagerness, used eagerness in new 
tasks, whereas individuals with subjective success in previous prevention tasks that required 
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vigilance, used vigilance in new tasks. These findings were valid for both a chromic or situational 
regulatory focus. 
 
 
In all, this study proposes that some psychological traits can be stable but evolving dispositions of 
how well an entrepreneur perceives that his/her previous stock of knowledge fits an opportunity, 
which depends not only of a fixed disposition inherited from childhood, but also on the previous 
experiences that shaped their motivations and dispositions to act (i.e. regulatory focus). These 
psychological traits, in turn, become chronic propensities, and act like schemas or mental models, 
as described in the following section (Sitkin & Weingart 1995; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). 
Schemas and Regulatory Focus 
Choi (1993) argued that under uncertain environments decision makers tend to derive a set of 
paradigms resulting from their previous experiences, which they use as a way to cope with 
external world. These experiences lead them to construct a representation in their minds or 
templates, which in turn motivate decision makers to test whether these templates fit with the 
external world. Templates or schemas are “dynamic, evolving mental models that represent an 
individual’s knowledge and beliefs about how physical and social worlds work” (Kaish & Gillad, 
1991, p. 97). These schemas are important elements in how decision makers represent the 
external environment in their minds.  According to the cognitive interpretation of Lane et al. 
(1996), whenever actors are confronted with environmental changes requiring actions, they 
categorize these situations according to previous patterns observed in similar situations. 
Therefore, if previous experiences are valuable then the association to that category is stronger 
and the easier it is its activation with external stimuli. The activation of these categories depends 
on many factors such as information primacy, schema accessibility, or personal motives (Gaglio 
& Katz 2001) and it acts like a heuristics in environments where uncertainty is high.   
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Perceptions and interpretations vary as part of a particular schema called upon in response to 
stimulus to real or imaginary events. Regulatory focus theory suggests that external stimuli as 
well as previous experiences can affect the perception and interpretation of events by activating a 
promotion or a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997). Therefore, a promotion or prevention focus can 
be conceptualized as a schema. A promotion schema is concerned with advancements and 
accomplishments, whereas a prevention schema is concerned with safety and security (Higgins, 
1997).  Psychologists have observed that some people have a chronic schema which they 
habitually activate regardless of its appropriateness for the moment (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; 
Higgins & King, 1981). Similarly, Regulatory Focus Theory predicts that some people are more 
likely to activate a regulatory focus related to promotion or prevention regardless of the situation 
that they face (Higgins, 1997). 
 
Studies show that a chronic promotion focus entails a propensity to take greater risks, whereas a 
chronic prevention focus entails greater risk aversion (Grant & Higgins, 2003). Liberman et al. 
(1999) suggest that the stronger the chronic promotions focus, the stronger the risk propensity 
defined as the willingness to deal with uncertainties and the readiness to bear it (Liberman et al., 
1999). In signal detection terms, a person with a chronic promotion focus would activate schemas 
related to previous successful experiences with accomplishments, which in turn lead them to 
associate events with those categories and be biased towards attaining hits and avoiding misses 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Therefore, previous successful experiences leads entrepreneurs to be 
willing to accept more risk than what is normatively appropriate in order to detect an opportunity, 
but at the expense of increasing the probability of exploiting an opportunity that leads to failure 
(commission risks). These behaviors are consistent with an explorative orientation in which a 
broader arrange of alternatives are explored.  
 
However, most studies have manipulated the promotion and prevention focus, and only a few 
studies have analyzed what psychological traits of the decision maker lead to activate this 
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regulation systems (exception being Tang, 2009). In the following section a review of the 
literature regarding the effects of psychological traits on exploration of opportunities is outlined. 
 
Psychological Traits and Explorative Orientation 
This study focuses on social cognitive self-regulation as suggested by scholars (Higgins, 2002; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1998; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). Regulatory focus is one of the theories of self-
regulation that offers a comprehensive framework for integrating both cognitive and social 
components, which offers great potential for entrepreneurship field (Brockner et al., 2008). 
Regulatory focus consists of both a chronic individual variable and a situational variable (Shah, 
Higgins, & Friedman, 1998; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004). The chronic component derives from a 
person’s accumulated experience and achievement history (Higgins et al., 2001; Higgins & 
Silberman, 1998).  
 
Social and cognitive psychology has given special attention to the fact that people tend to 
process the same ‘objective’ stimulus differently according to their personal subjective meanings 
(see, e.g., Cantor, 1976;  Shrauger & Altrocchi, 1964; Tagiuri, 1969). This literature suggests that 
meanings are shaped by personal past idiosyncratic experiences (Higgins, King & Mavin, 1980). 
Put differently, interpretation of social events is much more related to a subjective interpretation 
rather than the event itself (e.g. Kelly 1955, Lewin, 1935; Mischel, 1981).  
 
Models of social-construct accessibility (Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & Srull, 1981) suggest that 
the more frequency by which constructs are activated, the more accessible they become and the 
longer that accessibility should persist. Liles (1974) suggested that entrepreneurs in new ventures 
take several individual risks such as financial well-being, career opportunities, family relations, 
and psychic well-being. Therefore, to the extent that entrepreneurs activate their promotion focus 
by previous life experiences that reinforce promotion focus (e.g. successful previous stories of 
accomplishments), they should be more likely to associate external stimuli with those categories 
or schemas and be more willing to take more risks in their decision making process.  
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Moreover, previous outcome experiences should have an effect on risk perception through risk 
propensity (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992; Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). Previous outcome history can affect 
psychological traits of entrepreneurs (Sitkin and Weingart, 1995). For example, the accumulated 
positive experiences can result in a greater sense of confidence in achieving goals (i.e. 
achievement motivation) or in more confidence in controlling outcomes with one’s characteristics 
or actions (i.e. internal locus of control orientation). This study attempts to incorporate these two 
psychological traits to predict explorative behaviors using Regulatory focus theory. 
Effect of Achievement Motivation and Locus of Control on Promotion focus 
In entrepreneurship research many psychological traits have been studied, for example, risk 
taking propensity (Begley & Boyd, 1987), attitudes (Fraboni & Saltstone, 1990), and Jung’s 
typology (Roberts, 1989). However, only Need for Achievement (McClelland, 1990) and Locus of 
Control of Reinforcement (Rotter, 1966) could be considered as having significant value, across 
several studies (Johnson, 1990; Venkatapathy, 1984). 
 
Previous outcome history can also affect psychological traits of entrepreneurs. For example, the 
accumulated positive experiences can result in a greater sense of confidence in achieving goals 
(i.e. achievement motivation) or in more confidence in controlling events with one’s characteristics 
or actions (i.e. internal locus of control orientation).  
 
Tang (2009) recently looked at the effects of two important psychological traits on entrepreneurial 
alertness: achievement motivation (e.g. McClelland, 1961) and locus of control (e.g. Rotter, 
1966). The author argued that these two psychological traits should be a beacon of incentive for 
decision makers with a promotion focus because they will activate cognitive processes 
associated with identifying opportunities, such as entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973).  
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This study argues that previous outcomes history would be incorporated in these psychological 
traits, which are cognitive in nature, and depend on both the previous outcome history and the 
inherited dispositions of individuals. More specifically, it is proposed that these traits would be 
associated with stable mental representations, or schemas, that will prompt decision makers to 
act in a chronic promotion focus. 
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Achievement Motivation and Explorative orientation 
Following Tang’s (2009) study and the efforts of scholars like Shane (2003) and Klein (1990), this 
study defines “achievement motivation” in the context of new ventures as a cognitive and 
affective process that energizes, directs and maintains goal-directed behaviors of establishing 
new businesses. 
 
The concept of need of achievement was formulated in the 1950s (McClelland, Clark, Roby, & 
Atkinson, 1958) and basically argues that high- need of achievement people are more likely than 
low- need of achievement people to engage in energetic and innovative activities that require 
planning for the future and entail an individual’s responsibility for task outcomes. This is similar to 
Holland’s (1985) work on vocation choice, which suggests that individuals will be most attracted 
to careers that offer a fit between their environmental characteristics and their personality. 
McClelland’s (1961, 1965) various empirical studies suggest that high need of achievement foster 
entrepreneurial activities and, therefore, economic growth. McClelland found that individuals high 
in need of achievement would be more likely to take more responsibility, assume moderate risks, 
look for performance feedback indicators, and require individual skill and effort. Other studies 
have found that need of achievement is an important differentiating variable that predicts 
entrepreneurial activities at the group level between entrepreneurs and people from the general 
population, independent of the measurement method, samples, and entrepreneurship definitions 
(Johnson, 1990). Moreover, Collins et al. (2004) confirmed these results in their meta-analysis, 
and found that achievement motivation is associated with groups of entrepreneurs rather than the 
general population or non-successful founders in terms of both choice of an entrepreneurial 
career and entrepreneurial performance. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that achievement 
motivation in entrepreneurs is likely to foster entrepreneurial activities, which entails a persistent 
strategic orientation towards means that involve eagerness, or chronic promotion focus, in order 
to attain ends such as accomplishments, hopes and aspirations (Levine et al., 2000).  
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Regulatory Focus Theory in signal detection terms predict that entrepreneurs with a promotion 
focus would tend to explore opportunities in order to increase the probability to aim a “hit” 
(successful opportunity) and reduce the probability of an error of omission (not detecting a 
successful opportunity). Put differently, a founder high in achievement motivation should increase 
the propensity toward a chronic promotion regulation strategy (Higgins 1997, 1998) which leads 
decision makers to increase risk propensity in order to attain accomplishments, hopes and 
aspirations (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Moreover, risk propensity has been proposed to be directly 
related to risk perception and risk behavior (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992).  Sitkin and Weingart (1995) 
empirically tested that risk propensity was directly related to risky decision making and to risk 
perceptions. Sitkin and Weingart also found that risk propensity was strongly predicted by 
previous outcomes history, which suggests that a chronic regulatory focus was activated leading 
decision makers to be willing to take more or less risks depending on their subjective experiences 
of success. Previous outcomes that had a subjective experience of success related to promotion-
related tasks aimed to attain accomplishments and aspirations should lead to activate a chronic 
promotion focus which energize and direct behaviors to approach a new task goal (Higgins et al., 
2001). It follows that a main founder strong in achievement motivation is more likely to have had 
subjective success experiences on previous outcomes related to a promotion focus, which in turn 
become a stable mental representation related to a chronic promotion focus consistent with an 
explorative orientation. 
 
Furthermore, the main founder is not alone in making a decision related to exploration. Other 
family owners present are also important in the final decision. However, many scholars have 
suggested that an individual’s experience of reality depends strongly on verification from others 
(e.g., Asch, 1952; Cooley, 1902; Festinger, 1950; Lewin, 1931; Mead, 1956). Hardin and Higgins 
(1996) argued that social verification, or shared reality, is essential for confidence and 
predictability in potentially all knowledge domains (cf. Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Moscovici, 1976). 
Similarly, Levine, Higgins and Choi (2000), relying on Sheriff’s (1937) proposition that group 
members tend to converge on their individual’s judgment of ambiguous stimulus, analyzed the 
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effect of promotion and prevention focus on strategic orientations at the group level. In the case 
of family owners, their social verification is greater than that of non-family owners because family 
values tend to coalesce all family members identity into one (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Most 
importantly for the purpose of this study, the authors found, using Regulatory Focus Theory, that 
group members converged in their strategic orientations regarding solving problems through risky 
or conservatism behaviors. Specifically, they found that promotion groups were riskier than 
prevention groups. Therefore, it is expected that a main founder with a high need of achievement 
will tend to overlap with mental models related to a chronic promotion focus at the founding team 
level. Therefore, a chronic promotion focus, triggered by a main founder with strong achievement 
motivation, should increase risk propensity and lead to a promotion regulation strategy consistent 
with explorative behaviors that are variance-increasing in outcomes and actions at the startup 
level (March, 1991). It follows, 
Hypotheses 2 
Startups with main founders with more achievement motivation are associated with more 
explorative orientations   
 
Internal Locus of Control and Explorative orientation 
Internal Locus of control orientation is anchored on Social learning theory (e.g. Rotter; 1954, 
1955, 1960) from which Rotter drew from to derive the concept of locus of control. The basic 
theoretical argument is that whenever individuals perceive that a reinforcement (i.e. positive 
outcome) is contingent on his/her own behaviors, they are more likely to increase their 
expectancy than when they perceive that their behaviors were not the cause of the outcomes but 
rather it was due to luck or powerful others. For example, as infants gain experience they start 
differentiating causal relations between events and preceding events. To the extent that they 
attribute those successful events to themselves (i.e. internal locus of control) they will be able to 
improve their expectancy, that is, next time they would expect to perform as good as before. 
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Internal locus of control orientation makes this attribution across different situations, that is, they 
have a generalized expectancy that one’s behaviors caused the events in one’s life.   
 
Previous studies have reported a positive relationship between internal locus of control and 
entrepreneurial activities. Shapero (1975) found that “internals” or individuals high in internal 
locus of control orientation, tended to be more self-reliant and independent. Studies by Liles 
(1974), Brochaus (1975), Ahmed (1985) and more recently Pandey and Tawary (2011) and 
Hansenmark (2003), have reported a positive relationship between internality in locus of control 
and entrepreneurial entry. Tang (2009) found that entrepreneurs with a higher internal locus of 
control orientation tended to identify cues in the environments that might lead to opportunities, 
and thus increase their entrepreneurial alertness. Moreover, previous research points out that 
internals are more likely to exhibit more entrepreneurial qualities than externals. Brockhaus 
(1975), Durand & Shea (1974), Shapero (1975) found that executives who have an internal locus 
of control orientation are expected to engage in much more innovation and introduced new 
products and services more frequently, while Miller, Kets de Vries and Tolouse (1982) found that 
top chief executives with strong internal locus of control orientation influence corporate strategies 
towards more product-market innovation, greater risks, and to lead rather than follow competitors.  
Although the difference in locus of control between entrepreneurs and managers is not yet clear, 
previous research suggests that there are individual differences between entrepreneurs and the 
general public (Babb and Babb, 1992; Brockhaus, 1980; Hull, Bosley and Udell, 1980; Begley, 
1995; Begley & Boyd, 1987).   
 
Therefore, it is expected that individuals high in internal locus of control orientation would be likely 
to select actions over which they can have a direct impact on performance, such as 
entrepreneurial activities. Given the generalized expectancy of entrepreneurs with high internal 
locus of control orientation, individuals would have an incentive in using eagerness as means to 
attain accomplishments and aspirations, stemming from a promotion focus. Entrepreneurs high in 
internal locus of control orientation are also more likely to have had positive outcomes 
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experiences in the past (probably in other startups experiences or mastery experiences) which 
predispose them to activate schemas related to a chronic promotion focus. Put differently, they 
would feel more confident in putting effort in activities they feel they have control over the 
outcomes, which in turn prompts them to attain accomplishments and aspirations. Moreover, it is 
expected that main founders with internal locus of control orientation would tend to overlap 
mental models related to a promotion focus in the startup team (Levine et al., 2000). This chronic 
promotion focus, in turn, leads to increased risk propensity and to strategic orientation toward 
explorative behaviors that are variance-increasing in outcomes and actions (March, 1991). It 
follows, 
Hypotheses 3 
Startups with main founders with more internal locus of control orientation are associated 
with more explorative orientations   
 
Interaction of Psychological Traits and Situational variables 
So far the analysis of this study have dealt with the effect of situational variables related to the 
social context of family founders’ ties composition (family versus lone founder startup) and the 
effect of psychological traits such as achievement motivation and  internal locus of control 
orientation, on explorative orientation. 
 
Although previous research has analyzed these two effects in relation to risk behaviors (Sitkin 
and Pablo, 1992, Sitkin & Weingart, 1995, Tang, 2009, Hmielesky & Baron, 2008), their 
interaction has been largely disregarded. This is surprising because Shane and Venkatraman 
(2000) suggested that research on entrepreneurship will benefit from exploring the interaction of 
the individual with the situation and their impact on entrepreneurial performance and 
entrepreneurial behaviors.  Moreover, research on opportunity recognition has recognized the 
impact of this interaction perspective on organizational creativity which is closely related to 
exploration of new possibilities (Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993).   
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Regulatory focus theory and person-situation interaction effect on explorative orientation 
Woodman, Sawyer, and Griffin, (1993) analyzed the antecedents of creative behaviors at the 
organizational level as a function of many components such as individual characteristics, groups 
and contextual influences, and the behaviors resulting from influential salient situations at 
different organizational levels. Woodman et al (1993) defined organizational creativity as “the 
creation of a valuable, useful new product, service, idea, procedure, or process by individuals 
working together in a complex social system” (p. 293).  
 
Woodman and Schoenfeldt (1990) proposed an interaction model for creative behaviors at the 
individual level. Woodman et al (1993) applied this model at the organizational level and argued 
that “…the creative behavior of organizational participants is a complex person-situation 
interaction influenced by events of the past as well as salient aspects of the current situation” (p. 
294).  In particular, they proposed that social interaction and individual characteristics can 
facilitate or hinder creativity accomplishment either by affecting the continuous innovation based 
on current competencies and experiences, or the radical innovations that allows for a “creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter, 1961). Therefore, the interaction model provides an integrating frame-
work that combines elements of the personality (e.g., Woodman, 1981), cognitive (e.g., Hayes, 
1989), and social psychology (e.g., Amabile, 1983) to explain creative behaviors related to 
explorative orientation. 
 
Regulatory Focus Theory offers a comprehensive explanation of the personal dimension and the 
situational variables in one comprehensive model. As previously mentioned, an individual’s 
regulatory focus can be activated by external situations -situational regulation, or due to individual 
characteristics such as learned behaviors from caregivers since early childhood or past 
experiences – chronic regulation (Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 2004).  
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Using the regulatory focus framework, Tang (2009) identified achievement motivation and internal 
locus of control orientation as predictors of Entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973), or the 
capacity of entrepreneurs to discover opportunities hitherto unnoticed. Tang suggested that a 
person high in achievement motivation and/or internal locus of control orientation is more likely to 
activate his/her promotion focus whenever an opportunity arises with a promise of 
accomplishment of future expectations.  A person high in achievement motivation and/or locus of 
control is more likely to have succeeded in previous experiences, which allows him/her to have a 
chronic promotion focus. This chronic promotion focus corresponds to cognitive schemas that 
allow individuals to recognize patterns, or exemplars (Yu, 2001). These schemas help 
entrepreneurs to “connect the dots” (Baron, 2006), which allow them to recognize opportunities 
better than people without such schemas.  
 
On the other hand, the situational prevention regulation focus of family startups over lone founder 
startups coexists with the chronic promotion regulation strategy for main founders with strong 
internal locus of control or achievement motivation. Lieberman, Idson, Camacho and Higgins 
(1999) found evidence in 5 studies that individuals in prevention focus preferred stability by 
keeping an object they have already endowed or owned than an alternative object.  However, 
when they were induced in a promotion focus they were more likely to interrupt an activity and 
interrupt it with different activity, or change their preferences towards external objects outside 
their familiar endowments. This suggests that family startups will be able to be less motivated to 
prevent the loss of their SEW by either exploiting current courses of actions or avoiding new 
opportunities that may challenge their SEW. New opportunities involve behaviors related to 
creativity and openness to change, and are consistent with psychological traits of the main 
founder related to a promotion focus such as achievement motivation and internal locus of control 
orientation. 
 
From the previous arguments, it follows that the presence of main founders with strong 
achievement motivation and/or internal locus of control orientation should reduce the difference in 
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explorative orientation between family startups and lone founder startups. The reason for this is 
that family founders would be more aware not only of what they can lose (SEW) but also what 
they can gain by taking riskier courses of action. Given that a promotion focus associated with 
higher levels of these traits would be an incentive to attain hits and avoid misses (Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997), it is expected that a broader consideration of alternatives should occur (Brockner 
et al., 2004) along with a greater variability in outcomes and behaviors  consistent with an 
explorative orientation (March, 1991). This suggests a moderation effect of these traits on the 
effect of family/lone founder status on explorative orientation as follows, 
Hypothesis 4a 
In family startups, achievement motivation of the main founder will moderate the 
difference in explorative orientation between family and lone founder startups, such that 
this difference is significantly reduced when achievement motivation of the main founder 
is strong than when it is weak. 
 
Hypothesis 4b 
In family startups,  internal locus of control orientation of the main founder will moderate 
the difference in explorative orientation between family  and lone founder  startups, such 
that this difference is significantly reduced when internal locus of control orientation of 
the main founder is strong than when it is weak 
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Figure 1 shows the previous hypotheses in a socio-cognitive model predicting explorative 
orientation in family startups versus lone founder startup
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Explorative Orientation in Family Startups 
Ambidexterity and Social Cognitive approach 
Some scholars don’t agree that ambidexterity- the ability to explore and exploit simultaneously- 
can be achieved simultaneously because they are two fundamentally different path dependent 
processes that compete for the same organizational resources (Floyd & Lane, 2000).  This view 
regards ambidexterity as determined by organizational design in which an organization puts in 
place “dual structures” to cope with conflicting forces” (Duncan, 1976). However, researchers 
have recently begun to recognize the importance of managing this tension and shift the focus 
from tradeoff (either or) to paradoxical (both/and) thinking (Earley & Gibson, 2002; Lewis, 2000; 
Morgeson & Hoffman, 1999).  
 
Exploitation and exploration at the startup level are less likely to be either/or processes. Large 
established firms have their own organizational inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). These firms 
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have pre-established routines which constrain their future actions and strategies developing ‘core 
rigidities’ and ‘competency traps’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992, Levinthal & March, 1993). Startups, in 
turn, lacking previous outcome history, are more likely to try new alternatives because they are 
less constrained by organizational inertia and large size (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). It is 
reasonable to expect, therefore, that startups will be more likely to balance exploration and 
exploitation simultaneously (both/and) than large established business.  
 
Literature on ambidexterity has focused on three major approaches. A structural approach based 
on the assumption that exploitation and exploration should be performed one at a time facilitated 
by different organizational units that deal with these processes separately, a contextual approach, 
in which in which both exploration and exploitation are performed within one organizational unit, 
and a leadership approach which assumes that top-management teams are responsible for 
balancing the tensions between exploration and exploitation (see Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008 for a 
review). This study uses a contextual approach and it assumes that exploitation and exploration 
are two paradoxical and independent processes (Floyd and Lane, 2000) which can be deployed 
simultaneously at the startup level.  
 
Contextual ambidexterity was defined by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) as “the behavioral 
capacity to simultaneously demonstrate alignment and adaptability across an entire business 
unit” (p. 209).  Gibson and Birkinshaw argued that organizational ambidexterity depend on how 
organizations combine systems, processes, and beliefs that shape individual’s organizational 
behaviors (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994). A contextual ambidexterity approach is based on the 
paradoxical view and proposes that individuals can simultaneously deploy seemingly 
contradictory processes associated with exploitation versus exploration such as alignment versus 
adaptability, efficiency versus flexibility, short term orientation versus long term orientation 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  Contextual ambidexterity highlights the importance of achieving 
this balance by adequate processes and systems that help to resolve this paradox. Moreover, 
Gibson and Birkinshaw proposed that contextual ambidexterity helps to develop a dynamic 
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capability (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) which helps to manage paradoxical processes and attain a 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
Previous research has looked at different contextual factors that support ambidexterity, such as 
job enrichment schemes (Adler, Goldoftas & Levine., 1999), the use of leaders with complex 
behavioral repertoires (Denison et al., 1995; Lewis, 2000), and the creation of a shared vision 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989).  However, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) suggested that these factors 
can be subsumed in stretch, discipline, support, and trust.  More specifically, they argued that 
ambidextrous organizations are expected to balance the hard elements (discipline and stretch) 
with the soft elements (support and trust) in their organizational contexts (Raisch & Birkinshaw, 
2008).  Following this line of research, scholars have recently focused on analyzing the 
characteristics and processes that enable top management teams to simultaneously pursue 
exploitation and exploration. Beckman (2006) showed  empirical evidence that founding team 
composition in terms of prior company affiliations of the founders is an important antecedent of 
exploitative and explorative behavior. Specifically, they found that a firm whose founders have 
diverse companies’ affiliations tend to explore more, founders with common company affiliation 
tend to exploit more, and firms who do both had more ambidextrous orientation. Similarly, Peretti 
and Negro (2006) found evidence that a mix between “newcomers” and “old timers” is conducive 
to ambidexterity. Lubatkin et al. (2006) used the term “behavioral integration” to capture both the 
wholeness and the unity of efforts of top management teams. They found evidence that top 
management teams that are able to balance their social and task interactions which include - 
collaborative behavior, the quantity and quality of information exchanged, and the emphasis of 
joint decision making- improve organizational ambidexterity.  
 
In sum, in order to contribute to shed light on this unexplored area of research, this study 
analyzes the antecedents of ambidextrous orientation at the startup level, taking a contextual 
ambidexterity view. As previously mentioned, both the social and the cognitive context affect 
ambidextrous orientation (e.g. Lubatkin et al., 2006; Beckman, 2006; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; 
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Peretti & Negro, 2006). Therefore, the social cognitive approach of Regulatory focus theory is a 
useful theoretical framework to predict ambidextrous orientation by introducing the social context 
and the psychological traits of individuals. Put differently, it is proposed that an ambidextrous 
orientation stems from the cognitive processes of the founders at the individual level and the 
social context at the firm level, which in turn should influence the systems, processes and beliefs 
that lead to a balance exploitation and exploration. More specifically, it is argued that three factors 
are likely to influence the context that fosters ambidexterity: 1) the social context of family ties, 2) 
internal locus of control of the main founder, 3) the interaction between family ties and internal 
locus of control of the main founder. 
Ambidexterity in Family Startups 
In this study, exploration and exploitation are two independent constructs that refer to an 
orientation, rather than actual behaviors, which may not be yet observable at the startup level. 
Explorative orientation refers to a predisposition towards explorative behaviors related to 
variability in actions and performance (March, 1991). In this study, Explorative orientation is 
conceptualized by  assessing the founders’ relative importance of explorative behaviors and 
actions, such as targeting new markets, developing new product, be the first to achieve a 
competitive advantage, new technology development, and the importance of patents (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; He & Wong, 2004).  Exploitative orientation, in turn, refers to the motivational 
strength that the main founder put forward and that reflects the commitment to previous courses 
of action. This motivational force provides the orientation to put the effort and perseverance 
required to continue exploiting current paths. In this study, Exploitative orientation is 
conceptualized by assessing the founders’ propensity to exploiting current market domains, 
developing existing products and focusing on promotion and sales of existing products (Beckman, 
2006; Miles & Snow, 1978).  
 
Since both constructs are independent of each other, it is possible to have all possible 
combinations of exploration and exploitation at any given moment. This means that if a firm is low 
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in exploration (i.e. low variability in actions and outcomes) it can also be low in exploitation (i.e. 
low motivational force).  
 
As previously proposed, SEW in family startups leads family owners to be constantly aware of 
avoiding actions that may lead them to lose their affective endowments (i.e. threat to survival), 
heightening the saliency of survival targets over aspiration targets (March & Shapira, 1987).  This 
study proposes that the less explorative orientation in family startups due to SEW compared to 
lone founder startups also affects the balance of exploitation and exploration, or ambidextrous 
orientation.  
 
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, main founders with strong psychological traits, such 
as internal locus of control and achievement motivation, will be more likely to have a promotion 
focus, which leads founders to see opportunities as a gain (i.e. negatively framed situation) and 
thus, are more motivated to experiment with alternative options, increasing their explorative 
orientation.  
  
This study proposes a social cognitive model based on Regulatory Focus Theory to predict the 
effect of SEW and internal locus of control orientation of the main founder, on ambidextrous 
orientation.   
 
The effect of achievement motivation on ambidexterity was not analyzed in this section because 
classic motivation theory has suggested that achievement motivation can be driven by approach 
or avoidance motives (Elliot & Church, 1997). Put differently the motivation to achieve goals 
depends on the regulatory focus activated: a promotion regulation aimed to achieve success or a 
preventive regulation aimed to avoid failure (McCLelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; 
Murray, 1938; Lewin, Dembo, Festinger & Sears, 1944). Moreover, recent findings suggest that 
achievement motivation is not related to initiation of entrepreneurial activities, which relates to the 
aims of this study (Hansemark, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable not to include achievement 
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motivation as a determinant of ambidextrous orientation. Figure 2 shows the Social Cognitive 
Model for Ambidextrous Orientation which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
 
Figure 2: Family status and Locus of Control effects on Ambidextrous Orientation 
 
Direct effect of Family Ties on Ambidextrous Orientation 
As previously stated, in family startups SEW leads to reduced level of explorative orientation 
compared to lone founder startups (see hypotheses 1). However, in order to predict how the 
balance of exploitation and exploration differ in family startups compared to lone founder startups, 
a comparative analysis of  exploitative orientation in family startups compared to lone founder 
startups is needed .  
 
Exploitative orientation and Regulatory Focus  
Exploitative behaviors involve motivational strength to persevere on previous actions, and can be 
driven by subjective experiences of success in promotion related tasks-- which foster promotion 
regulation in new tasks, or subjective experiences of success in prevention related task --which 
foster preventive regulation in new tasks (Higgins et al, 2001).  Higgins (2000) proposed that 
motivational strength will be enhanced when the manner in which people work toward a goal 
sustains (rather than disrupts) their current regulatory orientation, or regulatory fit. Their basic 
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argument was that people experience a subjective sense of importance of a task when their 
means to achieve goals fit with their regulatory focus, which further motivates them to put more 
effort, commitment and perseverance on the task. For example, if a person had previously 
experienced success (avoid failure) in tasks that involve eagerness (vigilance) to achieve goals, 
he/she would be more likely to have a subjective sense of importance on new task. Simply put, 
this person would have the feeling that what they did was the right thing to do and thus, show 
more commitment to the task, and put more effort and perseverance to achieve that goal.  
 
Spiegel, Grant‐Pillow and Higgins (2004) tested the previous proposition of regulatory fit by 
Higgins (2000). They found, in two different studies, that the performance (e.g. the number of 
anagrams solved) improved when the task means were aligned with their regulatory focus 
orientation. Shah, Higgins, and Friedman (1998), study 1, found evidence that, when strength of 
ideals and oughts of participants fitted a promotion or prevention regulatory focus respectively, 
their performance increased. As expected, individuals with higher ideal strength performed better 
when they were in a promotion regulation focus but not in a prevention focus. Similarly, 
individuals with a higher ought strength performed better when they were in a preventive 
regulation focus, but not in a promotion focus. 
 
Forster et al. (1998) manipulated the means by which the activity approaches the goal by using 
arm flexion and arm extension respectively, as proposed by Cacioppo, Priester, and Berntson 
(1993). Arm flexion has been associated with the means to approach a goal consistent with 
eagerness (promotion focus), and arm extension has been associated with the means to 
approach a goals consistent with vigilance avoidance (preventive focus).  Forster and colleagues 
found that participants in a promotion regulatory fit (participants in a promotion focus who used 
arm flexion) and participants in a preventive regulatory fit (participants in a preventive regulatory 
focus who used arm extension) solved more anagrams than otherwise. Moreover, Forster et al. 
(1998) in his last study operationalized motivational strength as persistence in a task. The task 
consisted in finding all the possible solutions for green and red anagrams. Participants were 
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framed in a promotion focus by telling them that they would earn a point for each green anagram 
they solved completely, and framed in a prevention focus by telling them that they would lose a 
point for each red anagram they didn’t solved completely. The participants were also measured 
the strength of their ideals and oughts to determine whether they had a chronic promotion 
regulation (e.g. high strength of ideals), or a chronic preventive regulation (e.g. high ought ideals).  
They found that, as participants were closer to achieve their goals--in this case solving green 
anagrams for gaining points--individuals in a promotion focus persevered more in the task by 
taking more time in solving later anagrams, than individuals in a preventive focus. Similarly, as 
participants were closer to achieve their goals-in this case solving red anagrams to avoid missing 
points- individuals in a prevention focus persevered more by taking more time in solving later 
anagrams, than individuals in a promotion focus. This suggests not only that regulatory focus fit is 
important for motivational strength, but also the importance of the distance to achieve the goal. 
The latter is congruent with the classical “the goal loom larger" effect, which argues that the 
motivational strength increases as distance from the goal decreases as one is closer to it (Lewin, 
1935; Miller, 1944, 1959). 
  
In sum, either family startups or lone founder startups can have an exploitative orientation due to 
a promotion focus or to a prevention focus, depending of the regulatory fit and the distance to the 
goal.  There are other factors that also influence motivational strength such as self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1986), anticipated reaction and attribution (Weiner, 1986), expectancy value theory 
(see Feather, 1982), as well as mindsets, intentions, and control strategies (see Spiegel et al, 
2004 for a review). However, these motivational strength factors do not relate to the context of 
family businesses, which is the purpose of this study. It follows that there is no particular reason 
to assume that exploitation in family startups would defer from a lone founder startups. Hence, 
Hypotheses 5 
Family startups and lone founder startups do not differ in exploitative orientation 
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In sum, given that family startups explore less than lone founder startups, and that exploitative 
orientation is not related to whether it is a family startup or a lone founder startup, it follows that 
family startups will have a lower level of exploration for the same level of exploitative orientation. 
In other words, family startups would be less likely to be high in both exploitation and exploration 
(i.e. ambidextrous) than lone founder startups. Hence,  
Hypothesis 6 
Family-owned startups will be less likely to be ambidextrous (high in exploration and 
exploitation) than Lone founder startups.  
 
Direct effect of Locus of Control and Ambidextrous Orientation 
As previously proposed, internal locus of control orientation in individuals is consistent with a 
promotion focus, and the means to attain the goals are driven by eagerness. Evidence suggests 
that executives who have an internal locus of control, are expected to engage in more innovation, 
will frequently introduce new products and services and invent new production technologies 
(Brockhaus, 1975;Durand & Shea, 1974; Shapero, 1975). Miller, Kets de Vries and Tolouse 
(1982) found that top chief executives with strong internal locus of control, influence corporate 
strategies by engaging in more product innovation, taking greater risks, and leading rather than 
following competitors. A person with internal locus of control orientation has confidence that he or 
she can control the outcomes of a situation before he/she attempts to take action, due to his/her 
generalized self-efficacy (Rotter, 1966). Moreover, an individual with internal locus of control 
orientation and a positive outcome feedback of his/her actions will tend to use the same 
promotion focus that lead to good results in the past (Higgins et al., 2001), which leads to further 
experimentation in other to attain achievements and hopes. However, if the exploration of 
alternatives doesn’t lead to expected results, internals are willing to be more alert or preventive in 
order to avoid losing control over the situation (Tang, 2009). In other words, it is proposed that 
internals are able to balance over-exploration with more exploitation of available resources.   
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On the other hand, in case of failure feedback, entrepreneurs with strong locus of control would 
be confident that they can pull out a “victory out of a defeat” and thus, will discount evidence that 
doesn’t reinforce their beliefs in order to prove their assumptions. This is similar to the “rigidity-
threat” effect (Staw et al., 1981), which suggests that, under threat conditions, restrictions in 
information processing and concentration of control should occur.  Staw and colleagues argued 
that at the individual level there is substantive support that people respond to threat situations by 
restricting their information processing and by constricting control. This, in turn, has an effect both 
on cognitions and motivations. For example, restricting information allows to focus on internal 
hypotheses and prior expectations as well as focusing on cues that reinforce the dominant logic 
of previous mental models while ignoring those cues that don’t match that dominant logic (Staw et 
al., 1981).  Constricting control allows to “…emit dominant well leaned, habituated responses “ 
(Staw et al., 1981, p. 506). A person with a strong internal locus of control would be motivated to 
prove that his/her own assumption was correct in an attempt to justify their attribution that the 
cause of the events are due to themselves and not to external conditions. This rigidity threat 
leads, therefore, to a pattern of actions consistent with exploitative orientation, that is, actions that 
are based on previous paths over which decision makers persevere. This rigidity can lead to a 
competitive advantage if the exploitation of current competencies lead to a successful outcome in 
the future by outcompeting competitors who quit under challenging conditions or by gaining a first 
leader advantage in a market nobody else has ventured before. 
 
Moreover, literature on escalation of commitment (see Brockner 1992 for a review) suggests that, 
in conditions of uncertainty and when facing a negative feedback, decision makers tend to 
escalate their commitment to failing courses of actions (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner & Rubin, 
1985; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984; Staw, 1981; Teger, 1980; Thaler, 1980).  One of the most 
accepted explanations of escalation of commitment is self-justification (Brockner, 1992), that is, 
individuals are willing to escalate commitment to prove to themselves and others that the 
resources invested were not in vain.  This problem is aggravated when the goals pursued are 
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relatively high in value (Brockner, 1992). Scholars seem to suggest that this is the case of 
entrepreneurs. Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) support this claim by showing that optimistic 
entrepreneurs are optimistic regardless of how prepared they are to lead their firms. Busenitz and 
Barney (1997) also demonstrated that entrepreneurs tend to overestimate the probability of 
success and tend to generalize more from specific cases to the general population, than 
managers of large established firms. It follows that entrepreneur would be likely to invest their 
money and themselves in relatively challenging goals. Therefore, in conditions of uncertainty, and 
facing a negative feedback, entrepreneurs with strong internal locus of control orientation would  
be likely to escalate commitment following their previous commitments in order to prove to 
themselves that events were due to themselves rather than to external events or powerful others 
(Rotter, 1966). These behaviors are consistent with exploitative orientation.  
 
However, in the event that escalating commitment on previous courses of action does not result 
in success, it is argued that main founders with a strong locus of control are willing to reconsider 
the adequacy of previous decisions in order to improve their perceived control over the outcomes 
and triumph the situation. Tang (2009) empirically found that internals are more likely to detect 
opportunities that others can’t detect, or entrepreneurial alertness. Tang (2009) also found that in 
low munificence environment, that is, environments in which entrepreneurial activities are not 
conducive to entrepreneurship, internals have a stronger association with entrepreneurial 
alertness than in environments with high entrepreneurial munificence. The interpretation of these 
findings suggests that internals are more willing to triumph the situation in environments that are 
challenging. In other words, a person with strong internal locus of control orientation would be 
willing to change exploitation of current competencies to other alternatives if the current path 
does not result in success.  It follows that main founders with high internal locus of control would 
be willing to use a balance of a preventive and a promotion focus because it allows them to 
balance exploitation with exploration in order to increase their control over the situation (e.g. 
avoid failure if a change is needed). 
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In sum, taking the previous arguments together, founders with internal locus of control are more 
likely to balance exploitation and exploration, that is, are more likely to counterbalance over-
exploration with more exploitation and over-exploitation with more exploration. Hence, 
 
Hypotheses 7 
Main founders with internal locus of control orientation will be more likely to found 
ambidextrous startups. 
 
Interaction of Locus of Control and Family startup status on Ambidextrous Orientation 
Previously, internal locus of control orientation of the main founder was associated with more 
likelihood to have an ambidextrous orientation. Similarly, it was hypothesized that family startups 
should be less ambidextrous than lone founder startups (see hypothesis 6). Further, based on 
Regulatory focus theory, a high level of internal locus of control orientation of the main founder 
(i.e. internal founder) in a family startup would make more salient an explorative orientation than 
an exploitative orientation because new courses of action that differ from previous ones provide 
new opportunities to attain “hits”, that is, hopes and aspirations (promotion focus). If exploitative 
orientation is not likely to depend on whether the startups include family members or lone 
founders, it follows that, for a given level of exploitative orientation, internal main founders are 
more likely to become more explorative.  This suggests a moderation effect of internal locus of 
control orientation on the difference in ambidextrous orientation between family and lone founder 
startups as follows, 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 8 
In family startups,  internal locus of control orientation of the main founder will moderate 
the difference in ambidextrous orientation between family  and lone founder  startups, 
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such that this difference is significantly reduced when internal locus of control orientation 
of the main founder is strong than when it is weak 
 
Survival Hazards in Family Startups 
In the previous section a justification and a proposed relationship was drawn for ambidextrous 
orientation and internal locus of control based on Regulatory Focus Theory. In this section, it is 
proposed that that these variables would have an effect survival hazard in family startups, that is, 
the probability that a startup disengage from business activities. Figure 3 shows the model 
proposed, described in the following section. 
 
Figure 3: Ambidextrous Orientation, Internal Locus of Control and Survival Hazards in 
Family startups 
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Internal Locus of Control and Survival Hazards 
Previous studies have pointed out that founders of new ventures have a stronger internal locus of 
control than non-founders (Ahmed, 1985; Begley & Boyd, 1987; Mescon & Monanari, 1981). 
Hansemark (2003) found that entrepreneurs with strong internal locus of control orientation are 
more likely to startup new businesses. Internal locus of control orientation refers to the confidence 
that events are the result of one’s will, regardless of external factors (Rotter, 1966), which can be 
the result of an optimistic bias. Moreover, according to Hmielesly and Baron (2008), 
entrepreneurs tend to be more optimistic because they suffer from more confirmation bias 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987), largely ignoring information that doesn’t confirm their beliefs (Gibson & 
Sanbonmatsu, 2004). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that entrepreneurs with strong internal 
locus of control should be more optimistic about their capacity to control outcomes in order to 
confirm their beliefs that events were caused by their actions rather than by external 
circumstances. 
 
Although internal locus of control of the main founder can lead them to be more promotion 
focused, optimistic and explorative, it can also lead to a preventive focus. Tang (2009), based on 
Brockner, Higgins and Low’s (2004) study,  proposed and empirically found that low munificence 
(the scarcity of critical resources for the operation of a firm within a given context) would lead 
founders with strong internal locus of control orientation to use both promotion and preventive 
regulation focus because this will lead them to triumph the situation. Put differently, main 
founders with a strong internal locus of control orientation will be careful to make an error of 
commission (false alarm) because it will be fatal in a situation of scarcity, while at the same time 
they will be more alert to any opportunity that may be present in order to overcome the 
environmental constraints.   
 
Moreover, family startups incorporate both the preventive focus stemming from SEW and the 
promotion focus stemming from the internal locus of control orientation. Therefore, family 
founders with strong internal locus of control orientation in a family startup will be more likely to 
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deploy simultaneously a preventive and a promotion focus because they can complement their 
promotion focus with a preventive focus stemming from SEW preservation arguments.  
 
Brockner, Higgins and Low (2004) applied Regulatory focus theory as a framework to understand 
in what conditions entrepreneurial success occurs.  Brockner and colleagues argued that 
entrepreneurial success requires both prevention and a promotion focus. Rather than stating that 
the entrepreneurial process depends on only a promotion component, the authors argued that 
they are both equally important. For example, for certain aspects of the entrepreneurial process 
(e.g., generating ideas with the potential to be successful), greater promotion focus is necessary. 
For other aspects of the entrepreneurial process (e.g., doing the ‘‘due diligence’’ when screening 
ideas), greater prevention focus is necessary. This is important because firms that are aware of 
their resources and industry attributes are able to deploy their capabilities in response to 
environmental changes accordingly (Wang & Li, 2008).  
From the perspective of regulatory focus theory in signal detection terms, it is also suggested that 
ambidextrous family startups would reduce survival hazards.  As previously mentioned, signal 
detection framework hypothesizes that four possibilities exist in situations where individuals try to 
decide if a stimulus or signal  is present or absent: (1) “hit”—the signal exists and the perceiver 
determines that it is present; (2) “miss”—the signal exists but the perceiver fails to identify it; (3) 
“false alarm”—the signal does not exist but the perceiver mistakenly concludes that it is present; 
(4) “correct rejection”—the signal does not exist and the perceiver accurately determines that it is 
not present. A signal in the context of family-owned startups is the presence of an opportunity that 
leads to successful outcome.   
Applying the signal detection framework in the context of Regulatory focus theory, the presence 
of a signal is similar to the presence of an opportunity. A decision maker needs to make the call 
whether the opportunity (signal) is there or not. In the context of Regulation Focus Theory, when 
individuals are in a promotion focus the attention is placed on hits, which represents a situation 
where an entrepreneur successfully detects an opportunity when it actually exists. Similarly, in a 
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preventive focus strategy, the attention is placed on a “correct rejection”, which represents a 
situation where an entrepreneur accurately evaluates the absence of an opportunity when it 
actually is not present at all.  
 
However, although a promotion regulation strategy aims hits, it may have the downside that a 
signal is perceived when in fact the signal didn’t exist at all (i.e. detecting opportunity that leads to 
failure or “false alarm”). This is similar to a Type I error, that is, undertaking explorative behaviors 
in the hope of aiming a target, when in fact that action leads to failure. In the case of family 
startups this error is less likely to occur because family members are more cautious in 
undertaking courses of action that may challenge their SEW. Lone founder startups, in turn, lack 
SEW and thus, are more promotion-focused, which can lead them to be overly optimistic to detect 
opportunities that in fact didn’t exist. This is consistent with recent findings from Hmielesky and 
Baron (2008) regarding a negative relationship between optimistic entrepreneurs and 
performance in new ventures. 
 
On the other hand, although a preventive regulation strategy ensures correct rejections, it may 
have the downside that a signal is avoided when in fact the signal existed (i.e. not detecting 
opportunity that leads to success). This is similar to Type II error, that is, avoiding exploiting an 
opportunity while continuing with current courses of action, when in fact the opportunity was there 
and would have led to success. This is the case of a family founder who uses exploitation in order 
to avoid losing existing SEW but in doing so ignores important business opportunities that may 
lead to success.  
 
In all, a family business, which relies predominantly on a preventive focus, will benefit from a 
prevention and promotion focus because it will allow them to complement the prevention focus 
with a promotion focus, suggesting that the dual reinforcement of both would allow family-owned 
startups to successfully assess the impact of external threats as well as make sure not to lose 
valuable opportunities that would otherwise lead them to failure. This, in turn, can lead to adapt to 
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organizational changes by using both diligence and generation of ideas when it is appropriate, 
reducing the tendency to become fixated on only exploration or exploitation at the startups level 
and thus, decreasing their survival hazards. Hence, 
Hypotheses 9 
In family startups, internal locus of control orientation of the main founder will reduce 
survival hazards.  
 
Ambidexterity and Survival Hazards 
As previously mentioned, because ambidexterity consists on balancing two paradoxical 
processes which involve two contradictory processing of information, scholars have 
recommended that leaders reconfigure assets to reconcile the tensions between exploration and 
exploitation (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996). This view is based on the 
assumption that tradeoffs to balance the tension between exploitation and exploration are difficult 
and without managerial intervention they are not likely to prosper. The concept of dynamic 
capability allows overcoming this limitation by recombining capacities in unique ways avoiding 
unnecessary tradeoffs. Teece (2006) referred to dynamic capabilities as “distinct skills, 
processes, procedures, organizational structures, decision rules and disciplines” …”that allows 
top management teams to sense, seize, and reconfigure capacities that are hard to develop and 
deploy” (p. 319).  
 
This study argues that, although ambidexterity may require a managerial intervention in large 
established firms, startups are less likely to require these interventions because organizational 
capabilities are not yet transformed into organizational routines. Startups are more in 
experimental mode and thus, are more likely to change because they lack organizational myopias 
(Levinthal & March, 19993), core competencies and core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Therefore, a different approach is needed to avoid the tension of exploitation and exploration in 
startups that takes into account other factors that don’t necessarily deal with managerial 
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intervention. In this section, this study raises the question: do exploitation and exploration have 
an effect on organizational survival ex-ante? For example, if a founder has an exploitative and 
explorative orientation, does that help startups in organizational survival later in time? If the 
answer is positive then organizations will benefit from balancing these orientations earlier in the 
startup process in order to minimize the cost of future managerial interventions to smooth the 
tensions between exploration and exploitation. 
 
These questions attempt to propose an explanation to how startup organizations can address the 
basic problem confronting an organization of “…engaging in sufficient exploitation to ensure its 
current viability and, at the same time, devote enough energy to exploration in order to ensure its 
future viability (March, 1991, p. 105).”  
 
It is proposed that the sooner main founders are influenced by these factors to develop a 
capability that allows them to “think” in exploitative and explorative terms, the sooner the startups 
will learn how to manage the tensions between exploration and exploitation.  Put differently, 
developing earlier this capability should allow startups to be less likely to fall into competency 
traps that favor previous exploitation-driven processes. This, in turn, should allow them to 
improve organizational survival (March, 1991).  
 
Organizational survival increases because exploitation and exploration can be deployed 
according to organizational demands rather than become fixed in one particular approach (March, 
1991). This balance of exploration and exploitation should lead to improved performance and 
greater survival rates in the long term (March, 1991). Previous studies suggest that firms that use 
a balance of exploitation and exploration lead to increased survival rates than firms that only 
reinforce exploration or exploitation. Cottrell and Nault (2004) argued that the combination of 
exploitation and exploration is associated with longer survival. Probst and Raisch (2005) 
empirically found that a balance of exploration and exploitation was less prone to failure than 
firms with a one-sided orientation.  
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Organizational survival is particularly important in startups. According Knaup (2005) in a 4 year 
(1999-2002) cohort from Bureau of Labor Statistics in its Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages (QCEW) program, a 66% of businesses survive in the first 2 years and 44% survive after 
4 years. Audretsch (1995) found, similar to Geroski’s (1995) predictions, that innovative industries 
are a barrier of entry to new entrants which reduces their survival rate. These barriers result from 
the inability of new entrants to compete with established firms in the industry, specifically, with 
their economies of scale and product differentiation. Audretsch (1995) found that firms that are 
able to adapt to environmental changes and produce a viable product after enduring the initial 
startup process, not only increase survival rates, but also increase the survival hazards for new 
entrants. Put differently, entering and enduring in an innovating race can be a barrier of entry for 
new entrants that may dramatically reduce survival rate of incumbents. Moreover, if these 
incumbents successfully adapt and endure through the startup process, and they are able to 
create their own small scale and differentiate their product, they may out-compete new entrants 
and achieve a sustainable competitive advantage (Audretsch, 1995).  
 
Piao (2010) found that organizational survival in the long term increased with more exploration, 
however the specific predictions of exploration on organizational survival depended on the extent 
of time overlap between exploitation and exploration, with a moderate overlap being optimal than 
too much or too little. The rational of Piao’s study was that too long or too little time between 
exploitation and exploration challenges survival. Piao argued that having too long a lapse 
between exploiting and exploring an opportunity may lead to a short term orientation or 
organizational myopias, whereas exploring too soon after exploiting an opportunity reduces 
efficiencies such as economies of scale or scope. However, although illuminating in the general 
idea that the distribution of exploitation and exploration in time have an effect on firm survival, 
Piao’s study didn’t considered that the distribution of exploitation and exploration orientation at 
the startup level may lead to simultaneously and independently deploy exploration and 
exploitation later in time. 
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This study proposes that main founders are the major agent who can realize the importance of 
exploration and exploitation and that the ambidextrous orientation of the firm will finally depend on 
the relative importance those main founders attribute to exploitation and exploration initiatives. 
Specifically, it is proposed that a main founder with a simultaneous emphasis in exploration and 
exploration would be more likely to consider both orientations when they make a decision. In 
other words, they would be aware not only of what they might lose in terms of the opportunities 
forgone by exploring opportunities, but also of the resources forgone in the exploitation of  an  ill-
defined opportunity. This is supposed to increase the chances of survival. 
 
Therefore, it is hypothesized that ambidextrous family owned startups would reduce the 
probability of failure or survival hazards. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 10 
Ambidextrous family startups will be associated with less survival hazards than non- 
ambidextrous family startups.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Overview 
Research on nascent entrepreneurs has been difficult because of the lack of representative 
samples and the fact that nascent entrepreneurs are unregistered, which increases the costs of 
collecting information and follow up. Fortunately, a large database of nascent entrepreneurs has 
been generated by the Panel Study of Entrepreneurship Dynamic (PSED), a public database that 
includes detailed information on US entrepreneurs starting up their business. Full documentation 
and all data are in the public domain, available at www.psed.isr.umich.edu.  
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The PSED project consists of PSED I and PSED II studies. However, PSED II has better 
psychometric properties of the variables, more variables and a greater response rate than in the 
PSED I. PSED II was started in 2005 with screening items on 31,845 respondents contacted by 
random digit dialing, from which 1206 respondents were considered eligible autonomous nascent 
entrepreneurs. Nascent entrepreneurs answered a 60-minute phone survey and five follow up 
interviews or “waves”, followed after the initial interview (Wave A). The topics covered in “Wave 
A” include information on the nature of the business, start-up activities implemented on behalf of 
the new firm, demographic characteristics of the founders and the relationships among them in 
terms of family ties, friendship or acquaintances.  
This study consists of two samples taken from the PSED II. PSED II is a complete database of 
nascent entrepreneurs, which is described more in detail in the section below. Two samples were 
drawn from this database. The first sample was used to test the hypotheses concerning 
explorative and exploitative orientation. The second sample was used to test the hypotheses 
concerning survival hazards.  
Sample 1 
From the total random sample, family startup status and lone founder startup status were 
identified resulting in 628 (64%) lone founder startups (only one founder owns the business) and 
358 (36%) family startups (only family related founders own the business) for a total sample of 
986 startups. The family startup status was determined by looking at the type of relationship 
existing among owners. A family startup status was associated with family startups if founders 
were all family related or they were spouses living in the same household. A lone founder startup 
status was associated with startups consisting of only one founder.  After listwise deletion of 
missing values, the total sample size for the first model (see figure 1) was reduced to 470 cases 
with similar proportion of family to lone founder startup than the initial sample. Although listwise 
deletion of 50% of the sample might be problematic for representativeness of the sample, a 
Little’s test was performed which is discussed further in this chapter. 
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Sample 2 
For the second sample a harmonized database available for public access was used. A 
harmonized database refers to a database which contains all relevant variables for longitudinal 
analysis aggregated in one consolidated variable (see Reynolds & Curtin 2011 for methodology 
for harmonization of PSED study).  This harmonized data base included all startups that are 
appropriate for a longitudinal analysis. Startups that didn’t meet certain financial characteristics 
were dropped from the analysis. This harmonized database included the time until the startup 
failed and the status of the startup (1=failed, 0=survived). Since the code for each firm in the 
harmonized database included the same cases that were included in the PSED II study, the 
harmonized database was linked to the PSED II database. This allowed all variables in the 
PSEDII database to be included in the analysis. Only family startups were selected in this 
sample. The final sample was reduced to 172 cases. 
Description of Dataset: 
PSED II interviews started in 2005 and continued throughout 5 waves from A to E, until 2009. 
Given the cross sectional nature of this analysis, this study only included Wave A because of the 
greater data availability and less attrition of initial Waves.  
 
Further, since this study focuses on the initial stages of the venture process and analyzes the 
conditions that lead to exploitation and exploration of opportunities, Wave A is appropriate as it 
best represents the beginning of the pre startup process. Given the representativeness of the 
random sample from the general population and the nature of this study’s research questions, it is 
likely that construct and statistical validity is less compromised in Wave A as compared to other 
waves. However, given that the sample consists of US entrepreneurs only, generalizability to 
other non- US countries is not warranted.  
  
The study design consisted of identifying from the totality of respondents screened with random 
dialing, the nascent entrepreneurs who meet four criteria 1) they consider themselves as involved 
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in the firm creation process, 2) they have engaged in some startup activity in the past 12 months, 
3) they expect to own all or part of the new firm, and 4) the initiative has not progressed to the 
point that it may be considered an operating business (Reynolds & Curtin, 2008). Respondents 
were contacted by phone and offered 25 dollars for a phone interview of 60 minute length.  
 
The topics covered in the “Wave A” include information on the nature of the business, start-up 
activities implemented on behalf of the new firm, incorporation into business registries, the nature 
of the start-up team and helping networks, sources and amounts of financial support, evaluations 
of the immediate context, competitive strategy and growth expectations, along with details of the 
motivations, perspectives, self-descriptions, background, and family context of the responding 
nascent entrepreneur. If the startup reported initially in the screening process revenues that 
exceeded expenses, including salaries, for more than 6 months, it was considered a new firm 
and, therefore, was dropped from the sample. Similarly, a question was asked to identify the 
startups that had disengaged their activities. If this was the case, the disengaged startup was 
dropped from the sample for subsequent waves. 
 
Measures 
Family/lone founder startup status 
Family startups status is a dichotomous variable: family startup and lone founder startup. A value 
of one was used to identify cases having more than one founder along with other family 
members. PSED II included family relationships among founders in the following categories: 
partners or spouses sharing a household, relatives sharing a household and relatives living in 
different households. If founders were linked to one another in any of these categories, they were 
classified as a “family startup”. If one of the founders was not family related to the other founders, 
that startup was dropped from the analysis. If the startup involved only one founder, then the 
startup was considered a “lone founder startup” and was coded with the value of zero. The 
reason for this classification is twofold. First, the research question of this study is concerned with 
comparing teams bonded with socio-emotional wealth and lone founders who lack those bonds. 
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Second, a lone founder is the most common form of ownership in entrepreneurial endeavors and 
has been recently categorized as a non-family startup (Miller, Le Bretton-Miller & Lester, 2007). 
Therefore, this classification makes a clear distinction that socio-emotional dynamics among 
family owners are likely present exclusively in family startups, and are absent in the cases of lone 
founder startups.  
Explorative orientation 
In this study, “explorative orientation” refers to the founder’s assessment of explorative behaviors 
and actions. Following recommendations of Benner and Tushman (2003) and consistent with the 
typology of “Innovator” in the Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategy, these behaviors and actions 
correspond to  targeting new markets, developing new products, being the first to achieve a 
competitive advantage, focusing on new technology development, and patents (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003, He & Wong, 2004). 
Therefore, in this study, explorative orientation is measured by the degree of agreement or 
disagreement that the main founder places on the importance for the startup competitive position 
of the following Likert scale items (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree): (1) being first to 
market, (2) contemporary products, (3) developing new product technology, (4) technological 
expertise and (5) developing patents or copyrights.  For example, if a founder rates high in all of 
these items, it means the main founder considers important to use exploration as the preferred 
innovative strategy. 
Cronbach alpha for this scale was .84. A principal component exploratory factor analysis based 
on a Montecarlo simulation of eigenvalues, or parallel analysis, was performed to test for uni-
dimensionality of the scale. Since the decision of how many components to retain is key in 
exploratory factor analysis to determine construct validity (cf. Nunnally, 1978; Gorsuch, 1983; 
Guilford, 1946; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; see Thompson &Daniel, 1996, for a discussion), 
parallel component analysis was used as the preferred method to calculate the exact number of 
factors to be extracted. Parallel analysis has been proved consistently accurate and 
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recommended as a routine procedure in principal component factor analysis (see Hayton, Allen, 
Scarpello, 2004 for a review). One factor emerged with eigenvalue of 3.03 accounting for 61% of 
the variance in the total solution. All factor loadings after extraction were greater than .72 and 
communalities greater than .52. All items are significantly correlated above .38. The KMO test of 
sampling adequacy was .814 and Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant, supporting the 
suitability of the factor analysis.  No extreme outliers were observed and the plots suggested and 
approximately normal distribution. The items, therefore, were summed to form an aggregate that 
represents explorative orientation. 
The mean of explorative orientation was 16.00 and the standard deviation was 5.24. The range 
was from 5 to 25. No extreme outliers were observed for this variable.  
Exploitative orientation:   
Since exploitative strategies are not directly observable at the startup phase because routines are 
not yet standardized to follow a predefined course of action, this study considers exploitative 
orientation as the common factor between three item measures for exploitation: (1) whether the 
business has achieved sales or not after 12 months from startup, (2) whether the product 
development stage has been started or has been completed and (3) the extent to which 
promotional efforts have begun. These three items best describe the product/market trajectories 
(product development stage) and the customer/market trajectory (sales and promotion) as 
recommended by Benner & Tushman (2003). This measure is also consistent with the 
exploitative strategies suggested by Beckman (2006) related to either Low cost strategies 
(promotion efforts), or the Enhancer strategies (product development and sales). Each of these 
items were measured as dichotomous variable (0=no, 1=yes).   
 
Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .68. The construct validity of this measure was also 
evaluated by correlating this aggregated measure with other indicators of exploitation in Miles and 
Snow’s (1978) strategies, which captured the importance of quality products/services to achieve 
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competitive advantage. This item was available in PSED II in a 5-Likert scale item (1= strongly 
disagree, 5= strongly agree). The correlation was low but positive and significantly correlated 
(r=.101, p=.018). Furthermore, a principal component exploratory factor analysis based on the 
Montecarlo simulation of eigenvalues, or parallel analysis, was performed to test for 
unidimensionality of the scale. One factor emerged with eigenvalue 1.832 accounting for 61.1% 
of the variance in the total solution. All items had communalities greater than .54. All factor 
loadings after extraction were greater than .73. All items were significantly correlated. The KMO 
test of sampling adequacy was .641 and Barlett’s test of sphericity was significant, supporting the 
suitability of the factor analysis. The items, therefore, were summed to form an aggregate that 
represents exploitative orientation. 
 
Ambidextrous Orientation:  
Consistent with the idea from Floyd and Lane (2000) that exploration and exploitation are two 
interdependent orientations “inseparable” from each other, researchers have looked at ways to 
combine these two measures. These operationalizations have resulted in various measures. For 
example, Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) noticed that the multiplication of both explorative and 
exploitative orientation led  to better firm performance, whereas He and Wong (2004) classified a 
firm as ambidextrous when it was able to score high in both exploitation and exploration 
simultaneously.  
 
 Lubatkin et al. (2006), in measuring ambidextrous orientation in SMEs, used the methodology 
proposed by Edwards (1994), in which three different operationalization (adding, multiplying and 
subtracting) were compared in terms of their predictive capacity to achieve growth. This approach 
examines the information lost in the beta weight of the model , assessing the combined index 
relative to the unconstrained regression equation in which explorative and exploitative orientation 
are treated as separate independent variables. Using this procedure, and using performance as 
the survival status of the startup (1=failed, 0 survived), the results of this study  indicate that the 
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“additive” model significantly predicted survival rate with a beta weight that is similar to the beta 
weight of the unconstrained model and proved to be superior; its regression beta weight (.136) 
indicated no significant loss of information, whereas the beta weights for the “difference” (.05) and  
“multiplicative (-.011) models were not significant and indicated a significant loss of information 
relative to the unconstrained regression equation.  Therefore, and consistent with 
recommendations of Lubatkin et al. (2006) study, the adding of the standardized exploitative and 
explorative orientation scores is a reasonable operationalization of ambidextrous orientation.  
 
Summing the standardized value of exploration and the factor score solution from exploitation, 
generated an ambidextrous orientation score. Ambidextrous orientation scores were then 
grouped with a median cutoff grouping. That is, for the entire sample, values of ambidexterity 
(operationalized as the adding of both exploitative and explorative orientations) below the median 
cutoff were assigned a value of zero indicating a non-ambidextrous orientation. Values above the 
median cutoff were assigned a value of one, indicating an ambidextrous orientation.  
Furthermore, to test for robustness, a sensitivity analysis was performed in which other 2 cut off 
criterion were used to operationalize ambidextrous orientation at the 20th and 37.5th percentile. 
To test whether the Lubatkin et al (2006) index of ambidexterity was consistent with the 
ambidexterity classification proposed by He and Wong (2004), an alternative coding system was 
proposed. That is, a startup was coded as one when it was able to be high in both exploitation 
and exploration (ambidextrous firm) and coded zero if otherwise (non-ambidextrous firm). This 
conceptualization of ambidexterity has been common in extant literature and captures the 
paradoxical view on ambidexterity of this study.  
The ambidexterity model proposed in Figure 2 was then analyzed using this He and Wong’s 
(2004) coding of ambidexterity.  
The results are shown in Appendix 1, and suggest that the interaction of internal locus of control 
and family startups vs. lone founder startup was significant (χ2 (1, N=470), p<.001, odds 
ratio=.463), and that the main the effect of family startups vs. lone founder startup on 
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ambidexterity is also significant (χ2 (1, N=470), p<.001, odds ratio=.107). Moreover, the model, 
after the inclusion of this new ambidexterity classification of He and Wong (2004), is still 
significant (p<.001, -2 Log likelihood=458.643). This suggests that the operationalization of 
ambidexterity, based on Lubatkin et al’s (2006) additive mode, is a robust proxy that captures the 
essence of ambidexterity as a paradoxical construct. 
Achievement Motivation 
Miner’s Achievement Motivation scale was recommended by Johnson (1990) to reflect a more 
specific measure of task requirements rather than a   more global or generalized model of 
achievement motivation.  Tang (2009), using PSED I, adapted Miner’s scale of achievement 
motivation to reflect the motivation to perform the task requirements related to establishing new 
ventures. Items from PSED II were very similar if not identical to the scale from Tang (2009).  The 
scale included the following Likert scale items (1=to no extent; 5= to a great extent) regarding the 
importance for the main founder in establishing the new business of (1) higher position in society 
(2) achieving and be recognized (3) achieving a personal vision (4) achieving great wealth.  
 
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .70. A principal component factor analysis based on a 
Montecarlo simulation of eigenvalues, or Parallel analysis, was performed to test for uni-
dimensionality of the scale. One factor emerged with eigenvalue 2.096 accounting for 52% of the 
variance in the total solution. All factor loadings after extraction were greater than .62. All items 
were significantly correlated. The KMO test of sampling adequacy (.728) and Barlett’s test of 
sphericity were both significant, supporting the suitability of the factor analysis. The items, 
therefore, were summed to form an aggregate that represents the construct of Achievement 
Motivation. 
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Internal locus of control orientation 
It has been recognized that the construct of locus of control is multidimensional (Palhaus, 1983). 
Paulhaus’s (1990) sphere of control scale differs from the original Rotter’s scale of internal and 
external locus of control in that it distinguishes three subscale dimensions, or spheres of control, 
within that scale. The three scales measure personal control, interpersonal control and socio- 
political control. Since the level on each of these subscales can vary in each dimension, research 
supports this differentiated view (Paulhaus, 1990).  Paulhaus’s (1990) sphere of control measure 
related to personal control was used in this study. The personal control subscale is an improved 
scale of the previous personal efficacy scale from Paulhaus (1983). This dimension is similar to 
the conceptualization of locus of control as a person’s generalized belief above and beyond a 
specific situation as proposed by Rotter (1966). This scale is the most consistent with an internal 
locus of control orientation.  Tang (2009) used Paulhaus (1983)’s subscale of perceived efficacy 
to measure internal locus of control orientation. This study selected the PSED II items that closely 
matched Paulhaus’ (1990) scale of personal control. The items selected were very similar, if not 
identical, to items in the scales used by Tang (2009) and Kroeck et al. (2005) scale to measure 
internal locus of control orientation at the startup level. The five items selected constitute a Likert 
scale (1=to no extent; 5= to a great extent) measuring the importance to the main founder when 
establishing the new business of the following items: (1) my skills and abilities will help me start 
this new business; (2) my past experience will be very valuable in starting this new business; (3) 
I’m confident I can put in and the effort needed to start this new business; (4) I have no limit as to 
how long I would give maximum effort to establish this new business; (5) my personal philosophy 
is to “do whatever it takes” to establish my own business.  
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .73. To test for unidimensionality, a principal component 
factor analysis was performed based on Montecarlo simulation of eigenvalues or Parallel 
analysis. One factor emerged with an eigenvalue 2.53 accounting for 51% of the variance in the 
total solution. This confirms the unidimensionality of the scale. Commonalities were greater than 
.6 and all factor loadings after extraction were greater than .63. The KMO test of sampling 
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adequacy and the Barlett test of sphericity were both significant, supporting the suitability of the 
factor analysis. The items, therefore, were summed to form an aggregate construct representing 
internal locus of control orientation. 
Survival Hazards 
The dependent variable in the Cox Proportional Hazard regression analysis depends on two 
variables: (1) the time that a startup takes to disengage from the business in days and (2) the 
status of the business (1=disengaged from the business, 0=still a startup or new firm). This data 
was collected from an harmonized database from PSED I and II, in which all firms that were 
eligible to be considered a startup were filtered by using a standardized criteria of inclusion. 
Therefore, Cox Proportional Hazards is appropriate in this sample of startups because the cases 
selected contain similar information about their characteristics and outcomes. These cases can 
be compared across time without violating the assumption of Cox Proportional Hazards, that is, 
that the probability of survival hazard over time does not depend on the sample cases’ 
characteristics (for more details on the procedure for harmonization see Reynolds & Curtin, 
2008). 
 
Covariates 
Previous experience has been associated with the intensity of searching information due to 
stronger previous schemas and greater alertness (Kirzner, 1973). However, empirical testing of 
this relationship has been equivocal (Patel & Fiet, 2009; Fiet, 1996; Hayek, 1945; Cooper, Folta & 
Woo 1995). To account for both alternative explanations of experience on search intensity, this 
study controls for two type of experiences: industrial experience and previous startup attempts.  
 
The age of the firm in startups has not yet achieved sufficient variability to be included as a 
covariate in the analysis because startups are too early in the business life cycle. Firm size has 
been associated with inertia, difficulty in processing information related to changing resources, 
and failure to adapt to changing resource conditions (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Tushman & 
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Romanelli, 1985). Net household income was included as a proxy for firm size at the startup level 
because it affects the amount slack that the family founders have for investment.  
Environmental munificence, defined as the scarcity or abundance of critical resources needed by 
firms operating within an environment (Dess and Beard, 1984; Pfeiffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Randolph & Dess, 1984; Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), affects 
survival and growth (Castrogiovanni, 1991;  Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994; Korunka, Lueger & Mugler, 
2003). It also can affect promotion regulation since it facilitates the achievement of goals and 
hopes (Higgins, 1997). To control for this alternative explanation,  a measure similar to Tang’s 
(2009) concept of entrepreneurial munificence was used consisting of 12 Likert scale items (1= 
strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) such as (1) the extent that a society’s norms are supportive 
of success (2) the extent that norms emphasize self-sufficiency, entrepreneurial risks, creativity, 
and responsibility (3) the  extent that government supports new venture startups and encourages 
participation of young people in startups and (4) the extent that the community helps startup new 
firms.  
The Cronbach’s alpha was .8 and the principal component factor analysis showed that all the 
items loaded into one factor. This allowed adding of the items to represent the aggregate 
measure of entrepreneurial munificence. 
Finally, industry controls were used to account for the study’s large sample proportion of high- 
technology industry (20%). Given the high representation of high-tech firms in this study’s sample 
(20%) the business code was used as a control variable.  
Missing Values Analysis 
In sample 1 missing values were mostly present in explorative orientation (50%). In order to 
check whether the missing values were random, Little’s test was performed in the first sample by 
including all demographic variables such as the industry experience, age and sex of the main 
founder (i.e. that which ownership percentage is the highest in the founding team). Results 
showed that the model including all variables was non-significant (χ2 (56, N=1214) = 47.847, 
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p=.772), suggesting that missing values were random. To avoid biasing estimates of the 
dependent variable due to the high percentage of missing values for explorative orientation, list 
wise deletion in explorative orientation variable was preferred over inputting missing values for 
this variable. The total sample (which remained large) was reduced to 470 cases. 
 
From this sample of 470 cases, missing values were also present in net household assets 
(15.7%) and exploitative orientation (15.3%). Little’s test showed that missing values in this 
sample were random (χ2 (26, N=470) = 47.847, p=.272). Given the small percentage of missing 
values and the fact that data was missing at random, the expectation maximization algorism was 
used to estimate missing values (Dempster, Laird & Rubin, 1977).  
 
In sample 2, only three variables had missing values: net household assets (16.3%), status of the 
startup (9.3%) and time until the startup failed (13.4%). Little’s test showed that missing values 
were missing completely at random (χ2 (41, N=172) = 46.651, p=.251). Given the small amount of 
cases with missing values and the fact that values were missing completely at random, a listwise 
deletion was performed, reducing the sample to 131 in the case of ambidextrous orientation with 
a 50-50 split, 103 in the case of ambidextrous orientation with a cut off in the upper and lower 
37.5th percentiles and 51 cases with a cutoff in the upper and lower 20th percentiles in 
ambidextrous orientation. No extreme outliers were observed in ambidextrous orientation. 
Statistical procedures 
To test the exploration hypotheses a hierarchical linear regression was performed. In the first 
block all covariates were introduced. In the second block, the independent variables -including 
family/lone founder status, internal locus of control orientation and achievement motivation- were 
entered. In the third block, the two interaction terms were introduced. A bootstrap procedure was 
performed in order to take into account deviation from normality and to increase robustness of the 
model. 
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To test the ambidexterity hypotheses a logistic hierarchical regression in three blocks was 
performed. This is appropriate for a dichotomous dependent variable and a mix of continuous and 
dichotomous variable as independent variables. In the first block all controls were introduced. In 
the second block the independent variables were family/lone founder startups and internal locus 
of control. In the third block the interaction term was entered. 
 
To test for Survival Hypotheses a Cox proportional hazard model in two blocks was used to 
estimate the probability that a given startup would disengage from the business. In the first block 
all covariates were added. In the second block the independent variables internal locus of control 
orientation and ambidextrous orientation, were added. The dependent variables in this model are 
both the actual status (that is, whether it has disengaged or not from the business) and the time 
elapsed from the last time the startup was censored. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Analysis and Results 
Initial analysis 
In order to rule out the threat to validity of common method bias, a Harmon’s one factor solution 
(or single factor) was tested according to Podsakoff et al. (2003) suggestions. Harmon’s one 
factor test assumes that either one factor will emerge or a general factor solution will account for 
most of the covariance among the variables. Therefore all variables in this study were entered 
into an exploratory factor analysis using principal axis factoring method. The results for the un-
rotated solution showed that the number of factors that were necessary to account for 72.73% of 
the variance were 4, all with eigenvalues greater than one. No single value was dominant with the 
first factor accounting for 22.572% of the variance. This indicates that common methods bias is 
not likely to be a significant problem. Figure 4 shows the empirical model tested for explorative 
orientation. 
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Figure 4: Empirical Model Explorative orientation for Family startups versus Lone Founder 
startups 
Exploration Hypotheses 
Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviations, person product-moment correlations and 
coefficient alphas in the mean diagonal where applicable for 470 startups.  
Hypotheses were tested using hierarchical linear regression to account for the contribution of 
each model to explain variance in explorative orientation (see Figure 4). Table 2 shows the 
results of the hierarchical regression analysis. Controls such as average startup experience, 
average industry experience, munificence and the Sic business code were entered in Model 1 to 
account for their on explorative orientation. Next, the independent variables family/lone founder 
startup status, achievement motivation and locus of control, were entered in Model 2. Interaction 
terms were entered in Model 3 to test the moderating effects of achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control. The mean centering technique was used for the interaction terms. The 
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variance inflation factors (VIF) estimates for all variables in the full model (Model 3) were 
between1.002-1.856, suggesting no threat of multicolinearity (Pedhazur, 1982; Barringer & 
Bluedorn, 1999). In order to test the hypotheses, betas, change in R2, and F test statistic of 
significance in the change of R2 were used.  
Table 2 shows that Model 1, with all control variables entered in block 1, did not explain any 
significant variance in explorative orientation. Net assets, average industry experience, previous 
startups attempts, munificence and business code explained about 1% in the variance.  
Table 2 shows Model 2 as highly significant. Family/lone founder startup status was significant in 
the model. Model 2 explained a significant proportion of variance in explorative orientation with 
∆R2= .436, (F (3, 461)=116.041, p<.001).  The slope coefficient of family/lone founder startup 
status was significant ( = -.654, t (459) =-19.829, p<.001), supporting Hypothesis 1 that family 
startup status is negatively related to explorative orientation. This indicates that family startups 
explore less than lone founder startups. Achievement motivation and locus of control were not 
significant when included in Model 2.  
In Model 3, the two interaction terms were entered on block 3 after all controls and independent 
variables were included in Model 2. Table 2 shows that model 3 increased predictive power from 
the hierarchical F tests (∆R2= .074, F(2, 459)=34.903, p<.0.001) after the two interaction terms 
were entered in the model. Model 3 also explains more than half of the proportion of variance on 
explorative orientation when including all predictors, with R2 =.505 (F (10, 385)=39.334, 
p<.0.001). Slope coefficients of both interaction terms for achievement motivation ( = -.257, t 
(459) = -6.072 p<.001) and internal locus of control ( = -.181, t (459) =-4.12 p<.001) are 
significant and negative, lending full support to Hypotheses 4a and 4b. These results suggest a 
negative moderating effect of both locus of control and achievement motivation in the relationship 
between family/lone founder status and explorative orientation.  Put differently, the negative 
relationship between family status and exploration should be reduced for high levels of 
achievement motivation and increased for lower levels of achievement motivation.  Similarly, at 
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higher levels of locus of control the negative relationship between family status and explorative 
orientation is reduced and increased for lower levels. The two interactions terms are plotted in 
Figure 1. Figures 5 and 6 show that the slopes of the regression lines in each graph is decreased 
with an increment in the level of each moderator.   
In Model 2, both achievement motivation and internal locus of control were not significant after 
family/lone founder status was entered in the equation. However, Table 2, Model 3, shows that 
there were positive significant slope coefficients for the independent variables achievement 
motivation ( = -.219, t (459) = 5.204<.001) and internal locus of control ( = .117, t (459) = 
2.633. p=.009), which lends support for Hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively.  
Given that OLS assumptions rely on normality distribution and homogeneity of variance, a 
bootstrapping procedure was performed based on 1000 bootstrap samples. The results are 
identical to the previous results. This was expected given that a large sample size (N=470) 
improves the power and robustness of linear regression estimates. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Coefficients of Variables in the Explorative and Ambidextrous Orientation Models 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed). 
  
Listwise Deletion. N=470 
  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for scales are in parentheses   
     
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Exploitative 
Orientation 
1.49  1.14  (0.68)          
2 Explorative 
Orientation 
16.00  5.25  -.026 (0.84)         
3. Ambidextrous 
Orientation 
0.51  0.50  .559** .555** 1        
4. Family versus Lone 
Founder  startup 
status 
0.37  0.48  .051 -.654** -.340** 1       
5. Achievement 
Motivation 
11.70  3.87  -.103* .116* .012 -.081 (0.70)      
6. Internal Locus of 
Control 
21.78  2.74  -.078 .056 .013 -.076 .229** (0.73)     
7. Net Household 
Assets 
242,803  395,872  .125** -.034 .046 .102* -.168** -.031 1    
8. Average Industry 
Experience in Startup 
Team 
9.09  10.62  -.102* .066 -.020 -.077 .032 .142** .110* 1   
9. Average  Startup  
Attempts 
1.35  5.70  -.026 -.013 .032 .005 .032 .020 .090* .118* 1  
10. Munificence 31.69  7.64  .070 .029 .042 -.086 -.063 -.174** -.114* -.025 -.071 (0.80) 
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Table 2: Results of moderated hierarchical regression analysis on exploration family 
versus lone founder startups 
 
                                                     Exploration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls 
Average industry experience in 
startup team 
.073 .013 .003 
Average startup experience in 
startup team 
         -.19 -.020            -.023 
Munificence .025            -.022 .003 
Net Household assets          -.36 .043 .032 
Business Code .056 .031 .042 
Independent Variables 
Family status -.654***            -.659*** 
Achievement Motivation           .069             .219*** 
Internal Locus of control          -.012             .117** 
Interaction effects 
Achievement Motivation and 
Family/lone founder status 
   -.257*** 
Internal Locus of Control and 
Family/lone founder status 
   -.181*** 
R2 .101  .436              .51 
Adjusted R2 -.001 .426 .500 
R2 Change  .010 .426 .074 
F Change  .952 116.041*** 34.903*** 
Note: The entries in the table are standardized coefficients (betas). Results are based in a one 
tailed test. P values estimated by 1000 bootstrap samples. VIF between 1.002 and 1.856. 
*p<.05   
**p<.01  
***p<.001 
Deletion list wise. N=470      
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Figure 5: Achievement motivation as moderator of relationship between founder status 
and exploration orientation 
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Figure 6: Internal Locus of Control as Moderator of Relationship between Founder status 
and Explorative Orientation 
 
Ambidexterity Hypotheses 
Table 5 shows that, from a total of 470 family and lone founder startups available in the initial 
sample, 239 (51%) were considered ambidextrous. From the total number of ambidextrous firms 
only 49 (21%) were family startups and 190 (79%) were actually lone founder startups. The chi 
square test suggested that the percentage of family startups is negatively associated with the 
percentage of ambidextrous firms (χ2 (1, N=470) = 54.281, p<.001).  This provides support for the 
hypothesis that family startups tend to be less ambidextrous than lone founder startups. Although 
non-parametric testing such as chi square test can be useful to predict associations regardless of 
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distribution assumptions, it comes at the expense of less power and instability for sample 
coefficients for low sample size. In this study, sample size is considerable enough to overcome 
concerns about less power. Logistic hierarchical regression was used to test the hypotheses 
because 1) it is the appropriate statistical analyses when the predictors are both continuous and 
categorical variables and the dependent variable are dichotomous (Agresti, 1990), and 2) it 
provides information about the each variable’s contribution when added to the model.   
To test the ambidexterity hypotheses, a different treatment than ordinary least squares regression 
is necessary. This is because the dependent variable is dichotomous and a simple linear 
regression analysis does not meet the assumption of normality and homoscedasticity (Menard, 
1995) of the error term.  Also, the results from logistic regression are presented in the form of 
odds —or the probability of observing an event compared to the probability of not observing such 
event— which facilitates interpretation. Logistic coefficient estimates represent changes in the log 
of observing a firm with ambidextrous orientation for a unitary change in a predictor, with all other 
predictors held constant. The exponentiation of the logistic regression coefficient corresponds to 
the odds ratio. A positive value of the logistic coefficient indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between the predictor and the odds of observing an outcome, in this case, an 
“ambidextrous firm” (i.e. when the sum of exploration and exploitation is high). Similarly, a 
negative coefficient indicates that there is a negative relationship between the predictor and the 
odds of observing an “ambidextrous firm”. Exponentiation of the logistic coefficient results in the 
odds ratio of an ambidextrous firm for a unit change in the predictor. R2, in the case of logistic 
regression, is called pseudo R2 because it differs from the percentage of the total variance 
explained by the linear model. Pseudo R2 doesn’t rely on assumptions of minimizing the variance 
that OLS regression does. However, pseudo R2 provides a measure of the goodness of fit of the 
model. Positive increments in pseudo R2 can be interpreted as the overall improvement in the 
predictive power of the model. 
Table 3 shows the odds ratios and the Wald’s statistics for significance along with pseudo R2. 
Table 3 also shows the significance of the models for increments in regression coefficients. The 
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improvement in prediction accuracy of model 1, which includes the controls, was negligible when 
compared with a model containing only the intercept. After entering family/lone founder startup 
status and locus of control in Model 2, both the increment (χ2 (2, N=470) = 58.679, p<.001), and 
Model 2 (χ2 (7, N=470) = 61.774, p<.001) were significant. Similarly, Pseudo R2 increased from 
.007 to .123 for Cox and Snell R2, and from .009 to .164 for Nagelkerke R2. Since Nagelkerke is 
closer to how R2 is interpreted in linear regression, family/lone founder startup status accounts for 
nearly 16% of the variance in ambidextrous firms. The predictive accuracy of the model also 
improved from 54.5 in Model 1 to 66.6 in Model 2. This shows that the adding of family/lone 
founder startup and locus of control has a high overall contribution to Model 2 above and beyond 
covariates in Model 1. Model 3 introduces the interaction term of locus of control and family/lone 
founder startup status. After introducing the interaction term to Model 3, the increment (χ2 (1, 
N=470) = 14.489, p<.001) and Model 3 (χ2 (8, N=470) = 76.204, p<.001) were significant. Pseudo 
R2 increased from .123 to .15 for Cox and Snell R2, and from .164 to .2 for Nagelkerke R2. The 
overall correct predictions of the model 3 improved to 67.7 from 66.6 for Model 2, and accounts 
for 20% in the variance of ambidextrous firms.  Therefore, adding the interaction term between 
founder status and internal locus of control contributes to the predictive capacity of the model 
above and beyond all other predictors in Model 2. 
Table 3 shows the Wald test of significance and the odds ratio for each of the predictors. 
Employing a .05 criterion of statistical significance for all variables in Model 3, in Figure 2, was 
fully supported. Table 3 shows, in Model 3, that the odds ratio for family/lone founder startup 
status was significant, suggesting that a family startup is .191 as likely to be ambidextrous firm 
(high in the sum of exploitative and explorative orientation) as compared to a lone founder 
startup, keeping all other predictors constant.  Put differently, and taking the inverse of the odds 
ratio, the odds that a family startup is not ambidextrous it is 5.24 times higher than for a lone 
founder startup, keeping all other predictors constant. This finding fully support s hypothesis 5 
that family startups are less likely to become ambidextrous than lone founder startups.  
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Table 3, shows that the odds ratio for locus of control was significant and more than 1 when locus 
of control was entered in model 3. The odds ratio indicates that startups with a one additional unit 
in locus of control would be 12% more likely to be ambidextrous than lone founder startups. 
However, the interpretation of this result needs to be taken with care since the interaction effect 
was also significant. Therefore, the main effect cannot be taken out independently of the 
interaction effect.  
Table 3 shows, in Model 3, that the odds ratio for the interaction between locus of control and 
family/lone founder startups was less than 1 and significant. This suggests that the negative 
association of family startups and the likelihood to be less ambidextrous than lone startups is 
different for different levels of locus of control of the main founder. The interpretation of the 
interaction in a logistic regression can be tricky. Basically, the idea is that a conditional effect 
needs to take into account both the direct effect and the interaction. In the case of a logistic 
regression, a multiplication of both the odds ratio of internal locus of control and the odds ratio of 
the interaction of internal locus of control and family/lone founder startup status yields the total 
effect that a one unit increase in internal locus of control has on the likelihood of ambidextrous 
orientation in family startups. In the case of this study the multiplication of both odds ratio is less 
than one (odds ratio=.85), suggesting that additional increase in one unit further decreases the 
likelihood of ambidextrous orientation. 
 
Therefore, the interpretation of the total effect of internal locus of control on the likelihood of 
ambidextrous orientation needs to take into account the effect of the interaction and the main 
effect of internal locus of control. In this case, this study’s sample reveals that an additional unit of 
internal locus of control reduces rather than increases the chances to be ambidextrous. This 
finding is contrary to the expectation that internal locus of control should reduce the chances of 
ambidextrous orientation. However, these findings are consistent with the idea that SEW can also 
become a deterrent for change. The stronger the family founder’s internal locus of control, the 
more entrenched they may become in order to avoid losing their source of non-economic 
benefits. In order words, family founders may become more preventive focused by perceiving 
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their ownership of the business more important than pursuing uncertain actions that may 
challenge their SEW. Therefore, family startups with high internal locus of control can challenge 
the balance of exploitation and exploration and further reduce the chances of ambidextrous 
orientation compared to lone founder startups. 
 
Odds ratios of the moderator coefficient shows that family startups increase their likelihood to 
being ambidextrous compared to lone founder startup from .191 to .75, when locus of control of 
the main founder is considered in the model. This finding supports Hypothesis 7. 
In order to test whether the hypotheses of ambidexterity holds at cut off points different from the 
previous median cut-off grouping (i.e. when the upper 50th percentile contains ambidextrous firms 
with a value of one and the lower 50th percentile contains non-ambidextrous firms), a sensitivity 
analysis was performed. Table 4 shows a comparison of three cutoff points for Model 3: the 
median cutoff point already analyzed, a cut-off point that considered the upper and lower 37.5th 
percentile as ambidextrous firms, and a cut-off point that considered the upper and lower 20th 
percentile as ambidextrous firms. The results suggested that the more stringent the cut off, the 
more the magnitude of the effects of the predictors and the greater the accuracy of the model.  
When the cutoff point of ambidextrous orientation was more stringent, the odds of a family startup 
becoming ambidextrous compared to lone founder startups decreased from .191 to .149 for the 
37.5th percentile, and from .191 to .035 for the 20th percentile. Accuracy of the predictions of the 
model improved from 67.7 percent for the 50th percentile to 69.4 percent for the 37.5th percentile 
and to 79.4 percent for the 20th percentile. Also, the variance explained in ambidextrous 
orientation increased from 15% to 20% and to 37% as the cutoff became more stringent. This 
indicates that the more stringent is the criteria for considering a firm ambidextrous, the greater the 
effect of the founder status on ambidexterity. 
Similarly, internal Locus of Control increased its beta weight of the direct effect from 1.117 to 
1.134 to 1.184, whereas the moderation coefficient decreased from .75 to .69 to .62, as the 
criteria became more stringent. This suggests that the effect of locus of control is stronger the 
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more stringent the criteria for cutoff, and that the effect of the attenuation in ambidextrous 
orientation is more pronounced when the cutoff criteria is more stringent, for each unit change in 
locus of control. 
Table 3: Logistic hierarchical regression analysis on ambidextrous orientation family 
versus lone founder status 
 
 
                                                                Ambidextrous orientation (cut off point 50%) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls 
Average industry experience in 
startup team 
.995 (.371)    .987 (1.839) .984 (2.646) 
Average startup experience in startup 
team 
1.013 (.472) 1.016 (.565)     1.022 (.912) 
Munificence   1.013 (1.137) 1.000(.270)     1.010 (.546) 
Net Household assets   1.000 (.1.210)   1.000 (3.931)    1.000* (4.156) 
Business Code 1.000 (.191) 1.000 (.065)     1.000 (1.39) 
Independent Variables 
Family versus lone founder status      .210  (52.936)***  .191*** (54.431) 
Internal Locus of control 1.001 (.001) 1.117** (5.460) 
Interaction effects 
Internal Locus of Control and Family 
status 
   .750** (13.973) 
-2 Log-likelihood     648.327 589.648*** 575.219*** 
Cox & Snell R Squared .007 .164 .2 
Nagelkerke R Squared .009 .123 .15 
Model Fit Chi squared 3.096 61.774***   76.204*** 
Hosmer and Lemeshow p value .514 .955  .844 
Percentage Predicted       54.5         66.6        67.7 
Note: The entries in the table are Odds ratio. Wald’s statistic in parenthesis. Results are based on a 
one-tailed test. P values based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 Deletion list wise. N=470 
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Table 4: Comparison of results for different cut off points in Ambidexterity 
 
  Ambidexterity(20% Cutoff) 
Ambidexterity(37.5% 
Cutoff) 
Ambidexterity(50-50 
Cutoff) 
Controls       
Average industry experience 
in startup team .982 (.885) .983 (2.411)   .984 (2.646) 
Average startup experience in 
startup team 1.005 (.011) 1.014 (.171) 1.022 (.912) 
Munificence .988(.204) 1.024 (1.943) 1.010 (.546) 
Net Household assets  1.000 (1.293) 1.000 (.82)    1.000* (4.156) 
Business Code  1.000 (1.293) 1.000 (3.18) 1.000 (1.39) 
Independent Variables       
Family status       .035 (43.29)*** .149*** (49.144)        .191*** (54.431) 
Locus of control    1.184 (4.152)** 1.134** (5.028)    1.117** (5.460) 
Interaction effects       
Internal Locus of Control and 
Family startup status     .62** (10.155) .696** (15.111)       .750** (13.973) 
-2 Log-likelihood       173.575*** 412.635*** 575.219*** 
Cox & Snell R Squared 0.498 0.26               0.2 
Nagelkerke R Squared 0.374 0.195 0.15 
Model Fit Chi squared 88.43*** 76.724***     76.204*** 
Hosmer and Lemeshow p 
value 0.215 0.7 0.844 
Sample 189 353 470 
Percentage Predicted 79.4 69.4 67.7 
Note: The entries in the table are Odds Ratios. Wald’s statistic in parenthesis.    
Results are based in a one tailed test. P values based on 1000 bootstrap samples. No missing 
values.   
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001               
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Table 5: Family versus Lone Founder status * Ambidextrous Orientation Cross tabulation 
     Ambidextrous Orientation Total 
            No             Yes 
Family versus Lone 
Founder status 
Lone 
Count 108 190 298 (63.4%)
Expected Count 146.5 151.5 217
Family 
Count 123 49 172 (36.6%)
Expected Count 84.5 87.5 119
Total 
Count 231 (49.1%) 239 (50.9%) 470
Expected Count 231 239 470
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Alternative explanations for explorative and ambidextrous orientations 
So far the argument has been that the existence of family ties in a family business startup and 
their absence in a lone founder startup should make a difference in terms of explorative and 
ambidextrous orientation. However, the effect on exploration can be also due to a group effect.  
Early work from Sherif (1937) analyzed the role of group norms in decision making. Sherif (1937) 
proposed that individuals perceive a situation differently and are influenced not only by their 
personal judgments but also by the presence of other people. In order to account for the fact that 
a group effect, rather than the family ties, leads to explorative and ambidextrous orientation, a 
non-family business reference group was used in both the explorative and ambidexterity 
hypotheses.  This study design allows comparing two groups in terms of explorative and 
ambidextrous orientation. The first group corresponds to family startups in which all founders are 
family related (i.e. family startups). The second group (reference group) corresponds to non-
family startups, that is, startups in which all founders are non- family related (non-family startups). 
Therefore, if in fact there is a group effect, the group effect of family startups versus lone founder 
startups on explorative and ambidextrous orientation and the group effect of non-family startups 
versus lone founder startups in exploration and ambidextrous orientation, should be about the 
same.   
In  order to test for this alternative explanation,   a dichotomous variable “non-family startup” —
with  a value of 1 if all founders are non-family related and a value of zero if the startup has a lone 
founder— was entered in lieu of the previous family startup dichotomous variable in the 
exploration and ambidexterity models shown in Tables 2 and 3 respectively.  
Table 6, Model 3, shows that the difference in exploitation orientation of non-family founders’ 
group compared to lone founders was not significant ( = -.004, t(312)=-.0702, p=.943) after 
entering all the variables in Table 2. Similarly, Table 7 shows that the difference in ambidextrous 
orientation of non-family founders’ group compared to lone founders was not significant (p= .736) 
after entering all the variables in Table 3. 
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Therefore, group effects are not likely to play a role in explaining difference in explorative and 
ambidextrous orientation. 
 
Table 6: Results of moderated hierarchical regression analysis on exploration for non-
family versus lone founder startups 
 
                                                     Exploration 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls 
Average industry experience in 
startup team 
.1* .109* .107 
Average startup experience in 
startup team 
           .02 .000            -.002 
Net Household assets   -.019            -.008 -.008 
Business Code            .157**   .135* .137 
Munificence .-.02   .044 .046 
Independent Variables 
Non Family versus Lone Founder 
status 
-.002            -.004 
Internal Locus of control             .154             .142 
Achievement Motivation             .273             .291*** 
Interaction effects 
Achievement Motivation and 
Family/lone founder status 
   -.257*** 
Internal Locus of Control and 
Family/lone founder status 
   -.181*** 
R2 .04  .155              .157 
Adjusted R2 .025 .134 .13 
R2 Change  .025 .134 .13 
F Change  2.641             7.209 ***        5.804*** 
Note: The entries in the table are standardized coefficients (betas). Results are based in a one 
tailed test. P values estimated by 1000 bootstrap samples. 
*p<.05   
**p<.01  
***p<.001 
Deletion list wise. N=323      
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Table 7: Logistic hierarchical regression analysis on ambidextrous orientation non-family 
versus lone founder status 
 
 
                                                                Ambidextrous orientation (cut off point 50%) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Controls 
Average industry experience in 
startup team 
1.016 (1.965)    1.012 (1.028) 1.012 (1.031) 
Average startup experience in startup 
team 
     .999 (.003) 1.001 (.003)     1.001 (.003) 
Net Household assets   1.000 (.086) 1.001 (.156)     1.000 (.153) 
Business Code   1.002 (.019)   1.009 (.429)     1.009 (.426) 
Munificence     1.000 (4.364) 1.000 (4.473)*     1.000 (4.446)* 
Independent Variables 
Non-family versus lone founder status        .907 (.115)       .908 (.113) 
Internal Locus of control       1.125 (7.381)** 1.123 (5.051)* 
Interaction effects 
Internal Locus of Control and Family 
status 
     1.014(.003) 
-2 Log-likelihood      441.311        433.31*       433.328 
Cox & Snell R Squared .020   .044 .044 
Nagelkerke R Squared .026   .058 .058 
Model Fit Chi squared 6.434 14.414*          14.417  
Percentage Predicted         55.4           57.3          57.3 
Note: The entries in the table are 
Odds ratio. Wald’s statistic in 
parenthesis. Results are based on a 
one-tailed test. P values based on 
1000 bootstrap samples. 
   
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 Deletion list wise. N=323 
 
   
      
    
Survival Hazards Hypotheses  
A multivariate Cox proportional hazard regression model was used to predict the likelihood of 
disengaging from the business at any given time.  The dependent variable is the time at which the 
startup disengaged its activities (disengaged = 1) or the time elapsed until the surviving startup 
was censored (0 = survived). The Cox model was used in this study to estimate relative risks of 
disengaging from the business given the ambidexterity hypothesis that a more ambidextrous 
 91 
 
 
orientation is expected to reduce survival hazards in family startups. Cox proportional hazard 
assumptions were met as there were no time dependent covariates that contributed to the model.  
 
Explorative and exploitative orientations of the main founder were measured in wave A as the 
importance the founder placed on exploitation or exploration behaviors at the beginning of the 
startup process. Later in time, the status of a startup was determined in terms of whether the 
startup disengaged (i.e. not active anymore) or it continued operating. Also, the time of the 
disengagement was assessed in each wave. Both the time of disengagement and the status of 
the startup were entered in a Cox Proportional Hazards regression model, which provided an 
estimation of the likelihood that a startup would not survive beyond a certain time. Table 8 shows 
respective proportions of disengaged startups and active startups by family vs. lone founder 
status. 
 
The assumption that the hazard ratio is kept constant across different levels of a covariate at all 
times was confirmed using Kaplan-Meir estimation technique. Both Log rank (χ2 (1, N=108) = 
4.49, p=.034), and Breslow’s statistics (χ2 (1, N=108) = 4.38, p=.036) were significant, supporting 
the assumption that the distributions at different levels of the covariate came from different 
populations. Figures 7 and 8 also show a graphical representation of this assumption by showing 
that survival curves for family and lone founder startups don’t cross out and are approximately 
parallel to each other. Therefore, it is safe to say that proportional hazard assumptions were met.   
The model is shown on Figure 3. The model was tested in two blocks. In the first block, previous 
covariates were entered in the model (average industry experience in founding team, average 
startup experience in founding team, munificence, business code and net assets in household). 
None of the controls were significant and the first model was not different from the intercept only 
model. When ambidextrous orientation ---a dichotomous variable with 1 for high and 0 for low 
levels-- and locus of control were entered in Model 2, this step was statistically significant as 
compared to Model 1 (χ2 (2, N=131) =9.192, p=.01). The fit of the model was also statistically 
significant (χ2 (7, N=108) =15.976, p=.025) as compared to a model with intercept only.  
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Table 9 shows the exponentiated beta coefficients, or hazard ratios, along with their confidence 
intervals. The operationalization of ambidextrous orientation was a 50-50 split. That is, a firm that 
scores more than the median in ambidextrous orientation was considered ambidextrous and 
coded by 1 (0 was the coding for firms with non-ambidextrous orientation).  Hypothesis 8 was 
supported because the beta coefficient was negative and significant, suggesting that 
ambidextrous family startups will have lower survival hazard (HR=.556, C.I. = .333–.926). 
Therefore, ambidextrous family startups (those high in the sum of exploration and exploitation) 
were about half as likely to disengage from startup than non- ambidextrous firms (those low in the 
sum of exploration and exploitation orientation). Inverting the hazard ratio, ambidextrous firms 
were 1.8 times more likely to survive than non-ambidextrous startups, holding other covariates 
constant.  
Table 9 also shows that Hypothesis 9 was supported because the beta coefficient for  internal 
locus of control was significant and negative, suggesting that main founders with higher levels of 
a locus of control were associated with less survival hazards (HR=.881, C.I. 805-.976).   
Similar to He and Wong (2004), a sensitivity analysis was performed to analyze the effect of 
different cutoff criteria on survival hazards. Table 8 shows a comparison of the three previous 
cutoff points for Model 2. The results suggest that the more stringent the definition of 
ambidexterity, the greater the magnitude of the effects of the predictors and the greater the 
accuracy of the model.  
Table 10 shows that, when the cutoff point defining ambidextrous orientation was more stringent, 
the odds of a family startup to disengage from startup activities decreased from H.R. = .556 (C.I. 
= .333-.926) for the 50th percentile, to H.R. =.32 (C.I. = .170-.605) for the 37.5th percentile, and to 
H.R. = .274 (C.I. =.095-.789) for the 20th percentile. To estimate the model fit, the log likelihood 
ratio was calculated by subtracting the log likelihood of the null model from the log likelihood of 
the alternative model. The log-likelihood ratio for Model 2 with a median cut-off grouping was 
significant (χ2 (7, N=131) =15.976, p=.025). The log-likelihood ration for model 2 with a 37.5th 
percentile grouping had a better model fit (χ2 (7, N=103) = 26.485, p<.001). Finally, the log-
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likelihood ration for model 2 with the 20th percentile was also significant and with a better fit than 
the median cutoff grouping (χ2 (7, N=51) =19.890, p=.006). This suggests that the more stringent 
is the criteria defining a firm as ambidextrous, the greater the fit of the model to the data, even 
with a sample as small as 51 firms.  
Table 10 shows that internal locus of control also had a greater effect both as a moderator and as 
a predictor as the ambidexterity cut off becomes more stringent, decreasing the hazard ratio from 
HR=.908 (C.I. = .838-.983) to HR=.84 (C.I=.761-.928) to H.R. =.778 (C.I. =.671-.90). This 
suggests that the effect of locus of control is be stronger the more stringent is the criteria for 
cutoff, and that the effect of the attenuation in ambidextrous orientation is even more pronounced 
when the cutoff criteria is more stringent. 
Table 8: Cross tabulation survival hazard (disengaged) versus family/ lone founder status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lone Founder Family Startup Total 
Disengaged 
152  93  245 (57.8%) 
Active 116  63  179 (42.2%) 
Total 268 (63.2) 156 (36.8%) 424 
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Table 9: Cox’s proportional hazard model for predicting survival hazards in family startups 
for ambidexterity in 50-50 cutoff criteria. 
 
 Model 1 HR 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Model 2 HR 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Variables 
Controls: 
Average industry 
experience in startup team .973   .943—.1.004 .977 .947—1.008 
Average startup experience 
in startup team .995  .889—1.113 1.001 .916—1.093 
Munificence 1.005 .97—1.036 1.007 .975—1.041 
Net Household assets 1.000 1.000—1.000 1.000 1.0—1.000 
Business Code 1.000 1.000—1.000 1.000 1.0—1.000 
Independent Variables: 
Ambidextrous orientation  .556* .333–.926 
Internal Locus of Control .908* .838--.983 
Chi square change   6.502 13.513** 
-2LL 669.327     660.135 
Chi square   7.872         9.192* 
      
Note: HR= Hazard Ratio. N= 131. Cases excluded from the 
analysis because of missing values=41.      
*p<.05  
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
p values calculated using bootstrapping for 1000 samples     
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Table 10: Cox’s proportional Hazard model for different cut-off points in ambidexterity 
 
  Median cut-off grouping 37.5th cut-off grouping 20th cut-off grouping 
Controls             
Average industry 
experience in 
startup team 
0.977  .947—1.008 .964   .933—.997 0.979  .938—1.023 
Average startup 
experience in 
startup team 
1.001 .916—1.093 1.007 .907—1.117 0.992 .850—1.157 
Munificence 1.007 .975—1.041 1.007 .974—1.042 1.017 .961—1.077 
Net Household 
assets 1.000   1.0—1.000 1.000  1.0—1.000 1.000  1.000—1.000 
Business Code 1.000   1.0—1.000 1.000  1.0—1.000 1   1.000—1.000 
Independent 
Variables             
Ambidextrous 
orientation  .556*   .333—.926 .32***    .17—.605 .274*   .095–.789 
Internal Locus of 
Control .908*   .838—.983 .84*** .761—.928 .778** -.671--.901 
Chi square 
change 13.513**   18.973***   
12.164
**   
-2LL 660.135   488.156  
210.45
4   
Chi square 9.192*   26.485 ***   19.890**   
Sample size  131    103   51   
Missing    41      13     7   
Note: The entries in the table 
are Hazard ratio with the 
corresponding confidence 
intervals. *p<.05 , **p<.01, 
***p<.001 
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Figure 7: Survival Function in Family Startups 
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Figure 8: Hazard Function in Family Startups 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Exploration Hypotheses 
Following the call from researchers to incorporate social cognitive determinants in predicting 
entrepreneurship  outcomes (e.g. Shaver & Scott, 1991; Brittain & Freeman, 1980; Gartner, 1985) 
this study considered the following effects on explorative orientation: 1) the effect of the social 
context represented by the presence of family ties in family versus lone founder startups 2) a 
interaction effect between family versus lone founder startup status and the psychological traits of 
the main founders 3) the effect of the psychological traits of the main founders. 
First, this study showed how the social context, in term of the family ties among founders, affects 
explorative orientation as compared to the absence of such ties in lone founders (i.e. only one 
founder owns the firm).   
Gomez-Mejia et al, (2007) empirically demonstrated that family businesses are willing to take 
high risks in order to preserve socio-emotional wealth (SEW) and also avoid risks that may lead 
to the loss of SEW. However, their results applied only to established public family owned 
businesses. This study extends previous findings on established business to private startup firms, 
and asks the question: Does SEW have an impact on the explorative orientation of startup firms? 
More specifically, do family startups explore less than lone founder startups due to the SEW of 
family businesses?  
Although it can be argued that a lone founder can still have other links to other family members 
who don’t own the business, this study assumes that family ownership has a greater impact on 
risk taking, as recently shown by empirical studies (e.g. Gomez-Mejia at al. 2007). This approach 
has the advantage that it avoids complications with different family business definitions by 
analyzing how explorative orientations differ as a function of the presence of family ties (family 
startups) or their absence (lone founder startups). Consistent with literature on socio-emotional 
wealth (see Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011 for a review) --which considers family ties among owners 
as a proxy for socio-emotional dynamics among family owners-- this study predicted a negative 
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effect on explorative orientation when such ties are present rather than when they are absent. 
Results from the hierarchical linear regression strongly support the fit of the linear regression 
model. Results showed that the variance in explorative orientation is explained by all the 
predictors in the model. Moreover, family versus lone founder startup status alone predicts 43% 
of the variance in the difference in explorative orientation in the overall model. 
These results are consistent with literature on Behavioral Agency Theory which offers a different 
interpretation of risk behaviors than agency theory does (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency 
Theory assumes that decision makers hold consistent risk preferences.  Behavioral Agency 
Theory (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) allows for variation of risk preferences depending on 
the context that decision makers face. Results show that SEW, conceptualized as family related 
ties among founders, provides a salient context which affects risk behaviors, consistent with 
behavioral theories spearheaded by researchers  such as Bowman (1980), Bromiley (1991), 
Fiegenbaum (1990), Jegers, (1991), MacCrimmon & Wehrung (1986 a, b), March & Shapira 
(1987), Sinha (1994), Tversky & Kahneman (1981).  Behavioral theories argue that the relative 
importance that decision makers may give to similar outcomes depend on their reference points. 
In this study, it was hypothesized that those referent points depend on what is important for the 
family founders. Based on Regulatory Focus Theory, it was proposed that a preventive focus 
would be more salient as a reference point for family startups than for lone founder startups 
because of SEW preservation arguments, which in turn should increase risk perception and 
reduce explorative orientation.  
An alternative explanation regarding the effect of family ties on exploration is the “risky shift” 
effect- a phenomenon which spans 300 studies from the initial research of Stoner (1968). Risk 
shifting is one of the most standard phenomena in the risk-taking literature (e.g. Bateson, 1966; 
Rim, 1963; Stoner, 1961). It can be described “…as the increase in an individual’s likelihood to 
take larger risks as the result of group processes of the risk-taking situation and the level of risk 
involved” (Glover, 1977, p. 317). Numerous findings show that individuals in groups advocate 
greater risk taking than individuals alone (see Clark, 1974 for a review).  
 100 
 
 
"Value theory" offers an explanation to risk shift by focusing on the underlying motivation to agree 
upon shared values. Value theory argues that it is the value in risk rather than the exchange of 
information which drives risk shifting (Brown, 1965). This underlying motivation has been related 
to need of approval which stem from the desire for esteem (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964). For 
Crowne and Marlow "…the studies of the approval motive suggest a set of self-reflexive attitudes-
-a self-conception in which an idealized version of the self ... is maintained and defended (p. 
190)". Interestingly, family startups provide a strong value system which provides family owners 
with identification, control, altruism and belongingness all of which satisfy affective needs 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). Therefore it is reasonable to expect that family owners would tend to 
be driven by these values, which are salient to them, compromising their particular risk choice to 
this new reference point, that is, maintaining and preserving the SEW.    
In other words, risk shifting can explain why family startups have a less explorative orientation 
than lone founder startups. This also explains Gomez-Mejia et al.’s (2007) findings that family 
businesses were willing to take higher risks than normatively appropriate in order to prevent  the 
loss of their SEW. More specifically, value theory can help to understand why family businesses 
can be risk willing and risk seeking at the same time. Future studies might analyze the 
relationship between SEW, family values and risk shifting effect.  
Second, it was proposed that achievement motivation and internal locus of control interact with 
family startup/lone founder startup status to predict explorative orientation. Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that these constructs provide a promotion chronic promotion focus which interact 
with SEW in such a way that a strong value on these constructs lead to decrease the gap in 
exploration between family startups and lone founder startups. Contrarily to expectations, the 
moderation effects of both constructs, although significant, were positive rather than negative. 
This suggests that a strong value on these constructs lead to increase, rather than decrease the 
gap in exploration between family startups and lone founder startups. This was an unexpected 
finding because previous studies suggest that a promotion focus changes the preventive focus 
and leads towards more exploration and creativity (Liberman et al., 1999).  
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Risk shifting can help to explain these findings. As previously mentioned, strong internal locus of 
control and achievement motivation increase the saliency of family values in the form of SEW. 
This, in turn, leads to change the reference points in accordance with ideals and aspiration for the 
family business, which include protection of the SEW. In nurturing and protecting SEW (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011), family businesses can overcommit resources to a course of action resulting in 
less rather than more explorative orientation. Lone founders, in turn, are less restricted by SEW 
and act consistently with a utility maximizing criteria, changing from one opportunity to the next if 
that opportunity leads to  increased economic welfare. This can explain why the gap in 
explorative orientation increases rather than decreases for high levels of these constructs. 
Third, the effect of internal locus of control and achievement motivation on explorative orientation 
points out not only to the importance of the social context for risky decision making, but also the 
importance of these psychological traits of the main founders on explorative orientation. 
Specifically, this study showed that both achievement motivation and internal locus of control 
orientation are related to a promotion regulation focus and thus favors explorative orientation. The 
significant regression coefficient of internal locus of control and achievement motivation 
demonstrates the positive effect of psychological constructs on explorative orientation. However, 
it is important to be careful about the interpretation of this effect as the interaction term was also 
significant and in the opposite direction to expected direction. Therefore, a main effect cannot be 
interpreted alone without also considering the combined effect of both the main effect and the 
interaction term. 
In this particular sample, the effect of family/lone founder startup status on explorative orientation 
was positive. However, the positive and significant term of the interaction suggests that high 
levels of internal locus of control and achievement motivation may strengthen rather than weaken 
the negative effect of family startups on explorative orientation compared to lone founder 
startups. Put differently, although there is a positive effect of internal locus of control and 
achievement motivation on explorative orientation, there is also a negative interaction, which 
tends to reduce explorative orientation compared to lone founder startups. Moreover, in this 
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sample, the addition of both standardized effects is less than one, suggesting a slight overall 
decrease in exploration for each additional unit of internal locus of control.  
Results also showed that the effects of internal locus of control and achievement motivation are 
related explorative orientation. This suggests that the psychological traits of the main founder also 
affect risk behaviors that increase variance in actions. This is consistent with Yu (2001) argument 
that psychological traits can influence interpretation frameworks. Weingart and Pablo (1995) also 
suggested that psychological traits can affect risk propensities and that these psychological traits 
depend on past experiences. These findings, therefore, highlight the importance of incorporating 
these two distinctive psychological traits of the main founder as predictors of explorative 
orientation.  
The results in the hierarchical regression showed that the control variables related to industry and 
startup attempts were not significant predictors of explorative orientation. Also, the net household 
assets and entrepreneurial munificence didn’t have any effect on exploration. This is somewhat 
counterintuitive as previous research suggests that a greater industry experience, financial slack 
or previous startup attempts lead to foster more exploration of alternatives. However, previous 
research on innovation has focused on large public firms and not much on small business let 
alone at the startup level.  
There is a controversy about whether small firms innovate more or less than large firms.  Early, 
Schumpeter, in 1931, argued that small firms lack financial and human resources to support 
innovation initiatives, such as R & D., financial and human resources, while large firms contribute 
to innovation through the routinization of innovation by a process of “creative destruction”. 
However, some studies suggest that radical innovations are more likely to come from new 
entrants (Ross 1990), such as, the incandescent lamp (Edison), the FM radio (Armstrong), the 
microwave oven (Raytheon), the microcomputer (Altair and Apple) and the microprocessor (Intel). 
Similarly, Almeida and Kogut (1997) suggested that smaller firms are more likely to possess 
characteristics that allow them to make adjustments necessary to take advantage of new 
opportunities.  Henderson (1993) found some support to the link between new entrants and 
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radical innovation, proposing that larger incumbents were less productive in exploiting radical 
innovations than startup firms.  This is also consistent with the idea that structural inertia (Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984; Down, 1967) constricts innovation to previously established trajectories.   
Notwithstanding, this study’s findings suggest that SEW in family ties supersede these controls 
increasing risk perceptions and thus, constraining family founders in exploring alternative courses 
of action. Lone founder startups, in turn, are less restrained by SEW and thus, are more likely to 
explore new ideas and opportunities. An explanation for these findings is that endowments at the 
startup team level related to experience or financial slack are not yet developed as in established 
firms, therefore, the context that is most salient to founders relies more in the family’s SEW, or 
preservation of the non-economic benefits derived from their ownership of the firm. Moreover, 
SEW literature suggests that the family owners’ identification with the business is stronger in the 
startup of the business rather than on later stages of the business cycle where other family 
ownership is diluted by outside managers or shareholders (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). 
These findings have interesting implications for practitioners since achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control may in fact be a double edge sword. On the one hand, a founder high in 
both of these traits can promote an explorative orientation, as suggested by their positive effect 
on explorative orientation. However, on the other hand, the interaction terms suggest that the gap 
in explorative orientation is increased compared to lone founder startups. An explanation for this 
study’s findings is that both constructs provide a motivation for family founders to nurture and 
protect their already accrued SEW. Therefore, too much confidence in one self (i.e. internal locus 
of control) or the sense of confidence on achieving goals (i.e. achievement motivation) can act as 
both a driver and a deterrent. Put differently, family founders will perceive that pursuing their own 
family agenda (e.g. protect and nurture SEW) is more salient to them, which may lead them to 
risk shift, reducing their attention to alternative courses of action that stray away from their family 
values. This, in turn, results in family business being both risk willing and risk averse 
simultaneously, as predicted by Behavioral Agency Model (Gomez- Mejia et al., 2007; Wiseman 
& Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
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For example, achievement motivations have been related to previous mastering experience 
aimed to make the best out of a given situation, foster independence or a sense of autonomy 
(Rosen, 1958). Achievement motivation can be developed out of repeated affective experiences 
connected with certain types of situations and behaviors. Therefore, the experience that children 
have when learning from their parents can influence future behavior in terms of achievement 
motivation.  Parent’s previous entrepreneurial experiences are likely to motivate a family founder 
to achieve goals in the future, especially if those previous experiences evoke positive affect 
(McCLelland and Friedman, 1952; McCLelland, Atkinson, Clark & Lowel, 1953). Another 
condition that might foster achievement motivation relates to parents who foster children 
independence without interfering in their decision making process. 
However, strong achievement motivation, or high internal locus of control, as previously noted, 
can also lead to entrenchment and to less willingness to explore new ideas. Literature on family 
firms agrees that a major characteristic of these firms is the family owners’ desire to maintain the 
firm’s “familiness” stemming from a strong personal attachment, commitment and identification 
with the firm (e.g., Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Kets de Vries, 1993). Parents in family businesses, due to the comingling of business and 
family systems, tend to overlap these two identities into one. Therefore, the family business 
becomes a source of identification and purpose in life for the main founder. Due to this strong 
identification with the family and the business, family founders are motivated to centralize 
decision making, which leads them to perceive any thread to that identity (i.e. SEW) as a 
negatively framed situation. This can cause a lot of frustration in younger siblings participating in 
the family business because they are given mixed signals: on the one hand they have the 
perception they have the freedom to contribute to the family business, while on the other hand, 
they are faced with opposition from their parents to their ideas, especially if their ideas go against 
the status quo created by their founding parent. In fact, recognizing that there might be a better 
alternative than the one followed by the main founder can undermine his/her sense of identity and 
his/her role as the provider of the family and the founder of the business. In order to protect this 
loss in SEW main founders can use passive aggressiveness (Carsrud & Brannback, 2012) by 
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pointing down to the perils of going with a new strategy and the threat to lose the business in an 
uncertain path, (i.e. prevention regulation focus). Moreover, to the extent that other family owners 
depend on the main founder with strong achievement motivation or internal locus of control, it is 
expected that they are more likely to use risk shifting to align with the main founder who 
represents family values, which in turn hinders explorative orientation.  
Ambidextrous Orientation Hypotheses 
Social cognitive determinants of ambidextrous orientation were analyzed. Results suggest that 1) 
social context represented in family ties decreases the likelihood to become ambidextrous 2) 
internal locus of control increases the likelihood to become ambidextrous 3) The interaction 
between family/lone founder startup status and internal locus of control increase rather than 
reduced the likelihood to be ambidextrous in family startups compared to lone founder startups.   
First, it was proposed that family startups would be less likely to explore for a given level of 
exploitation because 1) family startups explore less than lone founder startups (hypothesis 1) and 
2) family startups and lone founder startups don’t differ in exploitative orientation.  
Results strongly supported these hypotheses. Family startups were between 2 to 29 times more 
likely to be non-ambidextrous than lone founder startups. The results were robust to changes in 
the criteria for ambidextrous firm. Results showed that the more stringent the cutoff criterion the 
more predictability of the model and the greater likelihood of the effect on ambidexterity (29 times 
for 20% cutoff point criterion versus 5 times for 50% cutoff point criterion).  Given that an 
ambidextrous orientation has been related to superior performance, these findings suggest that it 
is important that family startups develop dynamic capabilities that allow them to overcome their 
less explorative orientation earlier in the life cycle as proposed by Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) 
and Eisenhardt and Martin (2000).  
Literature on ambidexterity has analyzed how dynamic capabilities evolve after the business is 
established and routines have already been deployed. In the case of established firms, managing 
the balance of exploitation and exploration is necessary to avoid tradeoffs that may lead to more 
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reliance of exploitation or exploration. However, in all startups, the balance of exploitation and 
exploration is less constrained by routines of large established firms. Therefore, it is proposed 
that both orientations can lead to enact exploitation and exploration strategies early in the startup 
process and thus, foster a  mindset that allows them to exploit opportunities stemming from 
current courses of action or “old certainties”, as well as detecting opportunities stemming from 
“new possibilities” and ideas (March, 1991). 
Second, results showed that one additional unit of internal locus of control of the main founder 
increased in 11%-18% the likelihood of an ambidextrous firm. The results were robust to changes 
in the criteria for ambidextrous firms. The more stringent was the cutoff criterion the more 
predictability of the model and the more the likelihood of the effect on ambidexterity (18% more 
for 20% cutoff point versus 11% more for 50% cutoff points).  
Third, the interpretation of the interaction in a logistic regression can be tricky. Basically, the idea 
is that a conditional effect needs to take into account both the direct effect and the interaction. In 
the case of a logistic regression, a multiplication of both the odds ratio of interaction coefficient 
and the odds ratio of internal locus of control yields the effect that a one unit increase in internal 
locus of control has on the likelihood of ambidextrous orientation in family startups. In the case of 
this study the multiplication of both odds ratio is less than one, suggesting that additional increase 
in one unit further decreases the likelihood of ambidextrous orientation compared with lone 
founder startups. Therefore, the findings in this study suggests that internal locus of control can 
be a double edge sword as it can increase chances to become ambidextrous through the main 
effect, but also decrease the chances to be ambidextrous as compared to lone founder startups.   
This study has implications for practitioners in terms of entrepreneurship policy. Opportunity 
entrepreneur and necessity entrepreneurs were classified in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
study to differentiate entrepreneurs who have voluntarily pursuit an opportunity from 
entrepreneurs who have the necessity to engage in such activity in the absence of other 
employment opportunities (Reynolds et al., 2002, Sternberg et al., 2006).  There is an interesting 
relationship between these two types of entrepreneurs and Regulatory Focus Theory. For 
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example, a founder with a promotion focus is more opportunity oriented, whereas a founder with 
a preventive focus is more concerned with security and safety (Higgins, 1997, 1998, Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that opportunity entrepreneurs would be 
associated with entrepreneurs with a promotion focus, whereas necessity entrepreneurs would be 
associated with entrepreneurs with a prevention focus.  Furthermore, it should be expected, 
based on the previous hypotheses, that entrepreneurs with high internal locus of control would be 
more associated with opportunity rather than necessity entrepreneurs. Block and Wagner (2010) 
empirically demonstrated, in a sample of German entrepreneurs, that opportunity entrepreneurs 
had better performance than necessity entrepreneurs.  The authors suggested that this can have 
implications for allocating funding criteria (e.g. focusing more on developing skills through 
training, tax incentives or education to foster opportunity recognition) in order to favor unmet 
needs of opportunity entrepreneurs rather than necessity entrepreneurs. Given the importance of 
opportunity entrepreneurs for policy making, future studies can analyze the relationship between 
internal locus of control and opportunity entrepreneurs. 
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Survival Hypotheses 
It was proposed that family startups will be more likely to reduce survival hazards if 1) they were 
more ambidextrous from startup 2) main founders were high in internal locus of control.  
First, it was tested whether ambidextrous family startups reduced survival hazards. As expected, 
more ambidextrous orientation was related to survival hazards. Results showed that family 
startups were 1.8 - 3.6 times more likely to survive if they were ambidextrous than if they were 
not. A sensitivity analysis was performed in which different cutoffs for ambidexterity were 
operationalized. For a 50-50 cutoff a firm was classified as ambidextrous if the ambidexterity 
index (adding of exploitation and exploration) is above the median and non-ambidextrous if it was 
below the median. For a 20th cutoff, a firm was classified as ambidextrous if it scored in the upper 
20th percentile (between the 80th percentile and  the highest score on the ambidexterity index) 
and as non-ambidextrous if it scored in the lower 20th percentile (between the lowest and the 20th 
percentile of scores on the ambidexterity index)  Finally, for a 37th cutoff, a firm was classified as 
ambidextrous if it scored in the upper 37.5th percentile (between the 67.5th percentile and the 
highest score on the ambidexterity index) or as non-ambidextrous if it scored in the lower 37.5th 
percentile (between the lowest and the 37.5th percentile of scores on ambidexterity index). 
Results were robust for the different three cutoff criteria. The more stringent the cutoff points the 
more the effect on survival hazards and the predicted validity of the model (3.6 times more likely 
to survive for 20th cutoff criterion versus 1.8 times more likely to survive for 50th cutoff point 
criterion).  
These findings complement recent empirical findings suggesting that organizational longevity 
depends on whether a firm is able to embrace exploration activities earlier in time (Cottrell & 
Nault, 2004; Probst & Raisch, 2005). Piao (2010) added to these findings that exploration and 
exploitation should not be too close nor too far from each other. If exploration follows too close 
from exploitation, exploration may not be aligned with previous activities. Similarly, if exploration 
follows too distanced from exploitation, a window of opportunity might be loss. This study adds to 
these findings by analyzing the genesis of ambidextrous orientation at the startup level and 
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suggests that the sooner a family startup can embrace both explorative and exploitative 
capabilities by embracing both orientations simultaneously; the firm will be less likely to take too 
long or too little between an exploration or exploitation attempt. This, in turn, avoids over-
exploration or over-exploitation and increases likelihood of survival (March, 1991).  
Second, it was hypothesized that internal locus of control would predict survival hazards. Results 
showed that one unit increment in internal locus of control orientation had an effect of 10% -29% 
increments in the likelihood to survive. Results were robust for changes in the cutoff criteria. The 
more stringent the cutoff points the more the effect on survival hazards and the predicted validity 
of the model (28% more likely to survive for 20th cutoff criterion versus 10% more likely to survive 
for 50th cutoff point criterion).  
Implications for practitioners include the importance of internal locus of control of the main 
founders in order to reduce survival hazards. Interventions aimed to improve the main founders’ 
internal locus of control may include training programs aimed to improve their skills and abilities, 
access to social capital through association with the private and public sector, or providing 
incentives to startup business in the form of access to loans or tax incentives. 
Finally, these findings extend research by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) in large public family 
businesses to family startups. Methodologically, a Cox’s proportional hazard analysis needs to 
meet the assumption that the sample contains firms with equal probability of survival. Gomez-
Mejia et al. (2007) used this statistical technique, considering performance hazards as the 
probability of failure in established firms. Generalizing these conclusions to startups can be 
problematic because startups are less likely to survive than established firms. In order to extend 
Gomez-Mejia et al.’s findings while meeting the assumption of the Proportional Hazards in Cox 
Regression, a sample of family startups was selected  from a harmonized database, which 
provided equal opportunity for selecting startups that all met the same criteria for inclusion in the 
sample (see Reynolds and Curtin, 2011 for harmonizing procedure). This harmonization assures 
that all firms in the selected sample meet the assumption of proportional hazard in the sample. 
 
 110 
 
 
In all, this study provides a framework in which ambidextrous orientation and survival hazards can 
be influenced by the social context of family ties and the presence of certain psychological traits 
of the main founder, such as achievement motivation and internal locus of control. 
Limitation of the study and Future Research 
One major limitation of this study is the lack of available data to measure Regulatory focus. This 
study is based on inferences of Regulatory Focus Theory about the relationship between 
psychological traits of the main founders (e.g. achievement motivation and internal locus of 
control) and promotion regulation focus. However there is no operationalization of promotion 
regulation focus. Further studies may test for this relationship in order to understand the extent 
that these psychological traits drive a chronic promotion regulation focus. Future studies can 
address not only the extent of association with regulatory focus, but also causality by using 
longitudinal data.  
Similarly, this study lacks data to measure preventive regulatory focus. Further studies can 
incorporate a specific measure of preventive regulation focus, which can be related to the 
presence or absence of family ties.  
It is also possible that SEW can be present among founders non family related. For example a 
longtime friendship can also introduce SEW, such as identification, belongingness, control and 
altruism. Therefore, a validated measure of SEW could help to measure more accurately the non-
economic benefits embedded in family relationships. In the absence of such measures, this study 
used family ties presence as a proxy for SEW assuming SEW to be greater in families versus 
lone founder startups.   
Another limitation is the lack of data distinguishing risk propensities from risk perceptions. It was 
assumed that risk propensities stem from a chronic regulation focus, and that risk perception 
stems from situational regulation focus. Although these findings are supported by literature on 
decision making (e.g. Sitkin & Weingart, 1995) these relationships could be tested in future 
research in order to improve the predictive power of the model.  Furthermore, an interesting study 
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could be performed by measuring risk propensities and risk perceptions applying Sitkin and 
Pablo’s (1991) model for explorative orientation. These risk propensities and risk perceptions can 
be used to draw a more fine-grained model about the relationship of regulatory foci with risk 
perceptions and risk propensities.  
This study considered the adding of standardized values of explorative and exploitative 
orientation as the best index for ambidextrous orientation. This index has been suggested by 
Lubatkin et al. (2006) as the recommended index for Ambidexterity.  The combination of this 
index was also compared to the classical view of ambidexterity by He and Wong (2004) 
stemming from being high in both exploration and exploitation. The results of this alternative 
operationalization suggested similar findings as predicted in this study, adding to the robustness 
of this study’s findings.  
Future studies can use different operationalization of exploitative orientation. In the current study 
exploitation was related to activities that relates to exploiting current resources such as sales, 
promotions and product development. Nevertheless, PSED II items didn’t include items related to 
quality of the product and cost efficiencies which have been used in scales related to the 
exploitation construct (e.g. Beckman, 2006). Although it is recognized that the conclusions in this 
studies are limited to the design and content of PSED II items, this limitations are probably 
compensated by the benefits of studying this unique and large database at the startup level.  
Entrepreneurial alertness (Kirzner, 1973) has been related to both achievement motivation and 
internal locus of control orientation (Tang, 2009). In the present database, Entrepreneurial 
alertness was not measured. However, it would be interesting to test whether entrepreneurial 
alertness has a direct effect on explorative orientation. Future studies can control for this variable 
to test if the effect of both achievement motivation and internal locus of control orientation still 
hold after controlling for the level of Entrepreneurial Alertness. 
Finally, further studies can compare family startups including family and non-family members, 
with startups including only non-family members in terms of an SEW scale continuum rather than 
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a dichotomous variables.  The presence of SEW that lone founders have in relation to other 
family members who are not participating directly in the business may affect explorative and 
ambidextrous orientations.  Future studies can incorporate these variables once a validated 
measure of SEW is available. However, in the absence of this measure, this study provides a 
reasonable explanation of how the presence or absence of family ties affects explorative 
orientation and ambidexterity after controlling for alternative explanations. 
   
 113 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Agresti, A. (1990). Categorical data analysis. New York: Wiley.  
Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., & Levine, D. I. (1999). Flexibility versus efficiency? A case study of 
model changeovers in the Toyota production system. Organization Science, 10(1), 43-68. 
Ahmed, S. U. (1985). nAch, risk-taking propensity, locus of control and entrepreneurship. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 6(6), 781-782. 
Allinson, C. W., Chell, E., & Hayes, J. (2000). Intuition and entrepreneurial behaviour. European 
Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 9(1), 31-43. 
 
Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation (p. 40). New York: Henry Holt. 
Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. (1997). The exploration of technological diversity and geographic 
localization in innovation: Start-up firms in the semiconductor industry. Small Business 
Economics, 9(1), 21-31. 
Amabile, T., & Amabile, T. M. (1983). The social psychology of creativity (Vol. 11). New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Ancona, D. G., Goodman, P. S., Lawrence, B. S., & Tushman, M. L. (2001). Time: A new 
research lens. The Academy of Management Review, 26(4), 645-663. 
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding‐family ownership and firm performance: 
evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-1327. 
Andriopoulos, C., M. Lewis. 2009. Exploitation-exploration tensions and organizational 
ambidexterity: Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization Science, 20(4) 696–717. 
Arkes, H. R., & Blumer, C. (1985). The psychology of sunk cost. Organizational behavior and 
human decision processes, 35(1), 124-140. 
 
Asch, S. E. (1952). Social psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Astrachan, J. H., Zahra, S. A., & Sharma, P. (2003). Family-sponsored ventures. Kansas, MO: 
Kauffman Foundation. 
Atkinson, J. W. (1964). An introduction to achievement motivation. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrad. 
Audretsch, D. B. (1995). Innovation, growth and survival. International journal of industrial 
organization, 13(4), 441-457. 
Babb, E. M., & Babb, S. V. (1992). Psychological traits of rural entrepreneurs. Journal of Socio-
Economics, 21, 353–362. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Prentice-
Hall, Inc. 
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing across borders: The transnational solution. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press.  
Baron RA, Shane S. (2008). Entrepreneurship: A Process Perspective (2nd edn.). Southwestern 
Thomson:Cincinnati, OH. 
 114 
 
 
Baron, R. A. (2006). Opportunity Recognition as Pattern Recognition: How Entrepreneurs" 
Connect the Dots" to Identify New Business Opportunities. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 20(1), 104-119. 
 
Baron, R. A. (2004). Potential benefits of the cognitive perspective: expanding entrepreneurship's 
array of conceptual tools. Journal of Business Venturing, 19(2), 169-172. 
Barringer, B. R., & Bluedorn, A. C. (1999). The relationship between corporate entrepreneurship 
and strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 20, 421–444. 
Bateson, N. (1966). Familiarization, group discussion, and risk taking. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 2(2), 119-129. 
Bazerman, M.H. (2001). The study of “real” decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 14(5), 353–384. 
Beach, L.R., & Connolly, T. (2005). The psychology of decision making: People in organizations 
(2nd edn.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Beckman, C. M. (2006). The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm behavior. 
Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 741-758. 
Begley, T. M. (1995). Using founder status, age of firm, and company growth rate as the basis for 
distinguishing entrepreneurs form managers of smaller businesses. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 10, 249–263. 
Begley, T. M., & Boyd, D. P. (1987). A comparison of entrepreneurs and managers of small 
business firms. Journal of Management, 13, 99–108. 
Benner, M. J., & Tushman, M. L. (2003). Exploitation, exploration, and process management: The 
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review, 2: 238-256. 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L. (2012). Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms: 
Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future Research. Family 
Bussiness Review. 
Block, J., & Wagner, M. (2010). Necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs in Germany: 
characteristics and earnings differentials. Schmalenbach Business Review, 62, 154-174. 
Boekaerts, M., Maes, S., & Karoly, P. (2005). Self‐Regulation Across Domains of Applied 
Psychology: Is there an Emerging Consensus? Applied Psychology, 54(2), 149-154. 
Bouchikhi, H. (1998). Living with and building on complexity: a constructivist perspective on 
organizations. Organization, 5(2), 217-232. 
Bowman, E. H. (1980). A risk/return paradox for strategic management. Sloan Management 
Review, 21: 17-31. 
Brittain, J. W., & John, H. Freeman (1980). Organizational proliferation and density dependent 
selection. The Organizational Life Cycle, 291-338. 
Brockhaus, R. H. (1975). Recycling the unsuccessful technical entrepreneur. In Proceedings of 
the International Symposium on Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development (pp. 79-84). 
Brockhaus, R. H. (1980). Risk taking propensity of entrepreneurs. Academy of Management 
Journal, 23, 509–520. 
 115 
 
 
Brockhaus, R. H., & Horwitz, P. S. (1986). The psychology of the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship: 
critical perspectives on business and management, 2, 260-283. 
Brockner J, Higgins ET, Low MB. (2004). Regulatory focus theory and the entrepreneurial 
process. Journal of Business Venturing 19(2): 203–220. 
Brockner, J. (1992). The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action: Toward 
theoretical progress. Academy of Management Review, 39-61. 
Brockner, J., & Rubin, J. Z. (1985). Entrapment in escalating conflicts: A social psychological 
analysis. New York: Springer-Verlag.  
Bromiley, P. (1991). Testing a causal model of corporate risk taking and performance. Academy 
of Management Journal, 34: 37-59. 
Brown, R. (1965). Social psychology. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
Bryant, P., & Dunford, R. (2008). The influence of regulatory focus on risky decision-making. 
Applied Psychology: An International Review, 57: 335-359. 
Burgelman, R. A. (2002). Strategy as vector and the inertia of co-evolutionary lock-in. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 325-357. 
Busenitz, L., & Barney, J. (1997). Differences between entrepreneurs and managers in large 
organizations: Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making. Journal of Business Venturing, 
12: 9-30. 
Busenitz, L., & Lau, C. (1996). A cross-cultural cognitive model of new venture creation. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 20 (4), 25–39. 
Cacioppo, J. T., Priester, J. R., & Berntson, G. G. (1993). Rudimentary determinants of attitudes: 
II. Arm flexion and extension have differential effects on attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 65, 5-17.  
 
Camerer, C. F., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Behavioral economics: Past, present, future. 
Advances in behavioral economics, 3-51. 
Cantor, J. H. (1976). Individual needs and salient constructs in interpersonal perception. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 519-525. 
Carsrud, A. (2012). Understanding family businesses (Vol. 15). Springer Science Business 
Media. 
Castrogiovanni, G. (1991), “Environmental munificence: a theoretical assessment”. Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 542-65. 
Chakrabarty, S. (2009). The influence of national culture and institutional voids on family 
ownership of large firms: A country level empirical study. Journal of International Management, 
15(1), 32-45. 
Chen, C. C., Greene, P. G., & Crick, A. (1998). Does entrepreneurial self-efficacy distinguish 
entrepreneurs from managers? Journal of Business Venturing, 13(4), 295-316. 
Choi, Y.B., (1993), Paradigms and Conventions: Uncertainty, Decision Making and 
Entrepreneurship. University of Michigan Press. 
 116 
 
 
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Sharma, P. (2005). Trends and directions in the development of a 
strategic management theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(5), 
555–575. 
Collins, C. J., Hanges, P. J., & Locke, E. A. (2004). The relationship of achievement motivation to 
entrepreneurial behavior: A meta-analysis. Human Performance, 17(1), 95-117. 
Cooley, C. (1902). Human nature and the social order. NY: Schreiber. 
Cooper, A. C., Folta, T. B., & Woo, C. (1995). Entrepreneurial information search. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 10: 107–120. 
Cooper, A. C., Woo, C. Y., & Dunkelberg, W. C. (1988). Entrepreneurs' perceived chances for 
success. Journal of Business Venturing, 3(2), 97-108. 
Cottrell, T., & Nault, B. R. (2004). Product variety and firm survival in the microcomputer software 
industry. Strategic Management Journal, 25(10), 1005-1025. 
Crowe, E.B., & Higgins, E.T. (1997). Regulatory focus and strategic inclinations: Promotion and 
prevention in decision-making. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 69(2), 
117–132. 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1964). The approval motive: Studies in evaluative dependence (p. 
27). New York: Wiley. 
Das,T. K. & Teng,B. S. (1997).Time and entrepreneurial risk behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory 
and Practice, 22(2), 69-88. 
De Carolis, D.M. & Saparito, P. (2006). Social capital, cognition, and entrepreneurial 
opportunities: Atheoretical framework. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 41–56. 
Dempster, A. P., Laird, N. M., & Rubin, D. B. (1977). Maximum likelihood from incomplete data 
via the EM algorithm. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 1-38. 
Denison, D. R., Hooijberg, R., & Quinn, R. E. (1995). Paradox and performance: Toward a theory 
of behavioral complexity in managerial leadership. Organization Science, 6(5), 524-540. 
Dess, G. G., & Beard, D. W. (1984). Dimensions of organizational task environments. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 52-73. 
Down, A. (1967). Inside Bureaucracy, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.  
 
Duncan, R. B. (1976). The ambidextrous organization: Designing dual structures for innovation. 
The management of organization,1,167-188. 
Durand, D., & Shea, D. (1974). Entrepreneurial activity as a function of achievement motivation 
and reinforcement control. The Journal of Psychology, 88(1), 57-63. 
Earley, P. C., & Gibson, C. B. (2002). Multinational work teams: A new perspective. Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
Edwards, J. R. (1994). The study of congruence in organizational behavior research: Critique and 
a proposed alternative. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58: 51-100.  
 
 117 
 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: what are they?. Strategic 
management journal, 21(10-11), 1105-1121. 
Ensley, M. D., & Pearson, A. W. (2005). An exploratory comparison of the behavioral dynamics of 
top management teams in family and non-family new ventures: Cohesion, conflict, potency, and 
consensus, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 267–284. 
Feather, N. T. (1982). Expectations and actions: Expectancy-value models in psychology. 
Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. Inc. 
Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. Psychological Review, 57, 271–282. 
Fiegenbaum, A. (1990). Prospect theory and the risk-return association: An empirical examination 
in 85 industries. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 14(2), 187-203. 
Fiet, J.O. (1996). The informational basis of entrepreneurial discovery. Small Business 
Economics, 8, 419–430. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition. Mcgraw-Hill Book Company.  
Floyd, S. W., & Lane, P. J. (2000). Strategizing throughout the organization: Managing role 
conflict in strategic renewal. Academy of Management Review, 154-177. 
Forlani, D., & Mullins, J. W. (2000). Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture 
decisions. Journal of Business Venturing, 15(4), 305-322. 
Förster, J., Higgins, E. T., & Idson, L. C. (1998). Approach and avoidance strength during goal 
attainment: regulatory focus and the" goal looms larger" effect. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 75(5), 1115. 
Förster, J., Higgins, E.T., & Bianco, A.T. (2003). Speed/accuracy decisions in task performance: 
Built-in trade-off or separate strategic concerns? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 90(1), 148–164. 
Fraboni, M., & Saltstone, R. (1990). First and second generation entrepreneur typologies: 
Dimensions of personality. Journal of Social Behavior & Personality. 
Friedman, R. S., & Foerster, J. (2001). The effects of promotion and prevention cues on 
creativity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1001–1013. 
Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. (2001). The effects of promotion and prevention cues on creativity. 
Journal of Personality and social Psychology, 81(6), 1001. 
Gaglio, C. M., & Katz, J. (2001). The psychological basis of opportunity identification: 
Entrepreneurial alertness. Journal of Small Business Economics, 12(2): 95-111. 
Gartner, W.B., (1985). A conceptual framework for describing the phenomenon of new venture 
creation. Academy of Management Review. 10, 696–706. 
Geroski, P. A. (1995). What do we know about entry? International Journal of Industrial 
Organization, 13(4), 421-440. 
Gibson, B., & Sanbonmatsu, D. M. (2004). Optimism, pessimism, and gambling: The downside of 
optimism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(2), 149-160. 
 118 
 
 
Gibson, C., & Birkinshaw, J. (2004). The antecedents, consequences, and mediating role of 
organizational ambidexterity. Academy of Management Journal, 47(2): 209-226.  
Gnyawali, D. and Fogel, D. (1994), “Environments for entrepreneurship development: key 
dimensions and research implications”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 
43-63. 
Glover, J. A. (1977). Risky shift and creativity. Social Behavior and Personality: an international 
journal, 5(2), 317-320. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J. (2011). The bind that ties: 
Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms. The Academy of Management Annals, 5(1), 
653-707. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Nunez Nickel, and I. Gutierrez (2001). "The role of family ties in agency 
contracts." Academy of Management Journal, 44: 81-95. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010). Diversification decisions in family-
controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47: 223– 252. 
Gomez-Mejia, L., Haynes, K., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. and Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). 
‘Socio-emotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish 
olive oil mills’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52,106-137. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). Factor analysis (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Grant, H., & Higgins, E. T. (2003). Optimism, promotion pride, and prevention pride as predictors 
of quality of life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(12), 1521-1532. 
Gresov, C., & Drazin, R. (1997). Equifinality: Functional equivalence in organization design. 
Academy of Management Review, 403-428. 
Guilford, J. P. (1946). New standards for test evaluation. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 6, 427-439. 
Habbershon, T. and Williams, M., (1999), A resource-based framework for assessing the 
strategic advantage of family firms. Family Business Review, 12, 1–25.  
Hambrick, D.C., Crozier, L. (1985), Stumblers and stars in the management of rapid growth. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 1 (1) pp. 31–45. 
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change. American 
Sociological Review, 49: 149-164. 
Hansemark, O. C. (2003). Need for achievement, locus of control and the prediction of business 
start-ups: A longitudinal study. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(3), 301-319. 
 
Hardin, CD., & Higgins, E. T. (1996). Shared reality: How social verification makes the subjective 
objective. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: The 
interpersonal context (Vol. 3, pp. 28-84). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review, 35, 519–530. 
Hayes, J. P. (1989). Altitudinal and seasonal effects on aerobic metabolism of deer mice. Journal 
of Comparative Physiology B: Biochemical, Systemic, and Environmental Physiology, 159(4), 
453-459. 
 119 
 
 
Hayton, J. C., Allen, D. G., & Scarpello, V. (2004). Factor retention decisions in exploratory factor 
analysis: A tutorial on parallel analysis. Organizational research methods, 7(2), 191-205. 
He, Z. L., & Wong, P. K. (2004). Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the 
ambidexterity hypothesis. Organization Science, 15: 481-494. 
Henderson, R. (1993). Underinvestment and incompetence as responses to radical innovation: 
Evidence from the photolithographic alignment equipment industry. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 248-270. 
Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280–1300. 
Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as a motivational principle. In 
M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 1-41). San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
Higgins, E. T., & King, G (1981). Accessibility of social constructs: Information processing 
consequences of individual and contextual variability. In N. Cantor & J. F. Kihlstrom (Eds.), 
Personality, cognition and social interaction. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.  
Higgins, E. T., King, G., & Marvin, G. H. (1982) Individual construct accessibility and subjective 
impressions scale. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 35-47. 
Higgins, E.T. (2000). Making a good decision: Value from fit. American Psychologist, 55, 1217–
1230. 
Higgins, E.T. (2002). How self-regulation creates distinct values: The case of promotion and 
prevention decision making. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12(3), 177–191. 
Higgins, E.T., & Silberman, I. (1998). Development of regulatory focus: Promotion and prevention 
as ways of living. In J. Heckhausen & C.S. Dweck (Eds.), Motivation and self-regulation across 
the life span (pp. 78–113). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Higgins, E.T., Friedman, R.S., Harlow, R.E., Idson, L.C., Ayduk, O.N., & Taylor, A. (2001). 
Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success: Promotion pride versus prevention 
pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 3–23. 
Hills, G. E., Lumpkin, G. T., & Singh, R. P. (1997). Opportunity recognition: Perceptions and 
behaviors of entrepreneurs. Frontiers of entrepreneurship research, 17, 168-182. 
Hmieleski, K. M., & Baron, R. A. (2009). Entrepreneurs' optimism and new venture performance: 
A social cognitive perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 52(3), 473-488. 
Hmieleski, K. M., & Baron, R. A. (2008). Regulatory focus and new venture performance: A study 
of entrepreneurial opportunity exploitation under conditions of risk versus uncertainty. Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal, 2(4), 285-299. 
Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup 
relations and group processes. London: Routledge. 
Holland, J. L. (1985). Making vocational choices. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Holmqvist, M. (2004). Experiential learning processes of exploitation and exploration within and 
between organizations: An empirical study of product development. Organization Science, 15: 70-
81. 
 120 
 
 
Hull, D. L., Bosley, J. J., & Udell, G. G. (1980). Renewing the hunt for the heffalump: Identifying 
potential entrepreneurs by personality characteristics. Journal of Small Business, 18(1), 11-18. 
Jegers, M. (1991). Prospect theory and the risk-return relation: Some Belgian evidence. Academy 
of Management Journal, 34: 215-225. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Johnson, B. R. (1990). Toward a multidimensional model of entrepreneurship: The case of 
achievement motivation and the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39–54. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292. 
Kaish, S., & Gilad, B. (1991). Characteristics of opportunities search of entrepreneurs versus 
executives: Sources, interests, general alertness. Journal of Business Venturing, 6(1), 45-61. 
Katila, R., & Ahuja, G (2002). Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 1183-1194. 
Keh, H.T., Foo, M.D., & Lim, B. (2002). Opportunity evaluation under risky conditions: The 
cognitive processes of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(2), 125–148. 
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. (1993), The dynamics of family controlled firms: the good and the bad 
news. Organizational Dynamics, 21, 59–71.  
Kelly, G.A. (1955). The Psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton. 
Kirzner, I. (1973), Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y. W. (1987). Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis 
testing. Psychological review, 94(2), 211. 
Klein, J. I. (1990). Feasibility theory: A resource-munificence model of work motivation and 
behavior. Academy of Management Review, 646-665. 
Kluger, A.N., Stephan, E., Ganzach, Y., & Hershkovitz, M. (2004). The effect of regulatory focus 
on the shape of probability-weighting function: Evidence from a cross-modality matching method. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 95(1), 20–39. 
Knaup, A. E. (2005). Survival and longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics data. Monthly 
Lab. Rev., 128, 50. 
Knight, D., Pearce, C. L., Smith, K. G., Olian, J. D., Sims, H. P., Smith, K. A., & Flood, P. (1999). 
Top management team diversity, group process, and strategic consensus. Strategic Management 
Journal, 20, 445–465. 
Koot, W. C. J., Sabelis, I., & Ybema, S. (1996). Contradictions in context: Puzzling over 
paradoxes in contemporary organizations. VU University Press. 
Korunka, C., Frank, H., Lueger, M. and Mugler, J. (2003), The entrepreneurial personality in the 
context of resources, environment, and the startup process – a configurational approach. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 23-43. 
 121 
 
 
Kroeck, K.G., P.D. Reynolds and A. Bullough. 2005. Cognitive Aspects of Entrepreneurship 
Revisited: Differences in Locus of Control (paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Academy of Management, Honolulu). 
Lee, J., Lee, L., & Lee, H. (2003). Exploration and exploitation in the presence of network 
externalities. Management Science, 49: 553-570. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1995). Wellspring of knowledge. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
MA. 
Levine, J. M., Higgins, E. T., & Choi, H. S. (2000). Development of strategic norms in groups. 
Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 82(1), 88-101. 
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic management journal, 
14(S2), 95-112. 
Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual review of sociology, 319-340. 
Lewin, K. (1931). Environmental forces in child behavior and development. In C. Murchison (Ed.), 
A handbook of child psychology. Worcester, MA: Clark Univ. Press. 
Lewin, K. (1935). A dynamic theory of personality. New York. McGraw-Hill. 
Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festinger, L., & Sears, P. S. (1944). Level of aspiration. In J.McV. 
Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the behavior disorder (Vol. 1, pp. 333-378). New York: Ronald Press. 
Lewis, M. W. (2000). Exploring paradox: Toward a more comprehensive guide. Academy of 
Management Review, 760-776. 
Liberman, N., Idson, L.C., Camacho, C.J., Higgins, E.T., (1999). Promotion and prevention 
choices between stability and change. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77, 1135–1145. 
Liles, P. R. (1974). New business ventures and the entrepreneur. RD Irwin. 
Low, M., & MacMillan, I. (1988). Entrepreneurship: Past research and future challenges. Journal 
of Management, 14: 139-161. 
Lubatkin, M. H., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., & Veiga, J. F. (2006). Ambidexterity and performance in 
small-to medium-sized firms: The pivotal role of top management team behavioral integration. 
Journal of Management, 32(5), 646-672. 
MacCrimmon, K. R., & Wehrung, D. A. (1986a). Taking risks: The management of uncertainty. 
New York: Free Press.  
MacCrimmon, K. R., & Wehrung, D. A. (1986b). Assessing risk propensity. In L. Daboni, A. Mon-
tesano, & M. Lines (Eds.), Recent developments in the foundations of utility and risk theory, 291-
309. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Press.  
McGrath, R. G. 2001. Exploratory learning, innovative capacity, and managerial oversight. 
Academy of Management Journal, 44: 118-131.  
March, J. G. (1988). Variable risk preferences and adaptive aspirations. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 9(1), 5-24. 
 122 
 
 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization Science, 
2(1), 71-87. 
March, J. G., & Shapira, Z. (1987). Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking. Management 
Science, 33: 1404- 1418. 
McClelland DC, Atkinson JW, Clark RA, Lowell EL. (1953). The Achievement Motive. Appleton-
Century-Crofts: New York. 
McClelland, D. C. (1951). Measuring motivation in phantasy: the achievement motive. 
McClelland, D. C. (1961). The achieving society. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. 
McClelland, D. C. (1965). Toward a theory of motive acquisition. American Psychologist, 20, 321–
333. 
McClelland, D. C. (1990). Human motivation. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressMcGrath, 
R. G. 2001. Exploratory learning, innovative capacity, and managerial oversight. Academy of 
Management Journal, 44: 118-131. 
McClelland, D. C., & Friedman, G. A. (1952). A cross-cultural study of the relationship between 
child-training practices and achievement motivation appearing in folk tales. Readings in social 
psychology. New York: Holt, 243-249. 
McClelland, D. C., Clark, R. A., Roby, T. B., & Atkinson, J. W. (1958). The effect of the need for 
achievement on thematic apperception. In J.W. Atkinson (Ed.), Motives in fantasy, action and 
society (pp. 64–82). Princeton, NJ: Van Norstrand.  
Mead, G. H. (1956). The social psychology of George Herbert Mead. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago 
Press. 
Menard, S. (1995), Applied Logistic Regression Analysis. Sage University Paper Series on 
Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.  
Mescon, T. S., & Monanari, J. R. (1981). The personalities of independent and franchise 
entrepreneurs: An empirical analysis of concept. Journal of Enterprise Management, 3(2), 149–
159.  
Miles R, Snow C. (1978). Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process. McGraw-Hill: New 
York. 
Miller, D., Kets de Vries, M. F. R., & Toulouse, J. M. (1982) Top executive locus of control and its 
relationship to strategy-making, structure and environment. Academy of Management Journal, 
25, 237-253.  
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R. H., & Cannella Jr, A. A. (2007). Are family firms really 
superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(5), 829-858. 
Miller, N. E. Experimental studies of conflict (1944). In J. McV. Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the 
behavior disorders. New York: Ronald Press. Pp. 431-465. 
Miller, N. E. (1959). Liberalization of basic S-R concepts: Extensions to Conflict Behavior, 
Motivation, and Social Learning. McGraw Hill Company. 
 123 
 
 
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. 
Psychological review, 80(4), 252. 
Mischel, W. (1981). Metacognition and the rules of delay. In J. H. Flavell & L. Ross (Eds.), Social 
cognitive development: Frontiers and possible future, 240. 
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: 
Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. 
Psychological Review, 102(2), 246–268. 
Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1998). Reconciling processing dynamics and personality dispositions. 
Annual review of psychology, 49(1), 229-258. 
Morgeson, F. P., & Hofmann, D. A. (1999). The structure and function of collective constructs: 
Implications for multilevel research and theory development. Academy of Management Review, 
24: 249-265.  
Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change. New York: Academic Press. 
Murray, H. A. (1938). Explorations in personality: A clinical and experimental study of fifty men of 
college age (Vol. 2609). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Northcraft, G. B., &W olf, G. (1984). Dollars, sense, and sunk costs: A life-cycle model of 
resource allocation decisions. Academy of Management Review, 9: 225-234.  
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric theory (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw- 
O Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. (2004). The ambidextrous organization. Harvard Business 
Review, 82(4), 74-83. 
Osborn, R. N., & Jackson, D. H. (1988). Leaders, riverboat gamblers, or purposeful unintended 
consequences in the management of complex, dangerous technologies. Academy of 
Management Journal, 924-947. 
Pandey, J., & Tewary, N. B. (2011). Locus of control and achievement values of entrepreneurs. 
Journal of Occupational Psychology, 52(2), 107-111. 
Patel, P. C., & Fiet, J. O. (2009). Systematic search and its relationship to firm founding. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(2), 501-526. 
Paulhus, D. (1983). Sphere-specific measures of perceived control. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 44(6), 1253. 
Paulhus, D. L., & Van Selst, M. (1990). The spheres of control scale: 10 years of research. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 11(10), 1029-1036. 
Pedhazur, E. (1982). Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research. Fort Worth, TX: 
Pennington, G., & Roese, N. (2003). Regulatory focus and temporal distance. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 563–576. 
 124 
 
 
Peretti, F., & Negro, G. (2006). Filling empty seats: How status and organizational hierarchies 
affect exploration versus exploitation in team design. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4): 
759-777.  
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Piao, M. (2010). Thriving in the New: Implication of Exploration on Organizational Longevity. 
Journal of Management, 36(6), 1529-1554. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 88, 879-903. 
Probst, G., & Raisch, S. (2005). Organizational crisis: The logic of failure. The Academy of 
Management Executive, 19(1), 90-105. 
Raisch, S., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Organizational ambidexterity: Antecedents, outcomes, and 
moderators. Journal of Management, 34(3), 375-409. 
Randolph, W. A., & Dess, G. G. (1984). The congruence perspective of organization design: A 
conceptual model and multivariate research approach. Academy of Management Review, 9: 114-
127. 
Reynolds, P. D., & Curtin, R. T. (2011). PSED I, II Harmonized Transitions, Outcomes Data Set. 
Reynolds, P. D., & Curtin, R. T. (Eds.). (2009). New firm creation in the United States: Initial 
explorations with the PSED II data set (Vol. 731). Springer. 
Reynolds, P. D.,Camp, S. M., Bygrave, W. D., Autio, E. and M. Hay. (2002), Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor. 2001 Executive Report, Babson College, London Business School. 
Reynolds, P., & Curtin, R. (2008). Business creation in the United States: Panel study of 
entrepreneurial dynamics II initial assessment. Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, 
4(3), 155-307. 
Rim, Y. (1963). “Risk-Taking and Need for Achievement," Acta Psychologica 21, 108-115. 
Roberts, E. B. (1989). The personality and motivations of technological entrepreneurs. Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management, 6(1), 5-23. 
Rotter, J. B. (1954). Social learning and clinical psychology. 
Rotter, J. B. (1955). The role of the psychological situation in determining the direction of human 
behavior. 
Rotter, J. B. (1960). Some implications of a social learning theory for the prediction of goal 
directed behavior from testing procedures. Psychological Review, 67(5), 301. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of 
reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (Whole No. 609). 
Schumpeter, J. (1931). The present world depression: a tentative diagnosis. The American 
Economic Review, 179-182. 
 125 
 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1961). The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, 
credit, interest, and the business cycle. Transl. from the German by Redvers Opie. Harvard 
University Press. 
Schwartz, H. (2002). Herbert Simon and behavioral economics. Journal of Socio- Economics, 31, 
181–189. 
Shah, J., Higgins, E. T., & Friedman, R. S. (1998). Performance incentives and means: How 
regulatory focus influences goal attainment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 
285–293. 
Shane, S. (2000). Prior knowledge and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Organization science, 11(4), 448-469. 
Shane, S. A. (2003). A general theory of entrepreneurship: The individual-opportunity nexus. 
Edward Elgar Pub. 
Shane, S., & Venkataraman, S. (2000). The promise of entrepreneurship as a field of research. 
Academy of management review, 217-226. 
Shapero, A. (1975). The displaced, uncomfortable entrepreneur. Psychology Today, November, 
83-86.  
Shaver, K. G., & Scott, L. R. (1991). Person, process, and choice: The psychology of new venture 
creation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Winter: 23-42. 
Sherif, M. (1937). The psychology of social norms. New York: Harper. 
Shrauger, S., & Altrocchi, J. (1964). The personality of the perceiver as a factor in person 
perception. Psychological Bulletin, 62(5), 289. 
Siggelkow, N., & Levinthal, D. A. (2003). Temporarily divide to conquer: Centralized, 
decentralized, and re integrated organizational approaches to exploration and adaptation. 
Organization Science, 14: 650-669.  
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational thought. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
69:99-118. 
Simon, H.A. (1979). Information processing models of cognitions. Annual Review of Psychology 
30:363-396. 
Sinha, T. (1994). Prospect theory and the risk return association: Another look. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 24: 225-231. 
Sitkin, S.B., & Pablo, A.L. (1992). Reconceptualizing the determinants of risk behavior. Academy 
of Management Review, 17(1), 9–38. 
Sitkin, S.B., & Weingart, L.R. (1995). Determinants of risky decision-making behavior: A test of 
the mediating role of risk perceptions and propensity. Academy of Management Journal, 38(6), 
1573–1592. 
Slovic, P. (2000a). Introduction and overview. In P. Slovic (Ed.), The perception of risk (pp. xxi–
xxxvi). London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan. 
 126 
 
 
Spiegel, S., Grant‐Pillow, H., & Higgins, E. T. (2004). How regulatory fit enhances motivational 
strength during goal pursuit. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34(1), 39-54. 
Staw, B. M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course of action. Academy of 
Management Review, 6: 577-587.  
Staw, B. M., & Szwajkowski, E. (1975). The scarcity-munificence component of organizational 
environments and the commission of illegal acts. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20: 345-354. 
Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L. E., & Dutton, J. E. (1981). Threat rigidity effects in organizational 
behavior: A multilevel analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 501-524. 
Sternberg, Rolf, Udo Brixy, and Jan-Florian Schlapfner (2006), Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 
Länderbericht Deutschland 2005, Hanover/Bonn: University of Hanover and IAB.  
Stevenson, H.H., Gumpert, D.E. (1985) The heart of entrepreneurship. Harvard Business Review, 
63 (2) pp. 85–94 
Stevenson, H.H., Roberts, M.J., Grousbeck, H.I., (1985). New Business Ventures and the 
Entrepreneur. Irwin, Homewood, IL. 
Stoner, J. A. F. (1961). A comparison of individual and group decisions involving risk (Doctoral 
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
Stoner, J. A. (1968). Risky and cautious shifts in group decisions: The influence of widely held 
values. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4(4), 442-459. 
Tagiuri, R. (1969). Person perception. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social 
psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 3, pp. 395-449). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Tajfel, H.& Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. Ins. Worchel & 
W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
Tang, J. (2009). Exploring the constitution of entrepreneurial alertness: The regulatory focus view. 
Journal of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 22(3), 221. 
Tanner, W. P., & Swets, J. A. (1954). A decision making theory of visual detection. Psychological 
Review, 61, 285-293. 
Teece, D. J. (2006). Reflections on “profiting from innovation”. Research Policy, 35(8), 1131-
1146. 
Teger, A. (1980). Too much invested to quit. New York: Pergamon Press.  
Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization, 1: 39-60. 
Thaler, R. H., & Johnson, E. J. (1990). Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: 
The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice. Management science, 36(6), 643-660. 
Thompson, B., & Daniel, L. G. (1996). Factor analytic evidence for the construct validity of scores: 
A historical overview and some guidelines. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 56, 
197-208. 
Thomsen, S., Pedersen, T. (2000). Ownership structure and economic performance in the 
largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 689-705. 
 127 
 
 
Trope, Y., & Liberman, A. (1996). Social hypothesis testing: Cognitive and motivational 
mechanisms. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic 
principles (pp. 239-270). New York: Guilford Press. 
Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. (1986). Technological discontinuities and organizational 
environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 439-465. 
Tushman, M. L., & O'Reilly, C. A. (1996). Winning through innovation: A practical guide to leading 
organizational change and renewal. Harvard Business Press. 
Tushman, M. L., & Romanelli, E. (1985). Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis model of 
convergence and reorientation. Research in organizational behavior. 
Tversky,  A.,  Kahneman, D (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 
185 pp. 1124–1131 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. 
Science, 211(January 30): 453-458. 
Van Dijk, D., & Kluger, A. N. (2004). Feedback sign effect on motivation: Is it moderated by 
regulatory focus? Applied Psychology: An International Review, 53: 113–135. 
Venkatapathy, R. (1984). Locus of control among entrepreneurs: a review. Psychological Studies, 
29(1), 97–100. 
Venkataraman, S. (1997), 'The Distinctive Domain of Entrepreneurship Research', in J. A. Katz 
(ed.), Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and Growth, Vol. 3, Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press, pp. 119-138. 
Wang, H., & Li, J. (2008). Untangling the effects of overexploration and overexploitation on 
organizational performance: the moderating role of environmental dynamism. Journal of 
Management, 34: 925-951  
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion. Psychological 
review, 92(4), 548. 
Wiseman, R. M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). A behavioral agency model of managerial risk 
taking. Academy of Management Review, 23(1), 133-153. Work and Organizational Psychology, 
9, 31–43. 
Woodman, R. W. (1981). Creativity as a construct in personality theory. The Journal of Creative 
Behavior, 15(1), 43-66. 
Woodman, R. W., & Schoenfeldt, L. F. (1990). An Interactionist Model of Creative Behavior. The 
Journal of Creative Behavior, 24(4), 279-290. 
Woodman, R. W., Sawyer, J. E., & Griffin, R. W. (1993). Toward a theory of organizational 
creativity. Academy of management review, 293-321. 
Wyer, R. S., & Srull, T. K. (1981). Category accessibility: Some theoretical and empirical issues 
concerning the processing of social stimulus information. In Social Cognition: The Ontario 
Symposium (Vol. 1, pp. 161-197). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Yu, T. F. (2001). ‘Entrepreneurial alertness and discovery’. Review of Austrian Economics, 14, 
47–63. 
 128 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendixes 1: Ambidexterity model based on He and Wong's (2004) classification of 
ambidexterity 
Variables      Model 3 
Controls 
Average industry experience in startup team     .993 (.376) 
Average startup experience in startup team   1.000 (.000) 
Munificence     .997 (.026) 
Net Household assets   1.000* (4.953) 
Business Code       1.000 (1.86) 
Independent Variables 
Family versus lone founder status 
Internal Locus of control   1.029*** (.343) 
Family versus lone founder status     .107*** (32.574) 
Interaction effects 
Internal Locus of Control and Family status .463** (6.45) 
-2 Log-likelihood 458.643*** 
Cox & Snell R Squared       .12 
Nagelkerke R Squared       .179 
Model Fit Chi squared   59.833*** 
Hosmer and Lemeshow p value      .844 
Percentage Predicted   76.2 
Note: The entries in the table are Odds ratio. Wald’s statistic in 
parenthesis. Results are based on a one-tailed test. P values based on 
1000 bootstrap samples. 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 Deletion list wise. N=470 
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